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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Utilising data on a sample of large US firms, I explore the relationship between corporate 
irresponsibility and reputation penalties. I find that reputation, derived from the assessments of 
managers and market analysts, is infrequently influenced by observations of corporate 
irresponsibility and that different ‘types’ of irresponsibility events have different underlying effects 
on perceptions of the firm. Specifically, my results demonstrate that variance within firms’ prior 
social responsibility perceptions, celebrity status, history of irresponsibility and financial 
performance ‘shape’ stakeholder attributions of irresponsibility and the subsequent reputation 
penalties associated with these. Moreover, the results of my empirical analysis suggest that 
reputations tend to be more resilient than previously purported by extant literature and that 
reputational assessments appear to be largely ‘path dependent’, in that stakeholders’ prior 
assessments of the firm may determine the impact of revelations of corporate irresponsibility.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of over 30 years’ worth of encouragement for firms to consider their broader social 
responsibilities, it seems that irresponsible conduct is no less frequent or severe than it has 
been historically. Cases of corruption (Enron, Siemens), fraud (WorldCom), exploitation (Nike), 
price fixing (Apple e-books), discrimination (Wal-Mart), human rights abuse (Rana Plaza), 
environmental damage (Deepwater Horizon) and negligence (sub-prime mortgage crisis) have 
come to dominate accounts of modern corporate activities in the media. News of corporate 
misconduct can place significant unwanted attention on a firm’s past and present business 
activities. In response to this, corporate irresponsibility is widely assumed by the academic and 
business community to be hazardous to reputations and therefore, worth avoiding. Fombrun, 
Gardberg and Barnett (2000: 87) warn of “impoverished revenues, decreased ability to attract 
financial capital, and reduced appeal to current and potential employees” resulting from the loss 
of firm reputation - whilst Warren Buffet, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, suggests 
that being mindful of potential sources of irresponsibility is imperative because “it takes twenty 
years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it” (Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011: 154). 
In light of this, the prevailing logic within the corporate reputation and social responsibility 
literature is that actual or potential reputation damage is a key mechanism by which firms are 
encouraged to be more responsible (Campbell, 2007). It is believed that organisations which 
violate laws or fail to act in accordance with stakeholder or societal expectations receive 
subsequent reputational diminishment from parties unsatisfied with their behaviour (De Blasio 
and Veale, 2009; Fombrun, Gardberg and Barnett, 2000; Gaultier-Gaillard and Louisot, 2006; 
Resnick, 2004). More specifically, if corporate irresponsibility occurs, preceding reputation 
damages are believed to translate into downstream performance deficiencies for the firms 
involved because unsatisfied stakeholders tend to change their behaviour towards those firms 
which behave objectionably (Firestein, 2006; Neufeld, 2007; Thießen, 2009).  
That being said, some of the world’s most esteemed corporations such as Apple, Google, 
Amazon and others, have been found to engage in various forms of social and/or environmental 
harm, yet retain the perception that they are reputable organisations with no obvious 
impediments to perform successfully. Congruently, firms consecutively listed by Fortune 
Magazine’s ‘World’s Most Admired Companies’ have all, with few exceptions, been associated 
with widely publicised acts of corporate irresponsibility. Such observations are puzzling when 
juxtaposed against the widely held assumption that reputations are fragile in some fundamental 
sense. Even so, the notion that reputations can be easily damaged appears to be largely 
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undisputed by the broader academic community. Minor and Morgan, (2011: 40) state that 
“reputation can be a fragile thing” whilst Scott and Walsham (2005: 312) note that reputation 
takes “time to create, cannot be brought and is easily damaged”. Furthermore, scholars such as 
Koronis and Ponis (2012: 283) have also characterised the reputation concept of a “fragile 
nature and complexity” with many others writing in a similarly assured confidence about 
organisational reputation (e.g., Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008; Eccles, Newquist and 
Schatz, 2007; Hayes and Patton, 2010; Raithel et al., 2010; Scandizzo, 2011; Sims, 2009). Yet 
the research supporting this position, to date, suffers from some significant limitations. First, 
most empirical research that purports to evaluate reputational penalties does not measure 
stakeholder perceptions of the firm’s misconduct - but rather proxies reputational effects with 
short-run stock price movements. Consequentially, a substantial proportion of the available 
empirical research is not about organisational reputation and thus only tangentially informs our 
understanding of reputational harm. Furthermore, extant research has yet to fully explore the 
underlying nature of acts of irresponsibility, its characteristics and how stakeholders interpret 
corporate irresponsibilities. In light of these issues, our understanding of when, how and to what 
extent stakeholders react adversely to news of corporate irresponsibility is therefore, mostly 
incomplete. 
This thesis contributes to increasing our understanding of the underlying processes by which 
acts of irresponsibility alter stakeholder perceptions of the firm, and how changes in stakeholder 
perceptions subsequently impact corporate reputations. Specifically, this empirical 
research evaluates the efficacy of discreet aspects of corporate misconduct by modelling 
irresponsibility as categorised by various typologies found in the literature on corporate 
reputation. Moreover, I examine how discreet aspects of observed corporate irresponsibility 
affect stakeholder perceptions of the firm. Further, this study conducts the first large-scale 
empirical exploration of Attribution Theory in the context of reputation penalties in order to 
unpack whether prior stakeholder knowledge and perceptions of the firm, including; corporate 
social responsibility, celebrity status, history of corporate irresponsibility and financial 
performance, influence reputational assessments of corporate irresponsibility (Mishina, Block 
and Mannor, 2012). In doing so, this research has the potential to deepen our understanding of 
stakeholder responses to corporate misconduct by providing a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. This 
research study elucidates when, how and to what extent reputational assessors react adversely 
to revelations of corporate irresponsibility. The motivation to conduct this research stems from a 
lack of reliable evidence concerning the conditions that result in reputation penalties. As a 
result, reputation scholarship remains unequipped with a set of core principles regarding the 
nature of reputation penalties and stakeholder assessments of corporate misconduct more 
generally. This is particularly important since research that unpacks stakeholder assessments in 
14 
 
light of corporate misconduct is of practical relevance to organisations which may be largely 
misinformed about the associated reputational risks of corporate irresponsibility. Considering 
that a substantial and increasing proportion of total organisational value is attributed to 
intangible assets (Teece, 1998) of which, corporate reputation forms a significant proportion 
(Roberts and Dowling, 2002), research which helps appreciate the specific reputational 
vulnerabilities of firms in light of misconduct, may practically assist organisations direct 
resources more appropriately to protecting this valuable asset.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I review prior research on reputation penalties. I explore how the various 
management disciplines have contributed to our understanding of the drivers and dynamics of 
reputation damages. Though it remains unclear how and when irresponsibility is interpreted 
negatively by organisational observers, some initial reputation penalties research has begun to 
offer explanations for why variance in reputation penalties exists. These ideas appear to 
coalesce into a number of broad thematic groups. For instance, owning a positive prior 
reputation for corporate social responsibility is believed to create a ‘reservoir of goodwill’, which 
provides a form of ‘reputational insurance’ against wrongdoing (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; 
Godfrey, 2005; Minor and Morgan, 2011). Another broad strand of work suggests that the firm’s 
history of past offenses may amplify or attenuate the relationship between irresponsibility and 
reputation penalties (Coombs, 2004; Coombs, 2007; Coombs and Holladay, 2001). It is also 
generally assumed that the more extensive a firm’s ‘crisis history’, the more threatening a new 
event is likely to be. Another explanation for inconsistencies in observed reputation penalties is 
that some events are somehow perceived by stakeholders as fundamentally more ‘severe’ than 
others (Coombs, 1995; Dean, 2003; Greening and Gray, 1994) and in turn, that different events 
pose different reputational risks (Fombrun et al., 2000). The post event communications and 
behaviour have too been credited with importance here. In response to reputationally 
threatening incidents, research finds that the firm’s communications and substantive actions 
play an important role in mitigating the potential reputation penalties (Benoit, 1995, Coombs, 
1995). This said, some scholars (c.f. Siomkos and Kurzbard, 1994) emphasised that responding 
to an event involves the organisation accurately assessing the social complexity of the context, 
meaning that managers are often mistaken, therefore potentially risking further stakeholder 
scrutiny.  
Before exploring the literature on reputation penalties as it broadly relates to the topic of 
corporate irresponsibility, I first elucidate what is referred to as corporate reputation, 
irresponsibility and subsequently reputation penalties, as there are several related concepts that 
have been employed throughout this multidisciplinary literature such as ‘corporate identity’, 
‘image’, ‘celebrity’, ‘status’ and or ‘legitimacy’; these concepts are themselves distinct from 
corporate reputation and thus require some initial clarification. This chapter will then go on to 
unpack the contributions of each management sub-discipline as they relate to specific themes 
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within the broader reputation penalties literature. Finally, this chapter concludes with an 
overview of the current state of theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
 
1.2. A Definition of Reputation Penalties and Related Concepts 
1.2.1. What reputation is not: The Related Concepts of ‘Identity’, ‘Image’, ‘Status’, 
‘Celebrity’ and ‘Legitimacy’ 
Before considering the definition and nature of reputation penalties, it is important to situate the 
concept of corporate reputation within the wider literatures on social evaluations and to 
differentiate it from other related concepts. As reputation is known for being “one of those rare 
subject matters that cuts across several disciplines and can be put through different analytical 
frames” (Mahon, 2002: 438), the concept has subsequently drawn considerable attention from 
various management disciplines including marketing, economics, strategic management, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), accounting, as well as sociology (c.f. Barnett, Jermier and 
Laffferty, 2006; Fombrun and van Reil, 1997). Though fundamentally, reputation is comprised of 
social evaluations of the firm (Wartick, 2002), research has framed reputation in terms of being a 
resource (Deephouse, 2000; Grant, 1991; Roberts and Dowling, 2002), an asset in the 
marketplace (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott 
and Wehrly, 2005), as well as a communication (Dean, 2004; Coombs, 2007; Coombs and 
Holladay, 2006; Hearit, 1996; Mitroff, 1988; O'Rourke, 1997) and signaling device to 
stakeholders (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Walsh et al., 2009). Though, in its common use, the 
meaning of reputation is seen as fairly intuitive by the casual observer, a primary issue to the 
study of reputation penalties and its application within the broader management literature has 
been the identification of an appropriate and operational definition of the core concept (Lange, 
Lee and Dai, 2011). Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006: 26) point out that, whilst interest in the 
topic of reputation has significantly increased the volume of associated academic literature, “a 
precise and commonly agreed upon definition is still lacking”. One aspect that has been 
associated with impeding a universal description of reputation is that some research employs 
the concepts of identity, image and reputation interchangeably (Wartick, 2002).  
Thus far, scholars have articulated that there are important distinctions between the constructs 
‘identity’, ‘image’ and ‘reputation’ (e.g., Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Walker, 2010; Scandizzo, 
2011). Broadly, the term ‘identity’ has been used to conceptualise an organisation’s self-
assessment of its own character and capabilities (Markwick and Fill, 1997). ‘Image’, on the other 
hand, has been used to term the perception which the firm wants to portray to its publics through 
its communications and substantive actions (Bromley, 2001). In other words, identity 
conceptualises how insiders perceive their own organisation (Honey, 2009), whereas the term 
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image describes how the company wishes to be viewed by others (Caudron, 1997). Though 
historically, identity, image and reputation have been discussed in similar ways, there are 
several other terminologies and related concepts associated with corporate reputation that also 
require further clarification.  
Whilst the concepts of identity and image express endogenously derived judgements, , there are 
other constructs that are the result of inter-firm assessments by external evaluators. ‘Status’, for 
example, is a construct used in the management literature to capture the relative social rank 
(Washington and Zajac, 2005) or hierarchical positioning of the firm compared to others 
(Podolny, 1993). ‘Celebrity’ is another related concept that also articulates a more distinct type 
of social evaluation, in that the construct specifically refers to the firm’s ability to attract 
stakeholder attention (Rindova et al., 2006). In the reputation penalties literature, the concept of 
celebrity is highly relevant, as celebrity tends to play a role in work that assesses how reputation 
can have a buffering effect or create expectancy violations after revelations of corporate 
misconduct (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006; Janney and Grove, 2011; Minor and Morgan, 2011). 
The logic behind this research being that, whilst celebrity firms desirably attract increased 
stakeholder attention after engaging in positive practice, gaining such a degree of prominence 
may also intensify any potential scrutiny after revelations of bad behaviour. Contrastingly, 
another associated concept, organisational ‘legitimacy’, conceptualises a firm being similar to 
others, rather aiming to differentiate itself. A firm that is legitimate is perceived to conform to the 
normative standards and demonstrate appropriate structure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
this way, organisational legitimacy conceptualises whether stakeholders perceive the company 
to have gained validity and thus may be rewarded with more advantaged access to resources.  
 
1.2.2. What Reputation is (More Specifically) 
Unlike the constructs image and identity, reputations are not directly and readily influenced by 
the firm itself. Instead, reputations are held externally by organisational stakeholders as a 
collective representation of firm characteristics (Fombrun and van Riel, 1997). Reputation differs 
also in that organisational observers make a non-relational assessment regarding the firm’s 
character and capabilities, rather than an assessment of that organisation’s standing relative to 
others, as in the case of assessments of organisational status. Similarly, though reputable firms 
may be perceived as legitimate, in that they conform to an appropriate structure and practice for 
their industry context, so too may firms with bad reputations. This is because organisational 
legitimacy does not convey a sense of whether the firm itself is uniquely favorable or 
unfavorable, rather, legitimacy expresses the degree to which the firm has the ‘right to exist’ 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Likewise, though a reputable firm may have gained notoriety for it 
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to be perceived as a ‘celebrity’, the concept of celebrity captures exclusively the degree of 
stakeholder attention focused on the firm and its business activities, rather than any assessment 
regarding what those activities are or how favorable they may be perceived to be. In sum, the 
concept of corporate reputation captures aggregate perceptions of external audiences. These 
audience perceptions of the firm may be positive, negative or indifferent overall, yet reputations 
may also capture the minutiae of multiple, discreet aspects of an organisation’s capabilities as 
well as its character as a corporate citizen.  
With that said, there are many varying definitions of corporate reputation available in the 
literature, as evidenced by the number of systematic and non-systematic literature reviews 
published on the topic of defining the concept (notably, Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty, 2006; 
Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011; Walker, 2010).  Prior to this work, Fombrun and Rindova (1996) 
argued that issues associated with defining corporate reputation derive predominantly from the 
diversity of disciplines which explore the reputation construct via different perspectives such as 
strategy, marketing, economics, sociology or accounting. Furthermore, whilst multiple 
perspectives have explored the reputation concept, there are also incongruities of definitions 
within disciplines (see Walker, 2010).  
Though scholars generally agree upon the concept being, at some level, a perceptual 
representation of the firm held by external stakeholders, akin to the definition posed by Fombrun 
and Rindova (1996), there is less consensus regarding what exactly about the organisation is 
being assessed. Recognition of this led Lange, Lee and Dai (2011) to classify the various 
definitions of reputation on the basis of stakeholder assessments. Lange and his co-authors 
propose a typology of three broad categories of definitions, namely those where “reputation 
consists of familiarity with the organisation”, other definitions concerning “what to expect from 
the organisation in the future”, and finally “impressions about the organisation’s favorability” (see 
Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011: 153). Here, the authors expressed familiarity more succinctly as 
‘being known’, which can further encompass ideas such as organisational celebrity, in which 
reputation is understood from the lens of recognisability and the capacity to garner stakeholder 
attention. Definitions of reputation, according to Lange, Lee and Dai (2011) can also express 
that the firm is ‘known for something’ in that stakeholder preconceptions about the firm’s 
capabilities or character can influence judgements about that firm’s future behaviour, such as 
what customers can expect in terms of the level of product quality or whether a potential supplier 
can expect to be treated fairly, for example. Finally, favorability, often associated with the level 
of esteem the firm is held in (Barnett et al., 2006), consists of the overall assessment of a firm ’s 
attributes. The generalised favorability aspect of definitions of corporate reputation 
communicates that organisational assessors often aggregate multiple features of a firm, arriving 
at an overall estimation regarding whether their interaction with the organisation would be 
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favorable to them or not. Therefore, with all the previously discussed prior insights in mind, I 
define corporate reputation broadly as; the collective representation of an organisations 
character and capabilities held by an organisations external stakeholders. My aim in defining the 
construct in this way is to be inclusive of the positions previously discussed. 
 
1.2.3. Defining Corporate Irresponsibility: Contributions from CSR and Crisis 
Management 
A secondary step towards defining the reputation penalties concept is an appropriate articulation 
of the types of events that could lead to reputational damage. However, with the exception of the 
term ‘crisis’ which is discussed at length by the crisis management literature (see: Coombs, 
2006), scant attention has been given to specifying how the various terms such as wrongdoing, 
negative events and irresponsibility should be defined. Lange and Washburn (2012: 300) 
highlighted this issue by pointing out that “[i]rresponsibility - is often not discussed explicitly in 
the CSR literature”. That said Greenwood (2007: 324) offers that “[c]orporate irresponsibility 
occurs when the strategic management of stakeholders does not remain responsibility-neutral 
practice but becomes an immoral practice based on the deception and manipulation of 
stakeholders”, highlighting that irresponsibility is about when the management specifically 
generates negative outcomes. Whereas Strike, Gao and Bansal, (2006: 852) defined corporate 
social irresponsibility (CSiR) more broadly as “the set of corporate actions that negatively affects 
an identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate claims (in the long run)”. Both authors’ efforts 
speak to two fundamental issues when defining the irresponsibility concept, namely ‘what 
actions lead to irresponsibility?’ And ‘what are the outcomes of irresponsibility?’ 
Scholars in the field of crisis management however, have had a different approach to defining 
the concept of potentially negative events. Whilst they use the concept of ‘crisis’, a term similar 
to irresponsibility, in that the casual observer may find it semantically biased towards events with 
more severely negative outcomes; crisis management scholars have defined the crisis concept 
relatively broadly. Coombs (2006: 243), for example, discussed how crises may include actions 
where the organisation is the ‘victim’ and not the perpetrator; crisis can include ‘accidents’, 
where deliberate intention is not evident; and crisis can also be ‘preventable’ where intension for 
the event is more ambiguous than certain. The notion that crisis events are ambiguous in nature 
to both the firm and its stakeholders is a central theme of the crisis management literature 
(Pearson and Claire, 1998). 
The idea that negative events are ambiguous for the observer to diagnose both in their causes 
and effects is central to an appropriate definition of corporate irresponsibility that the CSR 
literature is currently lacking. This is a central component to understanding irresponsibility 
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namely because different observers may have different assessments, a point highlighted by 
Porritt, (2005: 199) when suggesting that “financial markets respond favorably to 
announcements of cost-cutting programs designed to increase profits by reducing staff costs - 
The wider community is less favorably disposed”. The idea that observers differ in assessment 
was also recognized by Lange and Washburn (2012: 301) when they suggest that “corporate 
behaviour is socially irresponsible only to the extent that observers perceive it as such”. With 
this in mind, I define corporate irresponsibility as; the actions associated with the firm that have 
the potential to harm and/or be interpreted negatively by organisational assessors. 
 
1.2.4. Defining Reputation Penalties: From Economics to a Management Perspective 
At present the term ‘reputation penalty’ is employed fairly narrowly within the economics and 
finance perspectives and has yet to diffuse into the wider reputation and management literature. 
Whilst finance and economics find broader agreement concerning the concept’s definition, 
extant conceptualisations are limited in that they seemingly do not encompass what the wider 
literature understands reputation to be. To date, reputation penalties are defined as the loss in 
market value exceeded over any legal penalties incurred (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 
2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005). This means that reputation 
penalties are the losses incurred when share prices decline beyond what can be attributed to 
litigation costs, fines and damages. Whilst this conceptualisation of reputation penalties 
translates into a convenient proxy for work that analyses stock market reactions to news of 
corporate irresponsibility, it qualifies only aggregate perceptual evaluations of the firm’s stock 
rather than stakeholder perceptions about the nature of the company’s character and/or 
capabilities, as thought to be by the wider reputation literature (Fombrun and Rindova, 1996; 
Mahon, 2002; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012; Wartick, 2002). Proponents of the economic 
view of reputation penalties such as Engelen and Essen (2012: 56) inadvertently capture this 
problem by stating that “[f]luctuations in stock prices are simply an aggregate of a huge amount 
of buy-and-sell decisions” suggesting that the core evaluation being made by stockholders 
captured by extant ‘market-penalties’ research is less about declining perceptions of the firm, 
and more about increases in stockholders personal financial risk and/or decreases in return on 
investments.  
Given that current definitions of reputation penalties fail to capture the underlying reputation 
construct, I define reputation penalties as; the aggregate negative reassessment of an 
organisations perceived character and/or capabilities by external audiences following actions 
associated with the firm that have the potential to harm and/or be interpreted negatively by the 
same external audiences. 
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1.3. Thematic Groups Within Reputation Penalties Literature 
The concept of reputation penalties has attracted interest from a number of established 
management disciplines. From marketing to finance and economics, each has contributed to the 
overall discussion concerning reputation penalties. Although research remains disparate and 
fragmented throughout numerous management journals. In this section I present an overview of 
the central contributions of each management sub-discipline by identifying and discussing a 
number of core themes in the literature. To facilitate locating and identifying the contributing 
literature - I conducted a systematic review. My rationale for this being that, traditional literature 
review methods have been identified as owning numerous problems, including a high degree of 
author subjectivity (Mulrow, 1994). To mitigate this issue, I instead adopted an archival - 
systematic review methodology, as it has been credited to enhance objectivity and quality in the 
literature review process (see Tranfield et al., 2003). Although the methodology is not without its 
limitations, such as the underrepresentation of books and the production of large volumes of 
material to review (Pittaway et al., 2004) I felt that these drawbacks were compensated by 
having “clear goals”, “a broad and inclusive search base”, and that it incorporated “a synthesised 
approach to organise the literature” (Walker, 2010: 358)  - particularly when considering that the 
knowledge pertaining to reputation penalties is deposited in a breadth of subject areas (See 
Appendix 1 for full details on the systematic review methodology). Although the core reputation 
penalties literature was identified using a systematic review methodology, I have also expanded 
into other evidence-bases to contextualise this body of work. In the next section I present a 
broad overview of the literature. I then go on to discuss a number of broad themes identified 
within it, as well as how each perspective has contributed to our overall understanding of 
reputation penalties.  
 
1.3.1. An Overview of the Reputation Penalties Literature 
Since 1993, the number of published works concerning corporate reputation and irresponsibility 
specifically has increased (Figure 1, Appendix 2). This is not surprising considering the broader 
topic of corporate reputation has also dramatically increased during this period (see Figure 1.1). 
Whilst seemingly benefiting from such growth, the literature has become widely dispersed over 
93 different management, economics, finance, marketing, public relations, communications and 
strategic management, journals. However, nearly half the total number of papers in this sample 
have been published in ten journal titles (Table 1, Appendix 2), of which the leading one is the 
reputation- specific journal, Corporate Reputation Review (16 per cent).   
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To illustrate the epistemological orientation of this body of literature, I utilised an existing 
typology previously developed by de Bakker et al., (2005). Specifically, the classification of 
academic articles included in the systematic review of the literature employs of six categories as 
follows; conceptual papers - which have as their primary focus the development of propositions, 
hypotheses, or correlations between theoretical constructs (without the collection of new 
empirical data). Exploratory papers – where the fundamental focus lies in the development of 
propositions, hypotheses, or correlations between theoretical constructs by collecting new 
empirical data. 
 
Figure 1.1: The distribution of articles containing the phrase “corporate reputation” over time 
 
Predictive papers - which test propositions, hypotheses or correlations by empirical examination. 
Prescriptive - Instrumental papers - that focus on providing means and ideas for prescriptive 
action in order to assist practitioners or professionals realise some desired end. Prescriptive - 
Normative papers - which also aim to provide actionable advice for practitioners, yet are 
valuable from a moral, ethical or religious standpoint. Finally, descriptive papers - are classified 
as those which aim to report fact or opinion with no intention of a theoretical or prescriptive 
contribution to knowledge (de Bakker et al., 2005: 294). The general orientation of the literature 
is considerably more predictive, with predictive studies equating for 45 per cent of the total 
sample; followed by conceptual (18.3 per cent), prescriptive instrumental (13 per cent) and 
descriptive studies (13 per cent). This result may be associated with a considerable body of 
work originating from the crisis management perspective which generally utilises small student 
survey techniques. The methodological orientation of this body of work is orientated similarly 
(see Figure 2, Appendix 2), with a significant proportion of the literature being both theoretical 
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and empirical in nature (40.8 per cent). The remaining articles are purely theoretical articles (16 
per cent), a cluster of purely empirical papers (8.9 per cent), case studies (18.9), and a 
proportion of ‘commentaries’ (13.6 per cent). A commentary would typically lack academic 
theorising and evidence to support the basic claims of the paper. Though the reputation 
penalties literature is broadly oriented in this way, the content of this body of work appears to 
similarly be divided into a number of core lines of questioning. 
 
1.3.2. The ‘Process Question’: What types of events pose a threat to reputations and how 
do they harm them? 
A primary body of work in reputation penalties literature is motivated to explore the process by 
which incidents of irresponsibility harm reputations. Typically, reputation penalties start with a 
socially, economically or environmentally undesirable event. Neoinstitutional theory posits that 
organisations should behave in accordance with social conventions (Allen and Caillouet, 1994). 
However, firms have a tendency to diverge from ethical and moral standards, laws, efficiencies, 
virtues, or beliefs of social justice (Young and Hasler, 2010). That being said, not all breaches of 
ethical and/or moral standards may be as relevant to reputational assessors. This is reflected in 
a significant strand of crisis management literature which proposes that some breaches of 
convention are generally more ‘severe’ than others (Benoit, 1995; Fearn-Banks, 1996; 
Lerbinger, 1997; Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). 
The idea that certain types of incidents vary in severity forms the basis for situational crisis 
communications theory (SCCT), in which events are categorised into three broad clusters, each 
with varying levels of potential to cause reputational harm (Coombs and Holladay, 2002). “The 
assumption [of SCCT] is that crises in the same cluster will have underlying similarities”; these 
similarities are understood in terms of severity (Coombs, 2006: 243), in that, the more severe an 
event’s outcome the higher the probability that the observer will perceive the firm as more 
responsible for causing it, thus increasing the potential for reputational damages. Coombs 
(2006: 244) describes thirteen different types of crises that fall within three broad clusters; the 
‘victim cluster’ where the organisation is the victim of the crisis; this group can include natural 
disasters, rumors, workplace violence and product tampering. Second, the ‘accidental cluster’ in 
which firm behaviour leading to the event was unintentional. Events under this classification 
include; challenges, whereby stakeholders claim inappropriate behaviour, technical accidents, 
product recalls. Finally, the third and most severe cluster of events, named the ‘preventable 
cluster’ includes events whereby the organisation has knowingly undertaken risks and could 
have avoided the outcome.  Events in the preventable cluster include human errors, misdeeds, 
deception, law violations and risking human life. Although SCCT suggests that some events 
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within the same cluster may be more severe than others, the basis for classification stems from 
a theoretical and philosophical valuation rather than from an empirical one. For instance; SCCT 
assumes that events which threaten human life are most severe and will therefore have the 
most profound impact of corporate reputation (Coombs, 2006), despite prior empirical evidence 
from the broader reputation literature which contradicts this assumption (Zyglidopoulos, 2001). 
Additionally, extant empirical research testing SCCT largely focuses on case study and or small 
sample student survey data (Besova, 2008; Fussell et al., 2009; Claeys, Cauberghe and 
Vyncke, 2010; Lee and Lariscy, 2009; Oyer, 2010; Wright, 2009), methods typical of crisis 
management research more generally, therefore, limiting the robustness of this body of work. 
That being said, crisis management has offered some significant theoretical contributions to our 
understanding of the types, causes, and management of corporate irresponsibility (Greening 
and Gray, 1994). Yet, there are other aspects of irresponsibility that have been proposed to 
influence the potential reputation penalty. 
The level of firm culpability for causing an undesirable event is also understood to play a role in 
determining the strength and direction of social disapproval (Laufer, 1996). However, 
determining the culpability of events is often ambiguous (Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000), as events 
are often associated with a group of possible culprits (such as in the case of the financial crisis), 
a number of related parties (such as Ebay’s customers using its services to sell counterfeit 
goods or Apple’s workplace safety issues in its supply chain with Foxconn specifically), or that of 
third parties (such as Google being required to disclose account data to the various American 
security services). Though SCCT incorporates the notion of culpability through increased crisis 
responsibility (Coombs, 2007), the framework’s consideration of multiple associated and 
potentially culpable parties is theoretically lacking.  
There is also an issue of the motive and deception underlying the cause of irresponsibility, as 
these too may play a role in influencing the severity of an event. Gertsen, Riel and Berens 
(2006) noted that the intent of the firm along with the degree of distortion were both important 
influencing factors in determining stock market declines after announcements of financial 
restatements. Diagnosing the culprits’ intentions and similarly, assessing the degree of effort 
and sophistication employed by the organisation during the process that caused a negative 
outcome may be important for some stakeholders because they may be considered diagnostic 
of future actions (Gertsen, Riel and Berens, 2006; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012; Parkhe, 
1993). However, more often than not, stakeholders do not directly experience the incident 
and/or its effects; therefore, highlighting the potential significance of the medium for delivering 
the news of an event. 
The media is discussed as an important mediating factor in the process by which negative 
events come to harm the reputations of firms because they act as ‘infomediaries’ between the 
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news of event and the stakeholder (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009; O'Rourke, 1997; 
Zavyalova, Pfarrer and Reger, 2012). Wartick (1992) found that the more intense the media 
exposure was towards an organisation, the more susceptible its reputation is to change. In light 
of this, a diverse sub-field of the reputation penalties literature has broadly sought to explain 
what features of events draw media attention, how the media portrays negative events, and 
also, what implications these portrayals have for the management communications effort.  
To this, Van Riel and van Den Bosch (1997) added that events involving stakeholders who have 
a high degree of source credibility meanwhile providing appealing visual images for the media, 
are more likely to become newsworthy. Unsurprisingly, it is expected that, the more newsworthy 
the event, the higher the likelihood that stakeholder attention is drawn to it. In this way, the 
media becomes important as it both increases the availability of information but also influences 
the diversity of portrayals of the event (Smaiziene and Orzekauskas, 2009). The prominence of 
the incident in the media may also be heightened by the celebrity status of the firm which too is 
deemed likely to influence the story’s newsworthiness (Zyglidopoulos, 2001). Moreover, the 
media’s framing of the event is also considered as an important issue to the process of 
reputational assessments because the incident may be complex, ambiguous, or may differ in the 
frequency and quality of evidence available (van Riel and van Den Bosch, 1997). In highly 
ambiguous and complex situations, the tone in which the news is delivered may also play an 
increasingly salient role in shaping how the event is perceived (Murphy, 2010; Wartick, 1992). 
Two related, yet often implicit components of corporate irresponsibility are the differences in 
stakeholder groups that are harmed or victimised and the manner in which they are harmed. 
Coombs (2007) suggests that incidents have the potential to harm a variety of stakeholders 
physically, emotionally, and/or financially. However, each stakeholder group has a different 
relationship to the firm’s goals, therefore some parties may have more influence on the 
behaviour of the firm because they also have more power, urgency and legitimacy (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). The idea that stakeholders may not be equally significant to the firm’s reputation is a 
point often highlighted by the finance and economics perspectives, particularly in instances 
where the victimised party has an indirect relationship to the firm, as is the case with some 
special interest groups (see Engelen and Essen, 2010). 
Reputations are expected to be at risk in light of broad types of corporate irresponsibility 
(Fombrun et al., 2000; Neufeld, 2007; Resnick, 2004; Thießen, 2009) but how exactly is 
corporate reputation damaged? One dominant approach to addressing this related sub-question 
has been to consider the effects of corporate irresponsibility on the market value of the firm. 
Empirical research from the finance and economics perspectives suggests that reputation 
damage could be inflicted in a holistic sense because different types of irresponsibility are 
observed to undermine the value of a company’s stock (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 
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1993). One straightforward problem with this perspective is that stock prices strongly reflect the 
overall estimation of future economic potential of the firm (Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). Yet, 
stock prices may also reflect stockholder assessments of firm favorability, meaning that 
investors may be assessing how other stakeholders perceive the firm’s general favorability and 
how this might translate into downstream performance effects (Gertsen, Riel and Berens, 2006).  
Consequently, the notion that reputations are somehow monolithic in nature and that 
irresponsibility has a broad impact, has been challenged. Theoretical work has begun to 
conceptualise reputation as a multidimensional construct, in that the firm may accrue many 
different perceptions in terms of its character and capabilities (Helm, 2007; Mishina, Mannor and 
Block, 2012), thus reputation damage might not be inflicted across social assessments but 
rather in areas specifically associated with the nature of the irresponsibility (Mishina, Manor and 
Block, 2012) or the firm’s ‘reputation for something’ (Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011). In this context, 
a recall may affect the firm’s reputation for product quality (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006) or 
human resource management issues may affect its reputation for workplace security (Friedman, 
2009). Empirical evidence presented by Jones and Rubin (2001) found that firms which violate 
environmental laws may suffer reputation penalties for social performance as a result, and not 
their reputation for other facets of their business or overall, aggregate reputation. Whilst this 
strand of literature describes the possible outcomes of irresponsibility on reputation, often by 
describing the variation in endogenous characteristics of events, they offer only a partial 
explanation of how negative events come to alter reputations. Largely because they do not 
consider the various exogenous factors, prerequisites and socio-cognitive processes influencing 
the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and reputation. That being said, research 
from the finance and economics perspectives have significantly contributed to our current 
understanding of the effect of irresponsibility on reputation. 
 
1.3.3. The ‘Efficacy Question’: What are the consequences of corporate irresponsibility 
and which are most significant to reputations? 
When assessing the available empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of irresponsibility on 
perceptions of the firm, quantifying the reputation penalty following announcements of corporate 
irresponsibility has been largely the focus of the economics and finance domains. Here empirical 
research focuses on the stock market losses associated with corporate irresponsibility. More 
specifically, this strand of enquiry utilises changes in the market value of the firm as a proxy for 
reputation penalties after news of corporate irresponsibility. Researchers in this area calculate 
the total decline in stock value deducting any potential costs of the irresponsibility events, 
including stakeholder compensation, court fines, legal costs and remedial action costs. Work 
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which employs this method then hypothesises that the residual loss of stock price can be 
attributed to the reputation penalty (Engelen and Essen, 2010). Generally, these studies find 
that the market penalises firms significantly more than the direct and legal costs of negative 
events such as a clean-up cost of an oil spill, or a judicial fine (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Engelen, 
2010). However, Nelson et al., (2008) cautioned using declines in market value as evidence of 
reputation damage because it may be more difficult to control for confounding effects.  
That being said, the general observation from this body of empirical evidence is that reputation 
penalties are most significant when the actions of the firm cause harm to stakeholders that are 
directly related to the organisation’s business activities, such as shareholders and customers 
(see Engelen and Essen, 2010). Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2006) found significant reputation 
penalties in cases of fraud concerning directly related stakeholders, namely shareholders, as too 
did Alexander (1999) with customers of the firm and Janney and Gove (2011), again, with 
stockholders in their study of stock options backdating. Karpoff and Lott (1993), Karpoff, Lott 
and Wehrly, (2005) and Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, (2009) all found similar empirical results in 
that the reputation changes associated with a broad range of corporate irresponsibilities were 
significant and negative. In turn, Jones and Rubin (2001) and later Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly 
(2005) found no evidence of reputation penalties for environmental violations. This may suggest 
that criminal offences associated with harming third-parties potentially pose lesser reputational 
risks than those which harm or undermine relationships with stakeholders that have a direct 
influence on the companies bottom-line or access to key resources. However, it is more difficult 
to determine whether these stock price losses reflect shareholders’ actual evaluations of the 
organisation’s reputation or simply their concerns about potential future performance difficulties. 
To this, Gillet et al., (2010: 231) argue that this uncertainty is a problematic aspect because “the 
market consistently overreacts” to news of corporate irresponsibility. 
Whilst a significant body of empirical work from the finance and economics perspectives 
repeatedly demonstrate reputation penalties using stock market values as a proxy for reputation 
damage, less empirical work has been conducted from the broader management perspectives. 
A notable exception by Zyglidopoulos (2001) explored Fortune Magazine’s ‘World’s Most 
Admired Companies’ database (WMAC), a survey-based methodology of collecting reputation 
data which found that, rather than environmental violations being less reputationally relevant, 
they were found to be associated with the most significant declines in corporate reputation. In 
the same study, Zyglidopoulos (2001) found no evidence that incidents where human life was 
lost had any negative impact on reputation, regardless of the whether the group had a direct or 
indirect relationship with the organisation. Such findings bring into question the base of empirical 
evidence offered by the finance and economics perspective - and also the assumptions of 
situational crisis communications theory - that loss to human life is broadly the most severe type 
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of corporate irresponsibility. This point is mirrored by real-life cases of corporate irresponsibility 
with associated losses of life, such as in incidences of motor vehicle safety (Ford-Firestone: 
Tires), pharmaceutical product harm (Merck: Vioxx), and worker safety incidents (Primark: Rana 
Plaza). Potentially, these conflicting evidence bases could be the result of empirical work 
seldom measuring the reputation construct as it is more widely understood (Caruana and 
Chicop, 2001; Fombrun, 1998; Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever, 2000; Mahon, 2002) as research 
which utilises large survey measures of corporate reputation are scarce. Subsequently, the 
majority of the available empirical evidence drawn from by practitioners and scholars alike 
suggests there to be broad and significant reputation penalties in light of corporate 
irresponsibility. 
The reputation penalties literature preserves a distinct number of thematic assumptions 
regarding the efficacy of irresponsibility on reputation (see Appendix 2, Tables 2 and 3: Incidents 
found of thematic assumptions within the literature). A typical example is that of Sims (2009: 
445) who posits that “[a] mishandled response, inappropriate act, labor dispute, product 
tampering, or poorly timed reorganisation all have the power to instantly tarnish a sterling 
reputation”. This statement implies a number of characteristics of irresponsibility and its efficacy 
on the reputations of firms; first, it infers a degree of equivalence to acts of corporate 
irresponsibility, listing a number of events that each have the ‘power’ to ‘tarnish’ reputations. 
Furthermore, it also implies irresponsibility poses significant risks to ‘sterling’ reputations; 
meaning that, even those firms with strongly positive reputations are distinctly fragile in light of 
irresponsible organisational behaviour. Whilst the previous assumptions represent much of the 
understanding of reputation in the practitioner-based literature, the notion that reputations are 
fragile in some fundamental sense is a reoccurring theme found in more heavily evidence-based 
studies too (Appendix 2, Table 2: Incidences of Assumed Fragility). For example, an article by 
Lange, Lee and Dai, (2011: 154) evidence an argument by quoting Chairman and CEO of 
Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet, that being mindful of potential sources of irresponsibility is 
important because “it takes twenty years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it”. Whilst 
the assumption that reputations are fragile is implicit in this statement, Koronis and Ponis, (2012: 
283) explicitly state that “[g]iven the fragile nature and complexity of the reputation concept” in 
order to present their theorization of reputation penalties. What is curious about the assumption 
that reputations are fragile is that the wider management literature has frequently noted that 
corporations are commonly associated with irresponsible behaviour and yet observe few such 
cases of irresponsibility which challenge their survival (e.g., Bansal and Clelland, 2004; 
Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Davidson, Worrell and Lee, 1994).  
The degree to which reputational challenges are overcome may also dependent on the breadth 
and severity of downstream performance problems. Fombrun, Gardberg & Barnett, (2000: 87) 
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state that a “damaged reputation manifests itself in impoverished revenues, decreased ability to 
attract financial capital, and reduced appeal to current and potential employees” suggesting that 
acts of irresponsibility risk a broad spectrum of downstream performance difficulties for the firm. 
Gaultier-Gaillard and Louisot (2006) suggest that reputational damage risks three broad 
classifications of performance problems: financial loss (e.g. decline in market share, loss of 
sales, or legal penalties), loss of information (e.g. reduction in talented labour, loss of business 
partners, loss of collaborators), and future liabilities (e.g. loss of consumer trust, increased 
scrutiny from regulatory bodies, inability to attract investment). However, whilst there has been 
considerable attention given to the value of a good reputation in terms of increased performance 
(Deephouse, 2000; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Hall, 1993), 
sustaining competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Boyd et al., 
2010; Hall, 1992; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Shamsie, 2003) and how positive social 
behaviours maintain positive performance through activities such as CSR (Lii and Lee, 2012), 
empirical evidence that systematically unpacks the performance consequences of reputation 
penalties is lacking. Instead, the reputation penalties literature consists of a significant number 
of practitioner-based commentaries and case studies (see Figure 2, Appendix 2) that often 
highlight more extreme cases of corporate irresponsibility and performance decline (Bebbington, 
Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008; Eccles, Newquist and Schatz, 2007; Garcia, 2006; Garcia and 
Ewing, 2008; McLane, Bratic and Bersin, 1999; O’Rourke, 2001; Schwartz, Young and Zvinakis, 
2000). The notion that irresponsibility has the potential to harm the reputation of the associated 
firm and that, in turn, reputational damage translates into downstream performance problems for 
the organisation, represents a simplistic, linear conceptualisation of reputational penalties that 
conflicts with observations of corporate irresponsibility and neglects a number of important 
mediating variables that may mitigate stakeholder updating assessments of the firm, and 
subsequently, penalizing them for any misconduct (Barnett, 2014). More specifically, recent 
theorising from the social psychology perspective argues that irresponsibility may be subject to 
different assessment criteria, judgement biases and path dependencies (notably, Mishina, Block 
and Mannor, 2012).  
 
1.3.4. The ‘Interpretation Question’: How does contextual information and prior 
knowledge affect observer assessments of reputation? 
Habermas (1975: 58) proposed that “the crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the 
one who is undergoing it”. Habermas’s (1975) proposition is central to the social psychology 
perspective of irresponsibility and reputation penalties. Though attribution theory is a relatively 
novel perspective on reputation, early theoretical work in the area has been suggested to 
represent a promising new line of empirical enquiry (Barnett, 2014; Lange and Washburn, 2012; 
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Mishina Block and Mannor, 2012). Fundamentally, attribution theories suggest that reputation 
damage is contingent upon the negative revaluations of stakeholders and is therefore subject to 
the same information processes and cognitive biases that influence the perspectives of 
individual observers (Kelley, 1973). Following this logic, reputations are therefore based on 
perceptions and not an objective reality (Wry, 2009). In this way, human perception is proposed 
to create the social reality whereby reputation can fall victim to negative revaluations (Bitektine, 
2011). Since reputations are also believed to be the outcome of collectively held perceptions 
(Fombrun and Rindova, 1996), attribution theory suggests reputations are sensitive to evaluative 
changes at the level of individual perceivers. Meaning that reputations are also sensitive to the 
factors that affect individual cognition (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). 
The assessments of stakeholders have been suggested to be contingent on a number of 
different judgment biases (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Mishina and his colleagues have 
speculated that reputational assessors distinguish between two fundamental types of signals. 
First, capability-related information or signals refer to the business activities of the firm (Mishina, 
Block and Mannor, 2012). A negative capability-related cue, such as product recalls, service 
delays, or financial losses, may pose less threat to corporate reputation because events of this 
nature are more likely to be interpreted as being influenced by exogenous factors (Mishina, 
Block and Mannor, 2012). The other type of signal, a character-related cue, contrastingly, is 
suggested to be more threatening to reputation because stakeholders may interpret these 
events as less likely to have been influenced by exogenous factors (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 
2012). Therefore, in the case of character-related signals, stakeholders tend to be less inclined 
to give corporations the benefit of the doubt. The origin of this idea lies with Heider (1958) who 
emphasised that the attributions individuals offer as explanations for events accentuate either 
factors that originate within that individual or factors that arise from environmental sources. 
Mishina and his co-writers phrase the process of stakeholders interpreting events on the basis 
of whether they represent the ‘true’ nature of a firm’s character or capabilities, as the level of 
‘diagnosticity’, or in other words, whether a piece of information is indicative of ‘who’ or ‘what’ 
the firm really is. This idea lends itself to the seminal work of Kelly (1971), a social psychologist 
who proposed what is referred to as the discounting principle. Kelly (1971) suggested that 
individuals tend to discount information when other plausible causes exist. In the context of 
negative character-related events, the level of discounting is expected to be lessened by 
growing skepticism in society (Fein, 1996; Skarmeas and Leonidou, 2013: Vanhamme and 
Grobben, 2009). Thus, looking through the lens of social psychology, one can observe that the 
nature of the ‘cue’ or event is brought back into focus. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a key theme of this line of reputation penalties enquiry is 
that irresponsible events have been suggested to vary somewhat in severity (Coombs and 
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Holladay, 2006). In particular, Coombs (2007) suggested that a key determining factor of event 
severity is degree to which the event could have been prevented by the organisation. The work 
of attribution theorists such as Weiner (1980) supports such an assumption, suggesting that 
attributions are made on the basis of the degree to which the individual believes the cause of the 
failure could have been controlled. However, Weiner (1980) also emphasized that negative 
attributions are also strengthened when individuals believe that the cause of the failure is 
enduring rather than temporary. Therefore, from an attribution perspective, reputational damage 
could be more pervasive when events are perceived to be within the organisation’s control and 
when the cause of the event is perceived to have longevity. Conceptualisations regarding how 
event characteristics affect perceptions of corporate irresponsibility have been captured in the 
more recent theorising of Lange and Washburn (2012) who describe the subjective 
understandings of firm behaviour that result in attributions of irresponsibility. The authors 
suggest that “[o]bserver attributions of corporate social irresponsibility depend on the combined 
presence of three components: observer assessments that the effect is at least somewhat 
undesirable, observer assessments that the corporation is at least somewhat culpable, and 
observer assessments that the affected party is at least somewhat noncomplicit” (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012: 308). This means that, for an observer to interpret the behaviour of the firm as 
irresponsibility, its behaviour must be perceived to have some level of each of the following 
three characteristics: first, ‘effect undesirability’, which builds on the ideas of Crouch, (2006), 
Donaldson and Dunfee, (1999) and Jones and Davis (1965), refers to the degree to which 
stakeholders perceive the actions of the firm to be personally threatening – or – the degree to 
which the event undermines the personal, philosophical or social values of the individual. For 
instance, a customer may perceive an organisation’s announcement of a financial restatement 
less personally threatening and egregious compared to a shareholder.  Second, ‘culpability’ 
describes the manner in which the observer assumes the role of the ‘intuitive psychologist’ 
(Hamilton, 1980), in that there may be individual attempts to assign causality to an event. In this 
case, the individual may assign causality to the firm or other plausible causal agents. Patients 
suffering overdoses from a medication that was appropriately labeled may be perceived as a 
plausible causal agent (or owning some of the associated blame) than a patient who overdoses 
on medication that was inappropriately labeled, for example. The third ingredient of Lange and 
Washburn’s (2012) model suggests that a degree of ‘affected party non-complicity’ is necessary 
for corporate irresponsibility to influence reputation. Here, the observer is expected to assess 
the complicity of the victimised party. The idea being that some victims might be perceived as 
more complicit in causing a negative event.  A bank’s shareholders may be perceived to have 
more complicity following the 2007 global financial crisis than its customers because the former 
seemingly benefitted from the firm’s irresponsible behaviour. Using this body of extant empirical 
evidence from the social psychology perspective, Lange and Washburn’s (2012) description of 
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the mechanisms by which observers attribute irresponsibility represents a potentially important 
first step in our understanding of why the variation of reputational effects exists between cases 
of corporate irresponsibility. 
A number of notable extant works align with Lange and Washburn’s (2012) framework. For 
example, Fiol and Kovoor-Misra, (1997: 149) stated that “societal filters enable perceivers to 
determine how discrediting an event is, based on widely-held social norms”. Furthermore, some 
incidents might not be perceived in isolation but part of an unfolding sequence of events. 
Coombs (2007: 168) added that a history of crises can “increase the initial assessments of the 
reputational threat”. Kelly (1971) suggested the covariate principle, noting that, when there is 
more than one possible cause for an effect, the effect is more likely to be attributed to that cause 
with which it covaries. Therefore, the past observations of reputational assessors may be used 
in relation to determining the cause of new events. In other words, when a firm has a history of 
involvement in a particular negative event, such as fraud, the accusations of later fraud, even 
when there are multiple possible causes for that event, the blame is likely to be attributed to the 
accused firm. That said, examples from business practice indicate that the covariate principle 
does not always apply. In the case of the car manufacturing industry, a more populous history 
for product recalls appears to have an insignificant effect on the reputations of automobile 
manufacturers. Crisis histories may therefore be also relative to industry standards. In an 
industry context where particular events are less frequent, these incidents violate stakeholder 
expectations and thus might potentially pose a more significant reputational threat. Though 
reputational assessors may have a tendency to interpret events on the basis of their 
diagnosticity (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012) there is also evidence which suggests that 
stakeholders expect different behaviour from different firms, so firms that do not conform to what 
is expected may, in turn, violate stakeholder beliefs, leading to greater scrutiny (see Rhee and 
Valdez, 2009).  
Interestingly, scholars such as Hoeken (1998) have suggested that individuals tend to preserve 
their original beliefs when evidence contradicts them. Experimental research in social 
psychology has long observed that individuals have a tendency not to update their beliefs in light 
of contradictory evidence (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al., 2013; Lord, Ross 
and Lepper, 1979). Subsequently, stakeholder assessments of the firm may not be based 
exclusively on evidence, but also on rumor, speculation, and their individual prior beliefs (Hess, 
2008). Interpretations of negative events have also been proposed to be path dependent, in that 
new information is interpreted on the basis of past beliefs (Mishina et al., 2012). Following this 
logic, negative events are therefore unbound to any specific place or time. Stakeholders may 
refer back to their past knowledge about the firm in deciding to update their beliefs, or not. 
Whilst attribution theory is relatively novel in relation to reputation penalties research, two 
33 
 
strands of extant empirical evidence provide some support for the idea that stakeholder 
perceptions of corporate irresponsibility are ‘colored’ by the prior reputation of the firm (Minor 
and Morgan, 2011: 56). First, a school of thought has emerged which suggests that owning a 
positive prior reputation creates a ‘reservoir of goodwill’ that can shield the firm from the 
associated problems of negative events (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, 2005; Schnietz 
and Epstein, 2005). The rationale being that, until new revelations emerge, firms with a 
generally positive reputation have behaved in accordance with stakeholder expectations. As a 
result, stakeholders are more likely give firms’ with an overall positive reputation the benefit of 
the doubt after revelations of irresponsibility (Mahon and Wartick, 2003; Tucker and Melewar, 
2005), or simply stakeholders may ignore evidence to the contrary because it does not sit easy 
with prior impressions of the firm (Godfrey, 2005). In order to use reputation as a shield, it is 
assumed that companies should invest more in reputation building activities, such as corporate 
social responsibility activities (Minor and Morgan, 2011; Williams and Barret, 2000). CSR 
activities and programs are believed enhance reputations in order to later ‘offset’ the associated 
risks of corporate misbehaviour (Brammer, Pavelin and Porter, 2009). Empirical evidence 
generally finds support for the idea that greater CSR performance can buffer against later 
revelations of irresponsibility (Brammer, Pavelin and Porter, 2009; Janney and Gove, 2011; 
Williams and Barret, 2000). Yet, most of the empirical evidence that assesses the mediating role 
of prior reputation assesses its defensive property in relation to buffering against market 
penalties. For example, Jones, Jones and Little (2000) found that firms with greater reputation 
scores prior to the 1989 stock market crash suffered significantly less than firms that owned 
weaker reputations. Similarly, Raithel et al. (2010) found that a good reputation prior to the 2008 
global financial crisis mitigated stock market decline, as too did Wiles et al., (2010). Bailey and 
Bonifield (2010) found that firms with enhanced prior reputations which reneged on promotional 
offers were able to mitigate negative purchase and word-of-mouth intentions if they later fulfilled 
promotional promises. In turn, firms with poor prior reputations were found to be unable to alter 
consumer purchase or word-of-mouth intensions whether they fulfilled promotional promises or 
not (Bailey and Bonifield, 2010). This implies that owning a prior positive reputation may serve 
as an advantage in certain instances, such as when firms operate in markets with limited 
competition or for those organisations offering undifferentiated and price elastic products and/or 
services.  
That being said, the second school of thought assessing the mediating role of prior reputation 
suggests that owning a positive reputation can create expectations about the way in which the 
firm should behave (Shapiro, 1983). When the firm’s behaviour does not conform to stakeholder 
beliefs, it creates expectancy violations which have the potential to deepen stakeholder scrutiny 
(Burgoon, 1978). A noteworthy study by Janney and Gove (2011) found evidence of both the 
halo effect and expectancy violations. The authors found that firms with overall positive 
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reputations suffered less stock value declines after general irresponsibility (Janney and Gove, 
2011: 1580). Yet also, the study found that firms with an enhanced reputation for certain 
characteristics, such as governance, were penalised more for events which pertained to 
governance failures (Janney and Gove, 2011: 1581). This may indicate that for certain types of 
irresponsibility stakeholders interpret events as duplicitous or perceive a level of betrayal which 
prompt assessors to revise-down their assessments of the firm. This is consistent with the 
findings of Rhee and Haunschild (2006) who found that automotive firms with a greater 
reputation for product/service quality suffered significantly greater market penalties after 
announcements of recalls than firms with lower levels of prior reputation for quality.  
 
1.3.5. The ‘Management Question’: How should the firm respond to reputationally 
threatening events? 
In the context of reputation penalties, scholars of crisis management have been particularly 
interested in categorizing the various types of crisis as well as uncovering best practice for the 
management of irresponsibility (Dean, 2004; Coombs, 2007; Coombs and Holladay, 2006; 
Hearit, 1996; Mitroff, 1988; O'Rourke, 1997). Generally, the crisis management literature 
proposes a variety of ‘horses-for-courses’ style response strategies, in that they broadly assume 
that managers should accurately appreciate the context of irresponsibility in order to choose and 
deliver the most appropriate organisational responses (Benoit, 1993; Coombs and Holladay, 
2006). Broadly, it is assumed that communications should be swift because first impressions of 
events form quickly and also tend to influence stakeholder reception of later communications 
(Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1999; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; Sen and Egelhoff, 1991).  
From the organisations perspective, there are a number of decisions which may need to be 
made in order to respond to stakeholder concerns. In this context, firms have been advised by 
the literature to choose their response carefully or risk further damaging relationships with 
stakeholders (Benoit, 1993; Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2007). Responses to revelations of 
irresponsibility are said to be achieved using two primary response mechanisms: an 
organisation can respond verbally via its communications, and tangibly, by the subsequent 
action that it takes following an event. It is also recommended that messages should be clear, 
consistent, and plausible (Kline et al., 2009). Over time, scholars have proposed a number of 
possible communication strategies available to firms (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2002; Sellnow et 
al., 1998). Typically, the response strategies firms employ are understood to vary in their degree 
of compassion for the victims (accommodative) and their motivations to limit exposure to the firm 
(defensiveness) (Coombs, 2007). However, it is also noted that organisations may fail to 
implement the correct responses to negative events because they often manage conflicting 
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internal and external pressures, such as those that arise from navigating the tensions between 
financial liabilities and social responsibilities (Greening and Gray, 1994).  
With regards to the managerial advice generated from extant empirical crisis management work, 
some studies have begun to incorporate attribution theoretic concepts to test the moderating 
capacity of managerial responses on the relationship between stakeholder attributions of crisis 
responsibility and perceptions of the firm. One study testing Coombs’ (2007) crisis types, 
Claeys, Cauberghe and Vyncke (2010: 256) conducted an experiment using 316 consumer 
participants, and found that “[t]he interaction effect between crisis type and crisis response 
strategies on corporate reputation is not significant”. Therefore, the different crisis response 
strategies did not alter the effect of irresponsibility on reputation. However, what was particularly 
relevant about this study was that it tested participants’ propensity for internal versus external 
locus of control. What this means is that the study tested participants’ preference to assign 
causation internally towards themselves (or for them to take the blame) or externally on a third 
party, in which case, participants were more likely assign responsibility to the firm. Even though 
this small scale study may be methodologically limited in terms of its generalisability, its value 
lies in the attempt to incorporate more nuanced theorisations akin to the ideas of cue 
diagnosticity and the negativity bias in character-related assessments of the firm (Mishina, Block 
and Mannor, 2012). More specifically, this study represents a growing appreciation of how 
assessors’ attribute irresponsibility in the context of reputation penalties. 
 
1.4. Summary and Research Agenda 
Though the research on reputation penalties has been increasing, it remains a fairly novel 
research area when compared to other more established management literatures. The core of 
the reputation penalties literature remains underdeveloped with 160 published works that 
explicitly positions its contribution in both organisational reputation and the corporate 
irresponsibility. Generally, the epistemological and methodological orientation of this literature 
leans towards predictive (45 per cent) and empirical work (41 per cent). Yet a significant 
proportion of empirical work on reputation penalties can be attributed to case study and small 
sample survey data from the communications/crisis management perspective as well as the 
market penalties perspective from finance and economics. Whilst the crisis management 
literature does offer some more nuanced and holistic conceptualisations of the relationship 
between corporate reputation and corporate irresponsibility, this literature tends to rely largely 
on case study and small survey data. Contrastingly, the market penalties literature employs 
more rigorous methodologies to assess the declines in stock value subsequent to 
announcements of irresponsibility, however, this field is theoretically limited in that it views and 
subsequently measures reputation as a result of buy and sell decisions (Engelen and Essen, 
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2010). Resultantly, the majority of available empirical evidence suggests that most types of 
irresponsible events have a significant impact on corporate reputation (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009), a point which jars with 
observations made within the broader management literature (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; 
Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Davidson, Worrell and Lee, 1994). This pool of reputation penalties 
evidence has been subsequently drawn upon by the theoretical and practitioner literature on 
reputation and its management, which, has seemingly led to the general thematic assumption 
that reputations are inherently fragile in the face of corporate irresponsibility.  
Though reputation penalties research is dispersed over 93 management journals, many of them 
contribute to the conversation on several distinct underlying themes. The first notable theme 
uncovered in the literature review process was a distinct group of studies which focus on the 
process of how irresponsibility - in its different forms - can have varying propensities to harm 
reputation. Work unpacking the ‘process question’ also expresses either implicitly or explicitly 
how the perspective views the nature of reputation damage. Here the crisis management 
literature has offered some insight as to the categories of harm (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; 
Coombs and Holladay, 2006). Generally, it is understood that events can vary in severity 
(Benoit, 1995; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Lerbinger, 1997; Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Pauchant and 
Mitroff, 1992) and that there are a number of sub-characteristics or intensifiers that contribute 
such as culpability, the type of victimization, and the level of media attention. The greater the 
severity of the event, the more the event is believed to be associated with risks to reputation 
(Coombs, 2007; Coombs and Holladay, 2006). SCCT has emerged as a prominent guiding 
framework in the crisis management literature, however the basis for this framework of 
classification stems from the authors’ philosophical values, rather than from empirical evidence. 
It assumes that events which threaten human life are most severe and will therefore have the 
most profound impact on corporate reputation (Coombs, 2006), despite conflicting prior 
empirical evidence from the broader reputation literature (Zyglidopoulos, 2001). Evidence from 
market penalties research, implies that reputations tend to be monolithic and broadly harmed by 
many classifications of corporate irresponsibility (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993).  
Another notable theme imbedded in this literature is an empirical curiosity surrounding the 
efficacy of corporate irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation. A significant body of 
empirical research has posed the following question; ‘to what extent does irresponsibility 
undermine corporate reputations?’ Empirical studies have generally found that many different 
types of irresponsibility exist and most have substantial impact on the market value of the firm 
(Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and 
Tibbs, 2009), with the notable exception of environmental violations (Jones and Rubin, 2001). 
This work emphasises that events which undermine the firm’s relationships with stakeholder 
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groups have a greater capacity than events which harm the natural environment (Engelen and 
Essen, 2010). However, some earlier empirical work using large-scale survey data contradicts 
this assumption, finding evidence that environmental violations are strongly penalized against 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001).  
Rather than focusing on the aspects that distinguish events from one another to then determine 
the likelihood of reputational effects, an alternative but related strand of research contends that 
reputations are perceptual phenomena and therefore the interpretations of observers require 
greater acknowledgement of the process of social judgements and impressions formation. The 
‘interpretation question’ has largely been posed by the newly emerging social 
psychology/attribution perspective of reputation penalties research. This perspective 
fundamentally views the reputation penalties problem from the perspective of the perceiver. 
Unlike prior work from finance, economics, and broader management literature, attribution 
theories do not ‘abstract-away’ the perceiver from the process of reputation harm as is largely 
the case with works using stock market proxies of reputational decline. Instead, social 
psychology perspectives place the observer at the heart of the social phenomena and unpack 
the various subjective assessments and interpretive variations in these (Lange and Washburn, 
2012; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Although attribution theory is a fairly novel area of 
research in the context of reputation penalties research, extant literature on the halo effect and 
expectancy violations lend some initial support to the general thesis of attribution theory. Whilst 
attribution theory represents a promising new direction for reputation penalties research, the 
ideas put forward by attribution proponents remain empirically underdeveloped. 
Finally, a distinct body of literature explores the possible management interventions that firms 
can deploy to mitigate potential reputation decline following revelations of corporate 
irresponsibility. The ‘management question’ has largely been considered from the crisis 
management, mass communications and practitioner literatures. This corpus of work mainly 
suggests that responding to events is a difficult process which requires the correct combination 
of communicative choices and remedial actions (Ansoff, 1975; Coombs, 1995; 2006; Rosenthal 
and Kouzmin, 1997). It is broadly assumed that communications should be swift (Benoit, 1997; 
Coombs, 1999; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; Sen and Egelhoff, 1991) and that firms tend to 
make poor choices in their communicative response because there may be competing internal 
and external pressures at work (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). 
Though a number of crisis response strategies have been recommended by this body of 
research (Benoit, 1995; Coombs and Holladay, 2006) they stipulate that the firm must tailor their 
response to the event in often ambiguous terms. A reason why managerial advices may be 
lacking specificity is that the corresponding empirical evidence used to formulate managerial 
advices are based on evidence which either lacks the necessary methodological robustness or 
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accurate measures of reputation. These limitations imply that research on reputation penalties to 
date only tangentially informs our understanding of reputation penalties and the management of 
corporate irresponsibility. 
In light of the achievements and limitations of extant research, advancements to our current 
understanding of reputation penalties may come from a number of possible directions; first, 
whilst the field of crisis management in particular has been central to the categorization of types 
of irresponsibility, empirical work to date tends to bundle events on the basis of broad 
characteristics, such as ‘accident’, ‘preventable’ or more broadly ‘accounting controversy’ or 
‘product recall’. This strategy neglects the many minutiae of events that attribution theory 
suggests may be important in determining stakeholder perceptions of irresponsibility (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012). To date, research that describes the minutiae of events and models the 
relationship between these and corporate reputation remains undeveloped. Second, though the 
finance and economics perspectives have applied rigorous management science to the topic of 
reputation penalties, its measures of corporate reputation do not appropriately capture the 
concept as it is more widely understood (Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty, 2006; Fombrun and van 
Riel, 1997; Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011; Walker, 2010). The ‘market penalties’ strand of literature 
predominantly use short-run stock price movements as a proxy for reputation damage, which 
predominantly captures changes in stockholders buy-and-sell decisions. This is a significant 
limitation because stockholders, in the context of corporate irresponsibility, have been shown to 
initially overreact to news of corporate irresponsibility (Gillet et al., 2010). Coupled with highly 
specific ‘profit-seeking’ motivations, share prices are likely to be unrepresentative of this 
stakeholder group’s general social judgments and impressions of the firm. However, there are 
alternative research methodologies that utilises data more closely representative of the 
reputation construct. Lange scale surveys like those conducted and published by Fortune’s 
World’s Most Admired annual survey (WMAC) or Management Today’s Britain’s Most Admired 
Companies (BMAC) are some examples that collect observer perception in settings that mitigate 
the confounding effects associated with stock market proxies and which remain underexplored.  
Moreover, though advancements in the reputation penalties literature has led to more nuanced 
theorisations of the process by which reputations are harmed by irresponsibility (Barnett, 2014; 
Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012), empirical work is conceptually underdeveloped in relation to 
it. Inadequacies, particularly with regards to capturing the different facets of reputations, such as 
firms ‘being known’, ‘being known for something’ and their ‘generalised favorability’ (Lange, Lee 
and Dai, 2011) subsequently result in empirical work neglecting the complex and 
multidimensional nature of the reputation concept. Consequentially, much of the available 
empirical research views reputation in overly simplistic terms and does not capture the many 
facets of social judgements and prior stakeholder impressions of the firm, nor does it capture 
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how these prior perceptions tend to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of irresponsibility. In 
light of this, empirical work which unpacks the various dimensions of stakeholder impressions of 
the firm would advance our understanding of the conditions in which different stakeholder beliefs 
shape the process of stakeholder judgements and impressions of the firm. 
Furthermore, theoretical developments in the area of social psychology suggest a number of 
psychological processes and biases that may determine how irresponsibility is interpreted by 
stakeholders, which may then set the stage for any downstream reputation penalties. These 
insights are potentially valuable because they highlight which characteristics of events are used 
in conjunction with prior knowledge to determine the ‘severity’ and ‘diagnosticity’ of 
irresponsibility events (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). To date, most conceptualisations of 
event severity have been limited by author subjectivity, as research has often predetermined 
what was likely to be perceived as most significant to reputational assessors.  Attribution theory 
therefore represents the first systematic, evidence-based framework for how and when 
stakeholders interpret events as being indicative of corporate irresponsibility. Research which 
empirically unpacks attribution theories as they related to reputation penalties would further 
advance our understanding of how, when and to what extent acts of observed corporate 
irresponsibility alter perceptions of the firm. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the current state of theoretical and empirical knowledge 
pertaining to reputation penalties, as well as highlighted a number of accepted wisdoms 
regarding the nature of irresponsibility and corporate reputation.  Through the literature review 
process, four broad limitations of extant research were uncovered; (1) empirical work to date 
tends to bundle observed irresponsibility using narrow criteria, thus neglecting the nuances that 
distinguish events. (2) The bulk of the available empirical evidence does not faithfully measure 
the reputation concept. The market penalties literature, whilst applying rigorous management 
science from the perspectives of finance and economics, utilises data that is ultimately 
unrepresentative of the core phenomena and resultantly reputation penalties may be overstated 
because markets often overreact to news of irresponsibility (Gillet et al., 2010). (3) The majority 
of extant empirical research views reputation in overly simplistic terms and does not fully capture 
the many facets of social judgements and prior stakeholder impressions of the firm which 
include an appreciation of minutiae of event characteristics and stakeholder’s prior beliefs. 
Research which systematically and empirically unpacks the contingencies within the relationship 
between corporate irresponsibility and firm reputation is currently lacking. (4) Finally, extant 
empirical work neglects the mechanisms and cognitive biases that influence observer 
perceptions of irresponsibility and subsequently of the firm associated with irresponsible acts. In 
this way, prior research tends to abstract the observer away from the process of reputation 
penalties. Such limitations restrict our ability to generate robust insights that, in turn, can inform 
managerial decisions concerning crisis and reputation management. In view of these limitations, 
this study places the perceiver back into analytical focus to contribute to increasing our 
understanding of how, when and to what extent stakeholders revise their reputational 
assessments in light of corporate irresponsibility. Utilising theories of attribution, this study 
departs from an overly simplistic, reductionist approach offered particularly by the market 
penalties strand of research, towards a more holistic and social constructivist perspective on 
corporate reputation penalties.  
 
2.1. Core Theoretical Paradigm: Attribution Theory 
In order to examine the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation, this study adopted theories from social psychology, namely attribution theory, as a 
guiding theoretical lens to understand the underlying processes that influence how and when 
stakeholders react to observed cases of corporate irresponsibility. Though this is a somewhat 
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fragmented and non-unified body of conceptual works advanced primarily by social psychology 
proponents, I adopt a number of integrated ‘attribution’ positions offered by management 
scholars such as Lange and Washburn (2012) as well as Mishina, Block and Mannor (2012). 
Although attribution theory is novel in terms of reputation penalties research, it offers a more 
nuanced description of the cognitive mechanisms and biases that may play a role in determining 
how and when organisational observers interpret events as acts of irresponsibility. Additionally, I 
adopt attribution theory in order to explore how contextual information influences the 
interpretation process as well as seek to understand when heuristics or cognitive short-hands 
are used by reputational assessors. Most importantly, attribution theory may explain why certain 
firms are seemingly less vulnerable to reputation changes despite being associated with various 
social, economic and or environmental harms. 
Theories of attribution began in the field of social psychology and was first put forward around 
the 1950s. specifically, the seminal work of Heider (1958) provides the underlying principles 
upon which theories of attribution continue to be based. The book The Psychology of 
Interpersonal Relations outlined Heider’s phenomenological approach to psychology, which at 
the time, was a departure from the established behavioural view. Heider stipulated that 
understanding individuals’ common-sense explanations to infer causation was at the route of 
behaviour between interpersonal relationships. Heider (1958) expressed that observers arrived 
at two broad categories of causation; those caused by individuals or those caused in an 
individual’s environment or situation. Heider also argued that generally individuals are fairly 
rational. However, unlike the reasoning found within the sciences, the lay-person is typically less 
analytical and increasingly prone to biases, particularly in instances whereby features of the 
behaviour are salient to the individual (Heider, 1958). Drawing from this initial work, Kelley 
(1967) later expanded Heider’s ideas to include descriptions of the process by which individuals 
orientated their causal inferences. Kelley (1967) emphasised that an individual is likely to have 
information from multiple prior observations, in different situations, and at different times. This 
information can thus be recalled by the perceiver to draw causal inferences regarding a 
subject’s current behaviour.  
Later, Weiner (1985) developed a framework of causal attribution that built from the earlier ideas 
of Heider (1958) and Kelley (1967) and described three distinct stages of the attribution process. 
The first of which refers to the observer’s perception of the subject’s locus of control; similar to 
Heider’s ideas, locus of control refers to the perception that the subject is the cause of a 
behaviour or the cause is attributable to the subject’s external environment. Second, observers 
determine the level of stability of a behaviour; this relates to whether the causes of a behaviour 
change over time or whether the behaviour is repeatedly observed. Finally, stage three, 
assessors are expected to determine the level of controllability, which specifically refers to 
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whether the behaviour is attributable to skill or luck. In other words, behaviours are perceived to 
be controllable when the subject is credited with the ability to generate a specific outcome, 
rather than the outcome being the result of situational and or environmental factors (Weiner, 
1985). Developments in attribution theories have led to the adoption of these ideas beyond the 
scope of the social psychology perspective. Adopters of attribution theoretic ideas include 
studies in the field of education (e.g., Stein and Wang, 1988), sport (e.g., Rejeski and Brawley, 
1983) and health (e.g., Whitehead, 2001), as well as research developed within management 
disciplines such as marketing (e.g., Calder and Burnkrant, 1977) and human resource 
management (e.g., Bowen and Ostroff, 2004).  
In a more simplistic manner, the underlying theme of attribution theories is a motivation to 
understand human perception through the various judgements and biases that form as a natural 
part of human cognition. These concepts have attracted scholars within the management 
sciences, particularly when investigating how consumer and or employee perceptions may 
influence organisational performance (Blodgett, Wakefield and Barnes, 1995; Folkes, 1984; 
1988; Mohr and Bitner, 1995). However, attribution theory in the context of reputation penalties 
research, whilst intuitively promising because of the perceptual nature of both the core concepts; 
irresponsibility and reputation, remains empirically unexplored. Lange and Washburn (2012), 
specifically, have developed a framework which dissects stakeholders’ attributions of corporate 
irresponsibility. Whilst Mishina, Block and Mannor (2012) proposed a model which explains 
reputational assessments as a function of behavioural cues and prior beliefs. These two studies 
significantly inform my conceptualisation of the reputation penalties process. Subsequently, this 
study argues that employing concepts from within attribution theory can provide a more nuanced 
understanding of reputational penalties. Furthermore, at present, the majority of empirical work 
lacks adequate measures of the core constructs. Resultantly, prior theories such as SCCT 
(Coombs and Holladay, 2006) and accepted wisdoms, such as reputation is a ‘fragile’ construct 
(Alsop, 2004) remain inadequately tested. With this in mind, my conceptualisation of the 
reputation penalties process begins with a more inclusive breakdown of the characteristics of 
irresponsibility, moving from broad categories of irresponsibility, to subtler aspects, such as the 
implication of vulnerable stakeholders. 
In light of extant research on attribution theory, the logic underpinning this thesis begins with two 
key insights from this body of work; first, social evaluations are based on perceptions and not an 
objective reality (Wry, 2009). Accordingly, corporate reputations are viewed as social constructs 
formed by perceptions that create a social reality in which an organisation’s reputation can fall 
victim to negative revaluations (Bitektine, 2011). Second, whilst reputations are the outcome of 
collectively held perceptions, they are also sensitive to evaluative changes at the level of 
individual perceivers. Therefore, reputations become sensitive to factors which effect individual 
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cognition (Mishina, Block & Mannor, 2012). In this chapter, I propose that changes in reputation 
are influenced by various contextual, historical and individual level factors. More specifically, I 
outline the variety in prior perceptions of the firm, past histories of offences, and factual 
knowledge which may affect the social evaluative process of reputation penalties. My 
conceptualisation also includes some of the broader facets of irresponsibility that have been 
utilised by the extant empirical, strategic management, reputation, crisis management as well as 
the finance and economics perspectives. The motivation to do this is twofold; firstly, while 
studies have explored the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and firm reputation 
before, to date, the absence of sound theoretical underpinnings have limited researchers’ ability 
to generate robust explanations of reputation penalties. Second, theories of attribution have 
themselves suggested that there may be an underlying cognitive mechanism that can 
fundamentally influence individuals to be distinctly more responsive to negative cues than 
positive ones, termed as ‘the negativity bias’ (see Ito et al., 1998; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; 
Skowronski and Carlston, 1989; Vaish, Grossmann and Woodward, 2008). Research in 
neuroscience has also provided some support for the idea of a negativity bias - the general 
rationale being that the “brain is like Velcro for negative experiences and Teflon for positive 
ones” (Hanson and Mendius, 2009: 41). Consequently, if assessors are distinctly responsive to 
negative information, the possibility of a negativity bias both empirically and theoretically 
motivates a further exploration into the typologies and classifications of irresponsibility currently 
suggested by the reputation penalties literature which purports that, in most cases, corporate 
irresponsibility is associated with significant reputation penalties (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and 
van Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005). In order to elucidate 
theories of attribution, the remainder of this chapter conceptualises the potential relationship 
between irresponsibility and reputation penalties as well as discusses the potential 
contingencies which may amplify or attenuate this relationship. I start by exploring extant 
typologies of irresponsibility and then go on to discuss more nuanced attribution frameworks of 
irresponsibility. Further to this, I specifically investigate the potential contingencies of prior 
perceptions of social responsibility, perceptions of celebrity status, history of corporate 
irresponsibility and financial performance and how these may contextualize, frame and/or shape 
the social judgements and impressions formation process in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
 
2.2. The Relationship between Irresponsibility and Reputation  
Extant reputation penalties research largely suggests that corporate irresponsibility, with few 
exceptions, is associated with significant and negative revisions in corporate reputation (e.g., 
Alexander, 1999; Engelen and van Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and 
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Wehrly, 2005). The market penalties strand of research, which is comprised primarily of the 
finance and economics perspectives, argues that irresponsibility is generally penalised by the 
marketplace. However, the relationship between irresponsibility and reputation or reputation 
penalties has been recently theorized as more complex, because of multiple assessments of the 
events themselves (Lange and Washburn, 2012) as well as being contingencies on assessors’ 
prior knowledge and beliefs (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012).  
This said, it is worth pointing out that attribution theory is a somewhat unified body of work and 
as a result there are some incongruences. On the one hand, a long history of observation in 
social psychology suggests that seldom do individuals update their beliefs in light of 
contradictory evidence (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al., 2013; Lord, Ross and 
Lepper, 1979). In this way, new information is theorised to be ‘path dependent’, meaning that 
new information regarding a particular actor or subject is interpreted based on an individual’s 
prior beliefs and knowledge regarding the specific actor or subject (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 
2012). In other words, individuals’ prior understanding influences their interpretation of events 
and thus, news which does not adequately match previously constructed views, may be 
dismissed. On the other hand, an additional perspective from attribution theory suggests that 
generally, human attention is biased towards negative cues rather than positive ones (Ito et al., 
1998; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Skowronski and Carlston, 1989; Vaish, Grossmann and 
Woodward, 2008). Termed the ‘negativity bias’, this particular perspective may explain why 
extant research from the market penalties literature repeatedly finds significant and negative 
relationships between corporate irresponsibility and organisational reputation. In order to 
elucidate these conflicting theories of attribution, I build into my conceptual model extant 
typologies and broad categories of irresponsibility suggested in the current literature as well as 
those more nuanced, attribution-specific characterisations of irresponsibility which are more 
novel. Hence, this study will also explore empirically the two somewhat conflicting 
conceptualisations of attribution theory. Furthermore, in this chapter I highlight that, although 
individuals may be more distinctly attentive to negative cues, this does not necessarily imply that 
assessors revise their beliefs in accordance with negative information.  
Understanding the underlying characteristics of events has been suggested to be an important 
component of the attribution of irresponsibility process, largely because these event 
characteristics may play a crucial role in the perceiver’s categorisation of irresponsibility (Lange 
and Washburn, 2012). In order for a subject to become the target of hostile social evaluations, 
observers are expected to deem the situation socially undesirable (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). 
Irresponsibility, much similar to reputation, is a social construct created by perceptions. Implicit 
in these assumptions is the idea that, events which may be perceived as significantly negative to 
some individuals, may, in turn, be interpreted positively by others. Porritt, (2005: 199) described 
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this idea best when suggesting that “financial markets respond favorably to announcements of 
cost-cutting programs designed to increase profits by reducing staff costs - The wider 
community is less favorably disposed”. This point was later echoed by Lange and Washburn 
(2012: 301) who suggested that “corporate behaviour is socially irresponsible only to the extent 
that observers perceive it as such”.  Therefore, upon initial contact with the news of an event, 
observers have been suggested to make a preliminary calculation regarding the event’s 
undesirability (Appiah, 2009). This calculation is suggested to be stimulated primarily by an 
individual’s self-preservation instinct (Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008). In other words, observers of 
irresponsibility are expected to initially assess the negativity of an event based on a reflexive 
assessment of how personally threatening they perceive the event to be. In most cases 
however, the effects of irresponsibility do not threaten the lives, livelihoods or lifestyles of 
observers directly, but rather tend to conflict with moral and or social norms (Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1999). It may be this moral conflict which then provides the motivation for corporate 
criticality. Lange and Washburn (2012) framed this as effect undesirability. In essence, Lange 
and Washburn (2012) imply that observers start by assessing the severity of an event, either 
because it has a direct effect on observers or because it undermines their values, with the 
potential of eliciting negative emotional reactions. 
The crisis management and ethics literatures have argued that the sanctity of human life 
(Coombs; 2006; Wines and Napier, 1992), the deliberate deception of individuals (Alsop, 2004) 
and relatedly, the discrimination of individuals on the basis of immoral preconceptions (Dean, 
2004) are broadly perceived to trigger the emotional conflict that underlies an event’s perceived 
effect undesirability (Lange and Washburn, 2012). That said, extant typologies of irresponsibility 
including more broad classifications do not adequately capture the degree of stakeholder 
aversion to irresponsibility; extant typologies and categories bundle events with varying 
undesirability. For instance, a product recall which is also associated with the physical harm of 
infants may be significantly more undesirable and thus be associated with greater reputational 
risk than a product recall that only inconveniences consumers. Yet, broad categories of 
irresponsibility classify these two, potentially very different events from a reputational risk 
perspective, into a single classification, namely product recalls.  
Some theories of attribution suggest that individuals are distinctly responsive to negative news, 
which may imply that the reputational penalties associated with the previous two examples of 
product recalls may be equivalent because individuals are simply cognitively biased toward 
negative information (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This theoretical position, however, jars 
with examples of corporate irresponsibility, such as the varying severity that may exist when 
comparing the Ford/Firestone recalls which resulted in the deaths of over 250 people and 
caused more than 30,000 road accidents; with the Takata airbag recalls with 11 associated 
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fatalities and over 100 injuries associated with it. Since no objective manner exists to predict 
social assessments, I build into my conceptualisation of reputation penalties more nuanced 
attribution frameworks together with extant typologies, including broad categories of corporate 
irresponsibility events, types of harm outcomes, deception and discrimination. Furthermore, the 
conceptual model also distinguishes between harm types such as human injuries and human 
fatalities to provide more nuanced conceptualisations.  
Additionally, theories of attribution also suggest that organisational observers evaluate any 
known contextual information regarding an event in order to build an initial picture of its 
implications (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This information 
could refer to what is relevant or what the observer considers indicative of corporate 
irresponsibility or the firm.  One of the broadest types of irresponsibility categories suggested 
within the literature is the type of harm inflicted on stakeholders as an outcome of firm 
behaviour. Coombs (2007) suggested that irresponsibility has the capacity to harm stakeholders 
financially, physically or emotionally. It is still unclear whether these characteristics alone have 
the capacity to incite stakeholder criticality. In turn, other types of stakeholder harms exist that 
do not sit neatly within the classifications offered by Coombs (2007), such as an infringement of 
stakeholder privacy rights or violations of other civil liberties (e.g. workers being denied the right 
to join a union). Another potential issue with Coombs’ (2007) typology of harm types is that 
environmental harms are captured broadly along with emotional harms. Whilst there are a 
number of limitations to broad categories of irresponsibility, not all cases of observed 
irresponsibility may provoke heterogeneity in opinion.  
Attribution theorists have suggested that some incidents may create broader social disapproval 
because they violate widely accepted societal norms (Donaldson and Dumfee, 1999). The 
sanctity of human life and the deliberate deception of individuals are believed to pervade 
individual and or cultural differences (Donaldson, 2009). Whilst empirical evidence from the 
market penalties literature accepts this to be often the case (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 
1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009), other scholars such 
as Zyglidopoulos (2001) found no support for the claim that irresponsibility associated with 
damage to human life has a negative impact on corporate reputation in his study of Fortune’s 
WMAC annual survey. What might be concluded from these inconsistencies in the literature is 
that, we have yet to fully understand the basic underlying processes of social judgements and 
impressions formation and how these then relate to reputation assessments. In order to 
progress our understanding, the conceptual development of this specific research study will 
include a variety of broad event characteristics ranging from event types, such as human rights 
controversies, worker health and safety incidents, environmental violations and accounting 
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fraud, to subtler aspects of irresponsibility highlighted by Lange and Washburn (2012) to 
develop a more holistic conceptual approach to understanding reputation penalties. 
Other nuanced aspects of the social impressions process have been offered by attribution 
theorists. Notably, social disapproval may be established based on a number of causal 
inferences, in that for a firm to become the target of disapproval, observers would have to deem 
the organisation to be, in some respect, culpable for the irresponsibility event. In line with the 
initial work of Heider (1958), scholars have suggested that observers first resolve the degree to 
which an effect is causal to internal versus external factors (Lange and Washburn, 2012; 
Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). In other words, social evaluators assign blame for an event 
to either the firm, factors within the firms’ environment or a combination of the two. For example, 
if a firm is found to have breached workplace safety regulations and subsequently this breach 
resulted in the death of an employee, social evaluators may causally infer culpability towards the 
firm. If later it transpires that the deceased workers’ faculties were diminished by drug or alcohol 
use on the day of the incident, it may potentially result in a diminished causal inference towards 
the firm from those assessing the case. The plausibility of this concept is often captured 
implicitly within the crisis management literature in comments that irresponsibility is highly 
ambiguous in nature (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Lagadec, 1997; Ulmer and Sellnow, 1997; 
2000) and often used to further the argument concerning the need to tailor managerial 
responses to events (Laufer and Coombs, 2006; Ulmer and Sellnow, 1997; 2000). The potential 
relevance of these discreet nuances of corporate irresponsibility undermines the notion that 
broad classifications of irresponsibility are sufficient to study corporate reputation, or any other 
research phenomenon concerned with the subjective process of social judgements and 
impressions formation of individual assessors.  
In other instances, stakeholders learn directly from events because of their proximity to and/or 
relationship with specific firm behaviours. In the example given above, employees may become 
aware of safety incidents because of their location or via word-of-mouth. However, because 
most corporate behaviour cannot be observed directly, attribution theorists suggest that 
individuals make attributions about the underlying characteristics of an actor based on the 
behaviour which they do observe (Kelley, 1973). Therefore, in addition to the contextual 
information highlighted by event characteristics, my conceptualisation of reputation penalties 
emphasises the important role of the media in drawing stakeholder attention to organisational 
behaviour. As many stakeholders do not experience events first hand, they rely on 
‘infomediaries’ such as news media to deliver the message (Zavyalova et al., 2012). This may 
be particularly relevant for developments involving the actions of large multinational firms, as 
their behaviour, by definition, spans geographical boundaries and therefore news media become 
important in dispersing news of these organisations’ actions across wider audiences. Because 
48 
 
Western media in particular have increased freedom to select the issues to be communicated, 
some incidents of corporate irresponsibility may obtain more coverage than others. This idea is 
captured within the literature on agenda setting, in which news have historically been somewhat 
significant toward influencing the collective social attention (see Rogers, Dearing and Bregman, 
1993). The apparent influence of the media is even more evident when comparing the disparity 
in news coverage between world events. The British Petroleum oil spill off the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Jebel al-Zayt oil spill off the coast of Egypt are illustrative of the media gravitating 
towards certain events whilst neglecting others, despite both of these spills occurring weeks of 
one another. Although not directly relevant to the initial conceptual development outlined here, 
these ideas form part of the methodological orientation of the thesis, in that the reporting of 
irresponsibility events may be a critical factor in awareness of corporate irresponsibility events, 
and subsequently influence reputational assessments. 
In view of building a more holistic conceptual approach, this thesis introduces an inclusive 
breakdown of potentially salient event characteristics, from broad categories of events to more 
nuanced aspects of corporate irresponsibility phenomena, such as affected party non-complicity, 
effect undesirability and corporate culpability. Although broad classifications have been typically 
used throughout the extant reputation penalties literature (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 
1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009), notable studies (i.e. 
Zyglidopoulos, 2001) found few statistically significant findings for the relationships between 
irresponsibility and reputation penalties (or lack thereof). A potential reason for this could be due 
to the underlying nature of the reputation construct, as assessments of the firm have been 
suggested to vary depending on what exactly about the firm is being assessed (Lange, Lee and 
Dai, 2011). In the case of research which uses short-run stock market proxies of reputation, the 
data may be capturing risk assessments of stakeholders’ own short-term financial losses rather 
than characteristics of the firm associated with the irresponsibility. Given that shareholders have 
also been suggested to overreact to bad news (Gillet et al., 2010) and that research does not 
track share prices over a significant period of time (most often a number of days to potentially 
weeks), reputation penalties may be distinctly overrepresented by the market penalties strand of 
reputation penalties research.  
This said, the market penalties literature proposes that some stakeholders are more 
fundamental to the firm’s business operations. More specifically, events that victimise 
stakeholders with direct relationships to the firm’s access to resources, revenue generation and 
costs, may be more likely to generate significantly greater reputation penalties than events 
which affect the lives, lifestyles or livelihoods of stakeholders with an indirect relationship to the 
firm’s core business operations (see Engelen and Essen, 2010). On its own, the relevance of an 
event category is limited from an attribution perspective, as firms can be associated with a 
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category of irresponsibility but not be perceived as culpable for causing the event itself (Lange 
and Washburn, 2012). In other words, just because a firm is mentioned to have behaved in a 
particular manner does not necessarily imply that assessors will perceive the firm as the culprit. 
What is more, assuming that causal inferences are made by stakeholders towards a specific 
firm, such assessments may not be considered ‘diagnostic’ of the firm’s ‘true’ character or 
capabilities (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Herein lies my main theoretical argument in 
relation to the relevance of the negativity bias, as the cognitive awareness of negative cues over 
positive ones does not necessarily imply that individuals subsequently view negatively the 
subject of the cue. Observers may not always update their assessments in light of negative 
information, even when alerted to the possibility of potential negligence or wrongdoing because 
they may feel that the information is not typical or a true reflection of the organisation. 
Additionally, extant empirical evidence from social psychology suggests that individuals are 
generally reluctant to alter their established beliefs in line with contradictory evidence (Asch, 
1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). In turn, some 
categories of corporate irresponsibility are more specific and somewhat restrict the availability of 
alternative interpretations, particularly in the case of event categories that only come to public 
attention as a result of government or legal investigations, such as accounting frauds.  
In some instances, the availability of alternative explanations for corporate behaviour is more 
limited because the likelihood of observers deriving causation to external factors within a firm’s 
environment is relatively lower. Event categories such as accounting fraud, stock options 
backdating and financial restatements are such examples; in that they harm a particular group of 
stakeholders with a direct relationship to the firm’s financial success and who have the capacity, 
when harmed, to hinder the organisation by for instance, withdrawing capital from the firm. 
Furthermore, the potential outcomes of backdating scandals, accounting fraud and financial 
restatements are unlike other categories of financial misconduct such as tax fraud, in that they 
may have a diminished capacity to be interpreted differently by different stakeholders. 
Particularly, taxation-centered irresponsibilities are interesting from an attribution theoretic 
position, as there is potential for some of the firm’s stakeholders to interpret such behaviour as a 
positive attempt to, for instance, retain capital expenditure (Porritt, 2005). Porritt (2005) 
suggested that this variation in stakeholder perceptions was also the case for organisational 
downsizing, yet it may be applicable to other corporate behaviour with the perceived intention of 
maximising profitability, such as environmental violations, child labor use or human rights 
violations. Whilst these types of events have a distinct capacity to break widely held social 
norms (Donaldson and Dumfee, 1999), research has yet to determine whether different 
categories of corporate irresponsibility have a lasting impression on the beliefs of stakeholders 
because extant empirical studies tend to model the effects of irresponsibility using narrow time 
windows, rather than longitudinally. 
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With these points in mind, my conceptualisation of the reputation penalties process begins with 
two distinct groups of event characteristics. The first includes the broader categorisations of 
irresponsibility expressed by the extant literature which include the event type (i.e. product 
recall, accounting fraud, management compensation), the harm type (financial, physical, 
emotional, civil liberties and environmental) and whether the event was associated with human 
injuries, fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses. These ideas are built into the 
conceptual model for two reasons; first, some theories of attribution have suggested that 
individuals are subject to negativity biases (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012) which may 
indicate that there is theoretical merit to the position that there are inevitable reputation penalties 
associated with corporate irresponsibility. In order to explore the relevance of this position, this 
study tests extant typologies prior to assessing the relevance of more nuanced attribution 
frameworks. Second, to date, the majority of the available empirical evidence does not 
adequately or robustly measure the reputation construct, providing the basis for an initial 
questioning of the basic assumptions of extant research. Despite the empirical attention given to 
reputation penalties from a market penalties perspective, the lack of sound theoretical 
underpinnings limits the capacity of this corpus of work to generate robust conclusions regarding 
the underlying nature of reputational harms. Generally, the findings from this body of literature 
contend that most acts of irresponsibility, with the exception of environmental harms, have a 
significant and negative impact on corporate reputation changes (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and 
Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005). Whilst the findings of the 
market penalties literature would support the presence of a negativity bias in the main, 
stakeholders have also been suggested to overreact in response to corporate irresponsibility 
and as a result, the findings of this body of work may be significantly overstated (Gillet et al, 
2010). Informed by the positions previously described, I broadly propose that, 
Proposition 1: There is no overall association between observed corporate 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. 
Proposition 2: There is no association between observed corporate irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation when events are categorised broadly (such as extant 
irresponsibility classifications, harm types, association with various harms to human life, 
deception, discrimination and job losses). 
Proposition 3: There is a negative association between the presence of events with high 
degrees of perceived effect undesirability, firm culpability, and affected party non-complicity and 
changes in corporate reputation. 
Even though the events have been suggested to provide important cues to organisational 
assessors regarding ‘what stakeholders are assessing’, the degree to which these cues are in 
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themselves indicative of firm irresponsibility has been questioned. In light of this, some notable 
studies have proposed that of equal importance to the social judgments and impressions 
process is also ‘who is being assessed?’ (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). 
 
2.3. The Moderating Effects of Prior Stakeholder Beliefs and Knowledge 
Recent theorizing within the reputation penalties literature posits that stakeholder attributions are 
‘path dependent’, in that news regarding a firm are suggested to be interpreted on the basis of 
individuals’ pre-existing knowledge and beliefs (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). In other 
words, stakeholder beliefs or biases may shape the attributions made in light of the newly 
attained information (such as news of corporate irresponsibility). Observers ‘sense-making’ of 
events may thus be guided by their prior beliefs of the firms’ character and/or capabilities. 
Therefore, event characteristics may only illustrate part of the broader picture of the reputation 
penalties process. An acknowledgement of the mediating properties of contextual information 
has been explored by extant reputation penalties literature, particularly from the strategic 
management and corporate social responsibility perspectives, where a good reputation has 
been argued to provide organisations a form of ‘reputation insurance’ that may ‘offset’ the 
associated reputational risks of corporate irresponsibility (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; 
Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Janney and Gove, 2011; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Vanhamme 
and Grobben, 2009). Yet, expectancy-violations research has suggested that a positive prior 
reputation for social performance can create greater expectancy violations of corporate 
irresponsibility (Burgoon, 1978; Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). Empirical evidence from Janney 
and Gove (2011) found that firms with overall positive reputations suffered reduced market-
penalties after general irresponsibility, suggesting evidence of reputation insurance/buffering. 
Interestingly, the study also found that firms with an enhanced reputation for certain 
characteristics, such as governance, were penalised more for events which pertained 
specifically to governance failures (Janney and Gove, 2011). This may indicate that specific 
types of irresponsibility are interpreted as hypocritical, prompting stakeholders to revise-down 
their assessments of the firm in light of such acts of irresponsibility. Similarly, Rhee and 
Haunschild (2006) found that automotive firms with increased reputations for product/service 
quality undergo significantly greater market penalties following product recall announcements.  
Having said this, at present, there is uncertainty concerning the conditions that elicit these two 
contrasting attribution processes. On the one hand, individuals are observed to be reluctant to 
update their beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; 
Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Yet greater stakeholder expectations may lead 
some firms to be held to higher moral standards than others (Kim, 2014). Though Janney and 
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Gove (2011) found evidence of reputation buffering when assessing reputation more broadly, 
they also suggested that, when the constituent elements of reputation are unpacked, they may 
potentially unveil more nuanced stakeholder assessments at work.  
Whilst a more comprehensive breakdown of event characteristics may assist our understanding 
of the types of events that are perceived as irresponsible, equally, a more extensive analysis of 
firm characteristics will help elucidate which firms are vulnerable to them. In other words, event 
characteristics may provide some analytical basis to understand; ‘what stakeholders are 
assessing’ but the nature of the firm’s reputational elements may offer additional information 
towards the question of ‘who exactly are stakeholders assessing?’ and ‘what specifically about 
them are stakeholders assessing?’ A significant body of work has conceptualised the various 
facets that comprise corporate reputation, including ideas of awareness (Shamsie, 2003), brand 
(Saxton and Dollinger, 2004), personality (Davies et al., 2001), and the perceived quality of 
products and services (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Boyd, Bergh, and Ketchen, 2010; Rhee 
and Haunschild, 2006; Rindova et al, 2005; Washington and Zajac, 2005; Shapiro, 1983); as 
well as specific qualities attributed to the firm such as the organisation’s perceived ability to 
generate superior financial performance (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006), its 
environmental activities (Carter, 2006; Deutsch and Ross, 2003), its perceived innovativeness 
(Carter, 2006) and managerial competence (Mayer, 2006).  
With these points in mind, I start my conceptual exploration of the possible contingencies within 
the reputation penalties process by assessing the relevance of assessors’ prior perceptions of 
social performance. I begin with stakeholder perceptions of social responsibility because 
seemingly, this belief captures assessors’ expectations of firm behaviour in relation to 
irresponsibility. Whilst socially responsible firms may not be expected to behave in such a 
manner or their behaviour may not be perceived diagnostic or typical of the firm’s true character 
of capabilities; firms believed to be generally socially irresponsible may be largely expected to 
behave irresponsibly. I then go on to explore another stakeholder perception associated with the 
celebrity status of the firm and how a firm’s degree of ‘celebrity’ may influence the relationship 
between corporate irresponsibility and changes in reputation. From these more subjective 
stakeholder assessments, I then explore more objective accounts regarding the frequency of 
past offences of the firm, namely the firm’s history of corporate irresponsibility, as well as 
unpack the relevance of the firm’s current financial performance to assess whether these factors 
are important to the process of reputation penalties. 
Though I explore four distinct categories of stakeholder beliefs and more objective knowledge 
regarding the firm’s character and capabilities, it has been noted that seldom does research 
explore multiple facets of reputation (Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011). That said, there are a number 
53 
 
of exceptions, each attempting to understand aspects of reputation (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Fischer and Reuber, 2007; Love and Kraatz, 2009; Staw 
and Epstein, 2000). In this study, the conceptualisation of the reputation penalties process 
follows this tradition. Therefore, I conceptualise the relationship between irresponsibility and 
changes in reputation to be contingent on four primary stakeholder perceptions of the firm; the 
first focuses on the firm’s reputation for social responsibility, mainly because irresponsibility may 
be perceived as hypocritical or largely expected depending on the level of repute obtained 
through CSR efforts. Second, the level of celebrity status of the firm may be salient to 
reputational assessments in light of irresponsibility because the level of firm celebrity may 
influence the degree of media coverage of irresponsibility attributing the firm to a negative social 
outcome and therefore potentially increasing the probability of wider stakeholder criticality. 
Thirdly, the frequency with which a firm is associated with irresponsibility is often suggested 
within the crisis management literature as an important facet of irresponsibility attributions 
(Coombs, 2006; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; 2002) that lacks robust empirical exploration to 
date. It is, therefore, considered appropriate to explore the firm’s history of corporate 
irresponsibility because stakeholders may draw on past experiences of irresponsibility to 
determine the likelihood of the organisation’s culpability (Weiner, 1985). Finally, this study 
conceptualises that the financial reputation of the organisation plays a role in mitigating or 
amplifying the effect of irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation. I specifically highlight 
the importance of financial reputation, theoretically at least, because firms held in greater 
financial regard may ‘offset’ the associated reputational risks of irresponsibility, whereas firms 
already considered to have inadequate financial performance may be considered at a 
disadvantage in their attempts to remediate the effects of irresponsibility.  
 
2.4. The Moderating Effect of Prior Knowledge of the Firm: Perceptions of Social 
Responsibility  
Corporate social responsibility and corporate reputation have been described as being ‘two 
sides of the same coin’ (Hillenbrand and Money, 2007) and owning an enhanced reputation for 
social performance has been purported to buffer the potential harms associated with acts of 
corporate irresponsibility (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Janney 
and Gove, 2011; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). The logic being 
that until the news of irresponsibility emerge, the firm acted largely in accordance with social 
expectations of it, providing assessors with cause to omit the firm’s violation. More nuanced 
theorisations in attribution theory suggest that the ability of an enhanced reputation to offset or 
buffer the reputational damage in light of irresponsibility may instead be the consequence of 
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assessors not considering the event ‘diagnostic’ of the firm’s ‘true’ character or capabilities 
(Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This means that assessors may not consider the news of 
irresponsibility to be in line with their general sense of the firm, particularly when the firm has 
already built positive associations with those assessors. Stakeholders may therefore not update 
their beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence, which is supported by a history of 
observations in social psychology (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, 
Ross and Lepper, 1979) and empirical evidence suggesting that organisational assessors are 
generally less inclined to penalise firms which are broadly recognised as reputable (Ducassy, 
2013; Jones, Jones and Little, 2000; Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010; Sanchez, Sotorrio and 
Diez, 2012). This may be because during the attribution process of corporate irresponsibility 
stakeholders are assessing specific aspects of a firm’s character or capabilities that the 
behaviour pertains to (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Here, it is important to clarify that I 
refer to ‘capabilities’ as the “collective evaluations about the quality and performance 
characteristics of a particular firm (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986)” (Mishina, Block and 
Mannor, 2012: 460). Whilst aspects of a firm’s ‘character’ relate specifically to the “collective 
judgments regarding a firm’s incentive structures and behavioral tendencies based on 
observations of its prior actions… note that character reputations are not simply about incentive 
structures, but rather about the imputation that stakeholder groups make about the target 
organization’s goals, preferences, and organizational values (e.g., Love and Kraatz, 2009)” 
(Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012: 460).  
However, Janney and Gove (2011) found that governance-related irresponsibilities were more 
significantly impactful for firms which had previously positive reputations pertaining to 
governance. This may indicate that firms with prominent elements to their reputation such as 
being well governed, socially responsible, or innovative may suffer more significant reputation 
penalties when events of corresponding nature are revealed to its stakeholders. Irresponsibility, 
and the subsequent reputation penalties that may follow, may therefore be highly context 
specific. Some acts of corporate irresponsibility may be seen as less relevant or diagnostic, 
particularly when the firm has enhanced perceptions pertaining to social responsibility. 
Stakeholders may, however, also view the actions of socially responsible organisations as 
hypocritical when associated with corporate irresponsibility. Yet, generally, research in social 
psychology suggest that individuals rarely update their perceptions in light of contradictory 
information. For this reason, firms believed to be poor social performers may also benefit from 
this tendency, as irresponsibility may be largely expected and thus assessors tend not to 
change their perceptions. Whilst this may be beneficial in light of corporate irresponsibility, it 
may not be as beneficial when firms attempt to enhance their reputations (Du, Bhattacharya and 
Sen, 2010; Elving, 2013; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli and Schwarz, 2006).  Firms with neither distinctly 
positive nor negative social responsibility reputations may be, theoretically at least, most 
55 
 
vulnerable in light of irresponsibility because they neither own the reputational insurance 
associated with having a positive reputation for social responsibility nor are expected to largely 
behave irresponsibly. Therefore, it is generally proposed that, 
Proposition 4a: Firms with strong positive and strong negative prior reputations for 
social responsibility will not be associated with significant reputation penalties in light of 
corporate irresponsibility. 
Proposition 4b: Firms with moderate (above and below average) prior reputations for 
social responsibility will be associated with significant reputation penalties in light of corporate 
irresponsibility. 
 
2.5. The Moderating Effect of Prior Knowledge of the Firm: Celebrity Status 
A distinctive aspect related to corporate reputation is its status relative to other peer 
organisations (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006). Firms with greater celebrity status may be 
able to garner increased stakeholder attention because external audiences tend to follow 
prominent firms more closely (Brooks et al., 2003) particularly in the news media (Carroll and 
McCombs, 2003). When a firm reaches a high degree of prevalence within the markets and 
wider communities in which it operates, it may be endowed with a degree of celebrity that can 
have both positive and negative implications for that firm. On the one hand, it appears logical to 
assume that celebrity firms may have distinct advantages over non-celebrity firms in their ability 
to communicate marketing messages, attract talented labour and or negotiate better contractual 
terms with other organisations such as suppliers and distributors. However, the ability to 
generate increased stakeholder attention may not be as beneficial when the firm engages in, or 
is associated with, acts of irresponsibility. Specifically, organisations with celebrity status may be 
more widely exposed to stakeholder criticality. In their analysis of ‘earnings surprises’ using US 
stock market data, Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova (2010: 1144) found that “firms possessing 
either high reputation or celebrity experience greater rewards for positive surprises and smaller 
penalties for negative surprises than firms that do not possess these assets”. Whilst this study 
suggests that increased celebrity status may shield the firm from stock market losses, it is 
unclear how earnings announcements impact reputation. In light of irresponsibility, being a 
celebrity firm may have its downsides. These disadvantages may be particularly salient in 
incidents where stakeholders find it implausible to attribute responsibility for an event to external 
factors. As suggested earlier in this chapter, Lange and Washburn (2012) identified that, the 
degree of corporate culpability is likely to be an important aspect of assessors’ irresponsibility 
attributions. A straightforward extension of this theorisation is that incidents which have few 
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plausible external causes focus stakeholder attention towards a single culprit. Further, when the 
event involves a firm with greater celebrity status, it may increase the number of potential 
stakeholders that will also conclude the firm to be culpable for causing the event. Equally, firms 
which do not possess a celebrity status, particularly those with very low visibility amongst 
potential organisational assessors, garner less attention following discreditable corporate 
behaviours. In this context, being a non-celebrity firm, or being ‘under the radar’, may influence 
the frequency of news of irresponsibility, in that irresponsibility is less known to the firm’s wider 
audiences, therefore mitigating the potential impact and frequency of stakeholder criticality. 
Since some firms are better known than others (Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010), this study 
proposes that, 
Proposition 5a: Firms with increased levels of organisational celebrity will be distinctly 
vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
Proposition 5b: Firms with moderate to low levels of organisational celebrity will not be 
vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
 
2.6. The Moderating Effect of Prior Knowledge of the Firm: History of Corporate 
Irresponsibility  
From an attribution perspective, stakeholders’ contextual knowledge may be utilised in order to 
generate more accurate causal inferences in light of irresponsibility. This is because assessors 
may repeatedly observe organisational behaviour over time and in multiple situations (Weiner, 
1985). Repeat observations have the potential to create both a corporate reputation endowed 
with being known for positive characteristics, such as being a good social actor or being 
financially successful - as well as negative ones, such as having a propensity for creating social, 
economic and or environmental harm (Coombs, 2007; Dean, 2004; Schultz, Ultz and Gortiz, 
2011; Weber, Erickson and Stone, 2011). However, firms may develop both positive and 
negative reputational attributes based on a variety of observations amongst different aspects of 
corporate social, economic, environmental and operational performance. What is more, some 
types of behaviours are more common in specific industries, which may alter norms and 
expectations - particularly when organisations are perceived to be relatively similar (Yu and 
Lester, 2008). This may be the case within the automotive industry with product recalls, or 
product harm associated often with firms operating in the pharmaceutical industry, or 
environmental incidents within the petrochemical industry as well as intellectual property 
disputes which are more frequent in the consumer technology industry. These observations of 
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similar behaviours amongst various firms operating within an industry tend to create stakeholder 
expectations surrounding specific types of irresponsibility.  
That said, whilst certain industries may have a propensity for certain kinds of irresponsibility, the 
more frequent an organisation is associated with wrongdoing, the more likely assessors may be 
to infer their behaviour as part of an unfolding pattern of events, rather than an isolated, ‘one off’ 
incident. With this in mind, this study builds into the conceptual model the contingent effect of a 
firm’s history of irresponsibility. In doing so, this study places stakeholder judgements and 
impressions in a more natural setting, whereby stakeholders are believed to attribute causation 
based on multiple observations of firm behaviour, rather than in isolation (Weiner, 1985). This 
may be particularly relevant when the culpability of an event is ambiguous; consequently, the 
reoccurrence of a firm being associated with a negative outcome would make it more likely for 
assessors to conclude that the firm is, indeed, (one of) the culprit(s) (Coombs, 2006). 
Organisations that have not been frequently associated with acts of irresponsibility may be given 
the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and considered to merit further observation before assessors revise 
their reputational assessments in light of irresponsibility. With the previous points in mind, this 
study proposes that, 
Proposition 6a: Firms with the most populous history of corporate irresponsibility will be 
distinctly vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
Proposition 6b: Firms with moderate to the least populous history of corporate 
irresponsibility will not be vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
 
2.7. The Moderating Effect of Prior Knowledge of the Firm:  Financial Performance 
Strong financial performance may bolster stakeholders’ overall impressions of firm reputation, 
particularly when the assessor group has a primarily economic relationship with the firm. 
Fundamentally, economic capabilities may be the single most relevant aspect of reputation for 
certain assessor groups, such as shareholders, market analysts, competitors and other peer 
organisations. This study makes the theoretical assumption that assessments of corporate 
reputation following an observed act of irresponsibility are shaped by stakeholders’ assessments 
of financial performance because the focal assessor groups employed here have an economic 
relationship with the firms in the sample. More specifically, the occupations of market analysts 
are specifically oriented around the assessment of organisations’ financial capabilities, whilst 
managers may be motivated to maintain a keen sense of the competition and the broader 
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market players’ financial health over time, because this knowledge may prove strategically 
beneficial to their own organisations (Hambrick, 1982).  
With this in mind, I theorise that enhanced financial performance may shield the firm from 
significant and negative assessor revisions in light of corporate irresponsibility akin to 
suppositions advanced by the strategic management perspective which suggests that generally, 
a positive prior reputation may play a role in offsetting the risk associated with irresponsibility 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Janney and Gove, 2011; Minor 
and Morgan, 2011; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). In terms of general observations of 
irresponsibility, I suggest that firms with strong financial performance may offset the associated 
reputational risks, whereas worse financial performers may be in a significantly weaker position 
after revelations of irresponsibility because the firm may already be considered to be 
underperforming. Those performing neither distinctly well, nor poorly, may be able to tolerate 
moderate reputational risks when compared to those with lesser financial performance because 
a proportion of the firm’s reputation, that of financial performance, is somewhat more enhanced. 
The aggregate perceptions of those with enhanced financial performance may be able to 
withstand greater impacts in other domains where they are being assessed, such as impacts to 
perceptions of social responsibility. Moderate economic performers may neither be particularly 
penalised, nor able to shield themselves from the totality of the risks associated with stakeholder 
wrongdoing because their reputations for financial performance are neither enhanced enough 
buffer from the effects associated with irresponsibility nor, I theorise, are they insignificant. In 
view of these points, it is proposed that, 
Proposition 7a: Firms with increased financial performance will be not be distinctly 
vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
Proposition 7b: Firms with lower levels of financial performance will be increasingly 
vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility. 
 
2.8. Conceptualising the Process of How Corporate Irresponsibility Impacts Social 
Evaluations of the Firm 
With the previous points in mind, here I give an overview of my conceptualisation of the 
relationship between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. In each 
empirical chapter, I refer to the corresponding features of this conceptual model in order to 
illustrate the relevant concepts of interest. Here, my conceptual framework starts with the 
primary relationship between ‘irresponsibility characteristics’, the ‘stakeholder judgements and 
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impressions’ of these, and the subsequent possibility that this process may lead to downstream 
aggregate revisions in ‘corporate reputation’. My conceptualisation of this process places 
stakeholders’ social judgements and impressions at its heart. This is in line with perspectives of 
attribution (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012), as well as the views 
of sociologist and philosopher Habermas (1975: 58) who suggested that “the crisis cannot be 
separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it”. Habermas’s (1975) proposition is 
central to the theoretical (and later methodological) conceptualisation of the link between 
corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. Fundamentally, the conceptual 
model describes that, any potential source of reputation risk is the result of social evaluations 
made in light of irresponsibility and its constituent components. The constituents of 
irresponsibility are illustrated in the box titled ‘Corporate Irresponsibility’ and are divided into two 
discreet sections; the first section describes extant typologies and broad categories of 
irresponsibility which are typical of the reputation penalties research. The second group 
specifically pertains to more recent, attribution specific characterisations of irresponsibility, 
namely those offered by Lange and Washburn (2012) i.e. ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived 
culpability’ and ‘affected party non-complicity’. 
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 Figure 2.1: Overarching conceptual framework on the relationship between corporate 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
 
However, events do not exist in isolation as stakeholder judgements and impressions may be 
drawn from a rich biography of pre-existing knowledge and perceptions of the firm (Mishina, 
Block and Mannor, 2012). Therefore, my conceptualisation of the link between irresponsibility 
and changes in corporate reputation is also contingent on four aspects of stakeholders’ prior 
knowledge of the firm illustrated in Figure 2.1. Later in the empirical chapters of this thesis, I go 
on to model the effects of each in turn. Further, my conceptual model first describes more 
subjective contingencies in this relationship, namely social responsibility reputation and celebrity 
status. In line with my previous discussion, perceptions of social responsibility and celebrity 
status may significantly differ depending on the organisation. These differences may in turn 
shape stakeholders’ judgements and impressions in light of irresponsibility. Thus, I build into my 
model the variables, ‘prior social responsibility’ and ‘celebrity status’. Subsequently, I explore 
these two contingent aspects of the firm in Chapter 5.  
What is more, I also describe two other relevant, yet distinctly more objective aspects of the firm 
which may influence stakeholder judgements and impressions, namely the firm’s ‘history of 
corporate irresponsibility’ and ‘financial performance’. I describe these two variables as more 
‘objective’ characteristics and capabilities than perceptions of social responsibility and celebrity 
status because these elements are more factual in nature; prior incidents of irresponsibility and 
the financial performance of the firm are grouped together and explored in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. Taken in its entirety, my conceptualisation of the relationship between irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation places stakeholder judgements and impressions at its center. 
This position is in line with attribution theories which emphasise the importance of social 
perceptions of both irresponsibility attributes (Lange and Washburn, 2012) and their subsequent 
effects on corporate reputations (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This departs from previous, 
large-scale empirical work on reputation penalties (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and van Essen, 
2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005), which has a tendency to abstract 
social perceptions away from the process of reputation penalties. Here I put ‘the perceiver’ back 
into analytical focus, suggesting that stakeholder interpretations in light of irresponsibility may be 
influenced by both characteristics of irresponsibility (extant typologies and attribution-based 
irresponsibility characteristics) as well as shaped by their prior beliefs (social responsibility and 
celebrity status perceptions) and knowledge of the firm (history of corporate irresponsibility and 
financial performance). Figure 2.1 illustrates my conceptualisation of this relationship and will be 
partially depicted as a point of reference throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will cover the overall research strategy of this thesis. In other words, it will not cover 
details of samples or methodology specific to the empirical chapters - that will be covered within 
each empirical chapter; it will rather present overarching information about the methods used 
and key considerations that underpin this work. It will start with a discussion on the epistemology 
and ontology that guided this research. This will be followed by an explanation of the research 
strategy and design used in relation to what has been done in previous empirical reputation 
penalties research. Then, this chapter discusses the data employed. Again, this chapter does 
not intend to cover the specific sample of each empirical study, but rather present the key data 
sources and justify the choice of data. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of 
the limitations of the approach utilised. 
 
3.2. Epistemology and Ontology 
Epistemology refers to “what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline” 
(Bryman, 2008: 13). There are two core epistemological paradigms with other sub-paradigms 
branching off from these over time. Namely positivism and interpretivism, are divided within the 
broader discussion on whether the social world can and should be studied following the same 
approach as the one applied to the natural sciences (Bryman, 2008). Positivism is an 
epistemological position that supports the application of the methods of the natural sciences to 
the study of the social world. Among other aspects, positivism proposes that an objective 
external reality exists beyond our descriptions of it and that only knowledge that can be 
confirmed by the senses can, in fact, be considered knowledge (Bryman, 2008). The position 
that underlines this study is that corporate social performance is an observable phenomenon 
which, despite the challenges discussed earlier can, in fact, be measured. 
Ontology, on the other hand, refers to whether the social world is external to the actors 
(objectivism), or if it is something actors are in the process of building and modifying 
continuously (constructionism) (Bryman, 2008). If understood as a continuum between those 
extremes, this thesis leans towards objectivism, in that it views organisations as concrete 
objects, with their own set of rules, procedures and hierarchies that exist separate from actors. 
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3.3. Research Methodology 
The research methodology applied in this thesis is guided by the objective to answer three main 
questions on the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation: 
(1) Is irresponsibility associated with broad reputational effects?  
(2) Which characteristics of observed irresponsibility are associated with the most significant 
reputation penalties?  
(3) Which perceived firm attributes are most relevant to the reputation penalties process?  
3.4. Research Strategy 
Here I describe the research strategy of this thesis. At the broadest level, a choice of whether 
quantitative or qualitative data is necessary and or appropriate considering the nature of the 
research questions asked. The latter places emphasis on language typically through an 
inductive approach, viewing our social reality in constant change, as a result of individuals’ 
creation (Bowen, 2008). Quantitative methods however focus specifically on quantification of 
phenomena and instead view social reality as an objective one, external to the social actor. 
Though commentators in the philosophy of social sciences have generally steered away from 
the term positivism because of problems associated with the underlying nature of studying 
‘open’ social systems (Bhaskar, 1975) and some level of unease with reductionist approaches 
(Bullock and Trombley, 1999), the positivist paradigm generally uses a deductive approach to 
establishing the relationship between theory and research, i.e. going from theory, to hypothesis 
building, data collection, results, review of hypotheses and of theory (Bryman, 2008). Work from 
the positivist paradigm typically utilises a quantitative research strategy and is followed by a 
process of deduction, as outlined below: 
1. Theoretical review: review of different theories explaining the relationship between 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. Development of an overarching 
conceptual framework, followed by specific theoretical pieces within each empirical 
chapter, i.e. focusing on each empirical question. 
2. Hypotheses: Based on the theory, development of specific hypotheses in regards to 
each of the three empirical questions within each empirical chapter. 
3. Data collection: Based on the theoretical review and informed by previous empirical 
work, gathering of secondary data followed both for the dependent and independent 
variables. 
4. Findings: Data analysis followed, and relevant findings emerged. 
5. Hypotheses review: Following the findings, the hypothesised relationships were 
reviewed and either supported or not supported. 
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6. Revision of theory: A discussion on the extent to which, and how specifically findings 
and theory align or contradict each other, closes each empirical chapter and the overall 
thesis. 
Although the epistemological landscape is significantly richer than outlined above (Boyd, 1991; 
Brown, 1970; Hacking, 1983; Hesse, 1980) the underlying motivation of the research questions 
in this study necessitates an epistemological orientation which is conducive to assessing large 
quantities of perception-based data. To manage a large number of observations, a quantitative 
strategy was identified most appropriate. 
3.5. Research Design 
This thesis employs a longitudinal research design which involves repeated observations of the 
same variables over time (Bryman, 2008), making it a valuable tool to employ in this study in 
order to understand, for example, what influences changes in corporate reputation. 
3.6. Method of Analysis 
Given this thesis’ interest in understanding predictors of reputation penalties, and in line with 
previous studies on corporate reputation or reputational penalties (notably, Brammer and 
Millington, 2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), this study employs multiple linear regression 
analysis. This statistical method was applied due to the characteristics of the dependent 
variable, which is a continuous, scalar variable; and the mix of both categorical and continuous 
independent variables which can either positively or negatively influence a firm’s reputation 
scores. Regression coefficients for linear relationships represent the mean change in the 
dependent variable (changes in reputation) for every one unit of change in the independents, 
while holding other predictors in the regression model constant.   
3.7. Alignment with Research Within the Broader Reputation Literature 
In addition to being methodologically appropriate to achieve the objectives of this thesis, the 
choices of strategy, design and methods are largely aligned with some previous research on 
corporate reputation more broadly (e.g., Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006) and one study specifically on the phenomena of interest (see Zyglidopoulos, 2001). The 
majority of empirical research on reputation penalties is quantitative in orientation with more 
robust works from the market-penalties perspective generally utilising large data samples (e.g., 
Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and 
Tibbs, 2009); however, longitudinal approaches remain lacking in this literature. 
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3.8. Data 
It should be specified here that the dataset if an unbalanced panel and estimations use pooled 
data. This section presents the dependent and independent variables used in this study. 
Specific details on the sub-sampling and building of the dependent variable will be provided 
within each empirical chapter. This section will offer an overview of the variables used, the 
sources used and some of the challenges encountered in the process of data collection. 
Following a revision of the literature and the conceptual development, independent and control 
variables were selected for each empirical chapter. Table 3.1 below summarises the variables 
used, how they are measured and the data sources; a more detailed description of the variables 
follows. Each independent variable measures a specific aspect of corporate irresponsibility.  
3.8.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
(1-2) Corporate Reputation 
To test general propositions derived from the theoretical model presented in the previous 
chapter, I employ Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most Admired Companies survey. The WMAC 
survey has been conducted yearly by Fortune magazine since 1983. In this survey, each 
corporation is rated relative to its competitors on eight key attributes. These attributes are (a) 
quality of management; (b) quality of products or services; (c) innovativeness; (d) ability to 
attract, develop, and keep talented people; (e) long-term investment value; (f) financial 
soundness; (g) use of corporate assets; and (h) community and environmental responsibility. 
For this rating, an 11-point scale is used (0 = poor, 10 = excellent). The companies that appear 
in the WMAC survey consist of the 5 to 10 largest companies in each of the 46 industries from 
the Fortune 1,000 list for the year prior to the year of the survey. The respondent sample 
consists of senior executives and outside directors of Fortune 1,000 companies and financial 
analysts who cover these companies. I use firm reputation ratings across eight annual surveys 
(2005-2012) in order to develop a longitudinal assessment of the reputation penalties process 
over time.  This yielded a total of 3850 company years, or an average of 226 firms per survey. 
My research questions are designed to examine reputation penalties i.e. changes in corporate 
reputation and as a result, the dependent variable in this study is measured as the year-to-year 
change in reputation scores.  
Although a number of research strategies have been employed to measure corporate 
reputation, including market share (Fang, 2005), media analysis (Deephouse and Carter, 2005), 
rankings by students (Cable and Graham, 2000; Turban and Greening, 1997), stock market 
proxies (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, 
Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009) and a number of surveys (Abraham et al., 2008; Fombrun, Gardberg 
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and Sever, 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Zyglidopoulos, 2001), there is still some debate 
about the relevance and appropriateness of various forms of reputation measures and data (see 
Berens and Van Reil, 2004; Chun, 2005; Fryxell and Wang, 1994). This is mainly due to the 
breadth in potential respondent groups, their relationship to the firm as well as the nature of the 
assessments these respondents make. In other words, because reputations could be assessed 
using any stakeholders, or stakeholder groups’ perceptions about the firm, measurements of 
corporate reputation may vary considerably on the basis of who’s perceptions are collected, how 
or in what context these perceptions are collected, as well as what specifically about the firm’s 
character, capabilities, favorability and so on, is explored. Fundamentally, market-based 
measures of corporate reputation are limited in their capacity to capture the corporate reputation 
concept because it is questionable whether they are, in fact, assessing reputation, or simply the 
firm’s capability of generating short-term financial returns. Walker (2010: 372) summarises the 
core issue with market-based methods by quoting Wartick (2002), in that “[c]orporate reputation 
should be measured as stakeholders’ perceptions – not factual representation”. Media 
representation techniques on the other hand scan the available media press/reports on 
organisations and through linguistic analysis, weight the media tone to generate an aggregate 
favourability score for sample firms (Deephouse, 2000). Media representations of reputation 
may capture only the perceptions of a medium non-representative of wider audiences.  
 
Consequently, a third potential strategy to obtain corporate reputation data for this research 
study was using large-scale survey methods such as Fortune or Reputation Quotient. Although 
Reputation Quotient, like Fortune, asks for participant perceptions on a number of firm attributes 
and characteristics oriented to obtain a sense of the emotional appeal of the firm, its financial 
performance, its social responsiveness and so on – Reputation quotient is not widely accessible. 
Fortune data however, is similar in the sense that it too asks a number of participants for their 
perceptions of various firms. Furthermore, Fortune’s WMAC survey asks participants to rate 
firms on eight key attributes (described previously). This said, some scholars have pointed out 
that Fortune data has a significant financial orientation because its respondents are managers 
and market analysts (e.g., Fryxell and Wang, 1994). Due to this, some research suggests that 
data collected in the WMAC survey tends to be “limited to measuring the extent to which a firm 
is perceived as striving for financial goals” (Fryxell and Wang, 1994: 1) because this may be the 
most relevant dimension of reputational elements to this group of reputational assessors. Even 
so, it remains the most conceptually representative and widely source of reputation data.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables 
Variable name Values/ Measures Source(s) 
(1) Corporate reputation 11-point scale (0= “poor”; 10= “excellent”) 
Fortune magazine, 
WMAC survey 
(2) Changes in corporate 
reputation [LAG] 
Changes in the reputation scores from one year to 
another  
Author’s calculations  
(3) ANY_EVENT 
Whether or not there were any events of corporate 
irresponsibility acts in a given year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no”  
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(4) EVENT 1_Management 
compensation 
Whether management compensation controversies 
were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(5) EVENT 2_Shareholder rights 
Whether shareholder rights controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(6) EVENT 3_Earnings 
restatements 
Whether earnings restatements controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(7) EVENT 4_Insider trading 
Whether insider trading controversies were identified in 
a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(8) EVENT 5_Accounting 
controversies 
Whether accounting controversies were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(9) EVENT 6_Consumer_related 
issues 
Whether consumer related controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(10) EVENT 7_Product and service 
quality 
Whether product and or service related controversies 
were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(11) EVENT 8_Environmental 
spills and pollution  
Whether environmental spills and pollution 
controversies were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(12) EVENT 9_Product recalls 
Whether recall controversies were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(13) EVENT 10_Intellectual 
property  
Whether intellectual property controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(14) EVENT 11_Public health 
Whether public health controversies were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(15) EVENT 12_Taxation  
Whether taxation controversies were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(16) EVENT 13_Anti-competition 
Whether anti-competition controversies were identified 
in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(17) EVENT 14_Human rights 
Whether human rights controversies were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(18) EVENT 15_Child labour 
Whether child labour controversies were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(19) EVENT 16_Freedom of 
association 
Whether freedom of association controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(20) EVENT 17_Diversity and 
opportunity 
Whether diversity and opportunity controversies were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(21) EVENT 18_Wages and 
working conditions 
Whether wages and working conditions controversies 
were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(22) EVENT 19_Employee health 
and safety 
Whether employee health and safety controversies 
were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
(23) EVENT 20_Ethics 
Whether ethics controversies were identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4, LexisNexis 
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Table 3.1: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables (continued) 
 
Variable name Values/ Measures Source(s) 
(24) HARM 1_Financial harm 
Whether financial stakeholder harms were identified 
in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
 LexisNexis 
(25) HARM 2_ Physical harm 
Whether physical stakeholder harms were identified 
in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(26) HARM 3_Emotional harm 
Whether emotional stakeholder harms were 
identified in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(27) HARM 4_Civil liberties harm 
Whether civil liberties harms were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(28) HARM 5_Environmental harm 
Whether environmental harms were identified in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(29) INJURIES 
Whether the firm has been associated with 
stakeholder injuries in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
 LexisNexis 
(30) FATALITIES 
Whether the firm has been associated with human 
fatalities in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(31) DECEPTION 
Whether the firm is accused of deceiving 
stakeholders in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(32) DISCRIMINATION 
Whether the firm is accused of discrimination in a 
year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(33) JOB LOSSES 
Whether the firm has been associated with loss of 
employment in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(34) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
Whether firm actions are perceived as morally 
negative in a year 
Continuous variable measured from LIWC 
LexisNexis - Author’s 
calculations 
(35) CULPABILITY 
Whether the firm was solely responsible for a 
corporate irresponsibility event in a year 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(36) NON-COMPLICITY 
Whether the stakeholders affected by the corporate 
irresponsibility event are perceived as vulnerable  
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis 
(37) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
AND CULPABILITY  
Measures the presence of both observed effect 
undesirability and observed culpability 
LexisNexis - Author’s 
calculations 
(38) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITY 
Measures the presence of both observed effect 
undesirability and observed non-complicity 
LexisNexis - Author’s 
calculations 
(39) NON-COMPLICITY AND 
CULPABILITY  
Measures the presence of both observed non-
complicity and observed culpability 
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
LexisNexis - Author’s 
calculations 
(40) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
AND CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
Measures the presence of observed effect 
undesirability and observed culpability and 
observed non-complicity  
LexisNexis - Author’s 
calculations 
(41) CORPORATE_LEVERAGE Ratio of long term debt to total assets DataStream  
(42) RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) Ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets  DataStream 
(43) FIRM_SIZE Logarithm of the value of total assets DataStream 
(44) R&D INTENSITY (RDASS) Ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets DataStream 
(45) SOCIAL SCORE 
(SOC_SCORE) 
Scores are a number between 0 and 100 that show 
the firm’s social performance  
ASSET4 
(46) ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE 
(ENV_SCORE) 
Scores are a number between 0 and 100 that show 
the firm’s environmental performance  
ASSET4 
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Table 3.1: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables (continued) 
Variable name Values/ Measures Source(s) 
(47) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 
(CGV_SCORE) 
Scores are a number between 0 and 100 
that show the firm’s corporate governance 
performance  
ASSET4 
(48) Year 2006 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(49) Year 2007 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(50) Year 2008 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(51) Year 2009 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(52) Year 2010 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(53) Year 2011 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(54) Year 2012 1= “yes”; 0= “no” ASSET4 
(55) Industrial sector 
SEC codes classification  
1= “yes”; 0= “no” 
ASSET4 
 
 
Using the ASSET4 dataset as a guide to observations of corporate irresponsibility for my 
sample, ASSET4 yielded a total of 4,542 observations for the sample firms for years 2003-2011.  
I then began a media search process (see Flammer, 2013) designed to both verify the ASSET4 
dataset as well as provide the initial media reports to later explore for additional supplementary 
data. I used the LexisNexis search engine to identify media reports. I was able to specify results 
for specific organisation as well as the year in which the event occurred. Furthermore, I then 
searched for a number of key terms related to the underlying events as well as a list of broad 
search terms constructed to capture media reporting of corporate irresponsibility such as 
“bribery”, “lawsuit”, “outrage”, “misconduct”, “failed” and so on (see Appendix 3 and 4 for a full 
list of search terms used). I chose LexisNexis for its capabilities to specify search results as well 
as it drawing data from a wider range of reliable sources, i.e. both media press (e.g., Wall Street 
Journal, Financial Times) and corporate communications sources (online published corporate 
rhetoric). Following the process of identifying how many observations each event had in a year 
(if any), some of the event categories were identified in multiple event categories and were 
therefore recoded into a single event classification. Additionally, if searches resulted in the 
finding of media reporting of irresponsibility not included by ASSET4, these observations were 
added to the dataset. This process resulted in 3,696 confirmed incidents of corporate 
irresponsibility for further examination. 
Following the media search process, I then extracted and processed the data from the articles 
identified. To reduce researcher subjectivity, I standardised the process of data-extraction by 
producing a pro forma. The pro forma included a mixture of quantitative and qualitative coding 
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variables. The pro forma document was then used as the basis for all subsequent coding of files 
from LexisNexis (see Appendix 3 and 4). Furthermore, the similarity of event classifications 
presented by the ASSET4 dataset necessitated a reduction in the total number of event types to 
20 categories from over 30; EVENT 1= ‘management compensation’; EVENT 2 = ‘shareholder 
rights’; EVENT 3 = ‘earnings restatements’; EVENT 4 = ‘insider trading’; EVENT 5 = ‘accounting 
controversies’; EVENT 6 = ‘consumer-related issues’; EVENT 7 = ‘product and service quality’; 
EVENT 8 = ‘environmental spills and pollution’; EVENT 9 = ‘product recalls’; EVENT 10 = 
‘intellectual property’; EVENT 11 = ‘public health’; EVENT 12 = ‘taxation’; EVENT 13 = ‘anti-
competition’; EVENT 14 = ‘human rights’; EVENT 15 = ‘child labour’; EVENT 16 = ‘freedom of 
association’; EVENT 17 = ‘diversity and opportunity’; EVENT 18 = ‘wages and working 
conditions’; EVENT 19 = ‘employee health and safety’; and EVENT 20 = ‘ethics. 
Next, the resulting articles of the media search were utilised to compile more specific 
information about each event. The articles were coded to reflect the underlying nature of 
events, including the broad types of associated stakeholder harms (‘financial’, ‘physical’, 
‘emotional’, ‘civil liberties’, ‘environmental’); specific types of stakeholder harms (‘injuries’, 
‘fatalities’, ‘deception’, ‘discrimination’, ‘job losses’); and event characteristics such as whether 
the corporate irresponsibility event was desired by the firm (‘effect undesirability’), whether the 
firms was perceived as responsible for the events (‘culpability’) and whether the party affected 
by the firm’s actions was perceived as particularly vulnerable (‘affected party non-complicity’). 
Following these searches, the total number of usable observations in the regression models is 
N=1,311. 
With regards to the variable specifics such as; how they are measured and what they measure, I 
describe each variable here in more detail: 
(3) I use the variable ‘ANY_EVENT’ to measure all identified acts of corporate irresponsibility 
per firm year without initially distinguishing between the different types of acts of irresponsibility. 
This is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm has been associated with 
corporate irresponsibility events in general in a given year and ‘0’ otherwise.  
(4-23) The variables ‘EVENT_1’ …. ‘EVENT_20’ measure whether specific types of acts of 
irresponsibility affect corporate reputation. These classifications of corporate irresponsibility 
events describe the types of incidents that the observation most closely conforms to and are as 
follows: (4) EVENT 1= ‘management compensation’, refers to incidents which pertain to the 
perception of wrongdoing regarding management incentives and remuneration; (5) EVENT 2 = 
‘shareholder rights’, refers to events that undermine stockholders’ abilities to exercise their 
legal rights regarding various business activities; (6) EVENT 3 = ‘earnings restatements’, 
describes announcements of accounting irregularities which require the firm to revise its 
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earnings; (7) EVENT 4 = ‘insider trading’, refers to events where actors related to the firm use 
confidential knowledge to exploit the stock market; (8) EVENT 5 = ‘accounting controversies’, 
describes events whereby a firm’s accounts have been manipulated, tampered or faulted; (9) 
EVENT 6 = ‘consumer-related issues’, describes the various contexts whereby consumers are 
harmed by a firm’s behaviour and not as a direct result of a product quality issue; (10) EVENT 7 
= ‘product and service quality’, this specific classification of irresponsibility refers to incidents 
whereby a firm’s products or services directly harm stakeholders as a result of potential quality 
issues; (11) EVENT 8 = ‘environmental spills and pollution’, describes events resulting in the 
detriment of the wider natural world including air, sea and land as well as any other natural 
resources; (12) EVENT 9 = ‘product recalls’, illustrates events whereby a firm, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, removes their product from the market and/or requires customers to 
return their goods; (13) EVENT 10 = ‘intellectual property’, refers to a certain category of 
events whereby the protected intangible property of a firm is claimed to be utilised by another 
without consent; (14) EVENT 11 = ‘public health’, describes a class of non-consumer related 
health impacts associated with organisational behaviour; (15) EVENT 12 = ‘taxation’, refers to a 
class of events whereby the focal firm is associated with tax irregularities; (16) EVENT 13 = 
‘anti-competition’ events describe the association with a set of illegal business practices 
motivated to reduce competition in the marketplace; (17) EVENT 14 = ‘human rights’, 
describes events which undermine the basic access to certain resources and fairness of 
treatment of individuals; (18) EVENT 15 = ‘child labour’ refers to the illegal practice of 
employment of individuals under the legal age, yet may also include moral judgements of age 
appropriateness when the host government lacks an adequate requirement; (19) EVENT 16 = 
‘freedom of association’ events describe those which undermine employees’ access to join 
representative bodies such as unions; (20) EVENT 17 = ‘diversity and opportunity’ refers 
specifically to events which employ discriminatory business practices that challenge 
stakeholders’ abilities to gain access to resources or fair treatment; (21) EVENT 18 = ‘wages 
and working conditions’ events describe non-health related incidents that undermine 
employee access to resources or fair treatment; (22) EVENT 19 = ‘employee health and 
safety’ events refer to incidents with actual or potential outcomes to employee health; and 
finally, (23) EVENT 20 = ‘ethics’ is a more general category of corporate irresponsibility events 
that do not to conform to the categories previously described. Another interesting aspect related 
to the “ethics” category is that it sits uneasy with stakeholder assessments of morality yet events 
of breaking ethical norms are not known to breach any explicit or extant legal parameters. These 
event classifications are all dichotomous variables and each take the value of ‘1’ if the firm has 
been associated with a corporate irresponsibility event and ‘0’ otherwise.  
(24-28) HARM_TYPES measure the specific influence an act of corporate irresponsibility has 
upon the victimised stakeholder group. In other words, this variable looks at how stakeholders 
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are affected; i.e. a product recall could cause environmental harm, financial harm, physical 
harm, or simply inconvenience the stakeholders involved. The specific types of harm measured 
here are as follows: (24) HARM 1 = ‘financial’ captures those events with associated financial 
harms towards victimised parties; (25) HARM 2 = ‘physical’ describes those events with distinct 
physical harms on victimised parties; (26) HARM 3 = ‘emotional’ captures events associated 
with emotional harms on victimised parties; (27) HARM 4 = ‘civil liberties’ describes those 
events with associated potential future stakeholder harms e.g., online privacy controversies; (28) 
HARM 5 = ‘environmental’, capture events that may affect the environment. Harm types are 
also dichotomous variables and each takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm has been associated with 
events that were perceived to cause a certain type of harm and ‘0’ otherwise.  
(29) INJURIES measures the specific effect of associated human injuries on changes in 
corporate reputation, whilst (30) FATALITIES describes events associated with human fatalities. 
This study distinguishes between the two forms of physical harm because events with 
associated fatalities may be perceived as more severe than those with associated injuries, 
potentially. The ability to distinguish between these types of physical harm resulted from 
conducting content analysis of media reports from searches of LexisNexis database. In turn, 
(31) DECEPTION captures incidents where the focal firm is associated with, or accused of, the 
deception of an individual or stakeholder group(s). (32) DISCRIMINATION describes incidents 
whereby the firm is associated with discriminatory behaviour towards an individual or 
stakeholder group(s). Again, this study is able to measure this variable because of the analysis 
conducted on the supplementary content of media reports, where information on these types of 
harm was identified. (33) JOB LOSSES measures incidents associated with the loss of 
employment of current or previous employees. Similar to the previous variables discussed here, 
data on job losses was compiled by hand via content analysis of media reports. 
(34) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY measures events that are associated with a certain degree of 
moral disregard by organisational observers. In order to measure the degree of moral disregard 
of stakeholders regarding specific organisational behaviours, I then analysed the content of the 
media reports identified using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC). LIWC 
analyses bodies of text and produces measures of the extent to which a body of work contains 
particular key words. The software automatically codes words and phrases using underlying 
dictionaries developed in psychology and linguistics research (see Tausczik and Pennebaker, 
2010). In particular, the percentage of the words in a given body of text that pertain to sadness 
and anger were extracted for analysis. In order to generate an overall measure of the 
undesirability of a given event, I multiplied the cumulative percentage of the articles expressing 
anger and sadness by the overall volume of media coverage, as measured by the total word 
count of media articles relating to instances of irresponsible conduct.  
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(35) CULPABILITY measures the proportion of blame the firm is perceived to have in relation to 
causing a negative outcome or the availability of alternative causal parties for an effect. In other 
words, for a negative event, the culprit may not only be the single firm, but others associated 
with it. Here, culpability measures whether an incident was reported alongside other potential 
causal agents. This was derived by analysing the content of media reports by hand. When a firm 
was solely implicated in the cause of an event without mention of other potential attributable 
parties, the dichotomous variable noted culpability (‘1’) and no culpability otherwise (‘0’). This 
proxy of culpability is in line with extant theorisation, in that Lange and Washburn (2012: 305) 
suggest that “[w]hen the firm is the target of the perceiver’s attributional activity, the critical 
causal question to be resolved is to what extent the source of the negative effect is internal 
rather than external to the firm (Green and Mitchell, 1979; Heider, 1958; Mitchell and Wood, 
1980). Evidence supporting external explanations would include the cognitive availability of 
plausible alternative causal agents”. Therefore, restricting the availability of suggested causal 
agents may increase the potential of perceived corporate culpability because other possible 
explanations for the cause of an effect are not considered. 
(36) NON-COMPLICITY measures the perceived affected party non-complicity evoked by an 
event. The ‘non-complicity’ variable specifically measures incidents that are associated with 
groups of stakeholders likely to be seen as non-complicit and evoke increased sympathy from 
the general stakeholder pool. These stakeholder groups were chosen because of the strength of 
the association between them and the two facets of non-complicity originally suggested by 
Shaver (1985); “(1) the power to act to prevent the effect and (2) knowledge of foresight of the 
effect (Lange and Washburn, 2012: 307). The variable non-complicity therefore indicates that 
the event victimised one of the following potentially perceived non-complicit parties; (1) children, 
(2) the elderly, (3) those with long-term significant health issues, (4) pregnant women, (5) the 
significantly economically disadvantaged and (6) the disabled. From an attribution perspective, 
the main thrust of non-complicity (also referred to as vulnerability) is the identification of 
sympathy elicited by broader assessors, evidenced by the statement “[i]n particular, more 
physically or mentally vulnerable affected parties are more likely to elicit perceptions of victim 
innocence, which would include the young, the very old, and defenseless” (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012: 307). When a firm was perceived to harm a non-complicit or vulnerable party, 
the dichotomous variable noted non-complicity took the value of ‘1’ and the value of ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
(37) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY measures the presence of both 
observed effect undesirability and observed culpability. The rationale here is that a variable 
which measures the combined effect of organisational actions perceived as immoral for which 
the firm is considered as the main culprit may better explain corporate reputation because the 
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combination of these characteristics may be more indicative of corporate irresponsibility than 
each individual characteristic. In the same vein, (38) EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY measures when the event is characterised by both moral disregard and the 
affected party is perceived as non-complicit, or in other words, vulnerable; whilst (39) 
CULPABILITY AND NON-COMPLICITY is a proxy that measures situations when the firm is 
perceived as culpable for an event where the affected party is perceived as non-complicit; and is 
measured as ‘1’ when the two characteristics are present and ‘0’ otherwise. Finally, (40) 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY AND NON-COMPLICITY is a variable that 
tests for the effect of all three event characteristics being present on changes in reputation. This 
variable is measured as ‘1’ when the three characteristics are present and ‘0’ otherwise. 
 
3.8.2. Control variables 
Strong financial performance in a firm is generally associated with healthy corporate 
strategising, good management and efficient resource allocation, all of which are considered to 
help a firm establish and or maintain a good reputation (e.g., Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). In turn, reputational assessors tend to be risk adverse, in which 
case, when two firms have similar levels of financial performance, firms perceived to offer lower 
risk, are considered more likely to have higher reputation scores (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990). Furthermore, a higher degree of leverage may influence institutional assessments in a 
negative manner as it may be perceived as a burden upon future returns. A measure of each 
firm’s (41) LEVERAGE, measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets and (42) RETURN ON 
ASSETS (ROA), measured as the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets, were extracted from 
accounting data courtesy of DataStream.  
Generally, firm growth can be associated with some level of managerial effectiveness and 
internal performance, in which case, over time, larger firms are expected to have accumulated 
better reputation than their smaller counterparts. Larger firms also tend to be more visible to 
reputational assessors, and this imbalance in information available may influence reputational 
scores. A measure of (43) FIRM SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of the value of total 
assets, was collected from DataStream and included in all the regression models. Furthermore, 
in light of the link drawn previously between firm reputation and product range (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990), this study accounts for the fact that firm reputation may be affected by those 
activities that foster the differentiation of its products from competitors such as technological 
advantages and innovation. Thus, each firm’s (44) R&D INTENSITY (RDASS) is measured as 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets; data is collected using DataStream.  
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This study also measures how well the firms score in various areas associated with reputational 
performance (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). (45) SOCIAL_SCORE (SOC_SCORE) 
measures “a company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and 
society, through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company's 
reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability 
to generate long term shareholder value”. (46) ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE (ENV_SCORE) 
measures “how well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks 
and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to generate long term shareholder value”.  
Furthermore, based on recent evidence, the composition of shareholders exerts a significant 
influence on corporate behaviour, including reputational effects (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). 
Specifically, a strong presence of institutional investors may signal that the activity of the firm is 
well monitored. I followed Ryan and Schneider (2002), Brammer and Pavelin (2006) and 
Johnson and Greening (1999) and measured (47) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE_SCORE 
(CGV_SCORE) as “the sum of the proportions of firm equity held by long-term institutional 
investor groups, i.e. pension funds, insurance companies and life assurors”. These variables are 
available in DataStream where they are measured on a scale from 0 to 100 illustrating the firm’s 
performance scores in these three areas.  
Finally, (48-54) year effects (calculated as dummy variables) and (55) industry effects 
(calculated as dummy variables and classified according to the SEC industry classification code) 
were included in the regression models as fixed effects but not reported.  
 
3.9. Summary 
This chapter aims to present an overview of key methodological aspects of this thesis. Further 
details, regarding the analysis and sub-sampling methods used to unpack the effect of corporate 
irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation according to firm characteristics, are included 
in the empirical Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This thesis uses a quantitative strategy and a 
longitudinal design throughout. The methodological choices discussed in this chapter are 
considered to offer the most appropriate alternative to answer the research questions, they also 
allow for coverage of a large number of firms and furthermore, they permit conducting 
observations of corporate irresponsibility over time. 
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CHAPTER 4: UNPACKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRRESPONSIBILITY 
AND CHANGES IN CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I begin to explore the relationship between aspects of irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation by modelling for both broad and distinct characteristics of 
observed irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation for a sample of US firms for an 8-
year period between 2003 and 2011. The subsequent longitudinal research offered in this 
chapter specifically seeks to answer; (1) whether firms associated with acts of corporate 
irresponsibility subsequently incur reputation penalties? (2) Do firms experience more significant 
reputation penalties when they are associated with certain types of irresponsibility? (3) What are 
the characteristics of irresponsibility that reputational assessors penalise firms most severely 
for? With this in mind, the aims of this chapter are: 
 To examine whether an association with acts of observed corporate irresponsibility 
leads to reputation penalties. 
 To explore whether certain types of irresponsibility lead to greater reputation penalties 
for associated firms. 
 To assess the specific qualities of irresponsibility that are most significantly penalised by 
reputational assessors. 
A long held assumption within the corporate reputation literature is that reputation is a fragile 
intangible asset that is distinctly susceptible to damage in the face of corporate irresponsibility 
(Koronis and Ponis, 2012; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Scott and Walsham, 2005). This is not 
surprising considering that the most rigorous empirical research on the topic of reputation 
penalties to date suggests that, with few exceptions, acts of irresponsibility significantly and 
negatively impact corporate reputations (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott 
and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009). Due to the ever important role intangible 
assets play in the total valuation of firms (Teece, 1998), the practitioner community has actively 
circulated the idea that firms should be proactive in the management of corporate reputation as 
well as take threats to it very seriously (Alsop, 2004; Firestein, 2006; Gaines-Ross, 2010; 
Garcia, 2006; Jacka and Scott, 2011; Neufeld, 2007). These two elements have culminated in 
the broad thematic assumption that reputations are distinctly fragile in the face of corporate 
irresponsibility. However, this stance sits uneasy with real-life examples of corporate 
irresponsibility, as some of the world’s most reputed organisations have been associated with 
significant social, environmental or economic harms with seemingly little reputational impacts. 
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Apple - for example - has been associated with numerous working conditions controversies in its 
supply chain, environmental impacts, product quality issues and intellectual property lawsuits 
despite being ranked as World’s most admired company for nearly a decade (Fortune, 2016). 
Similar observations can be made regarding Google (tax evasion), Amazon (working 
conditions), Walt Disney (human rights violations), Starbucks (environmental impact), General 
Electric (employment discrimination) and Nike (human rights abuse). Though non-exhaustive, 
this list of seemingly inconsistent case evidence raises some fundamental questions regarding 
the assumption that irresponsibility is associated with significant reputational risks. These 
contrasting evidence bases may be the result of limitations associated with the market-penalties 
stream of empirical research, namely that this strand of research does not measure reputation 
but rather proxies declines in stock prices, the sub-discipline also defines the scope of research 
over narrow time windows of several days to weeks. These limitations have been noted to 
compound into a method of measurement with a tendency to capture market behaviour when it 
is most prone to overreact (Gillet et al, 2010) and thus research to date may only tangentially 
inform our understanding of reputation penalties. 
That being said, one attribution perspective contends that individuals have a distinct negativity 
bias, which means that we are more perceptive to negative events than we are in relation to 
positive events (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This idea is largely supported by research in 
neuroscience (Gordon et al, 2008; Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom, 2010) - the general rationale being 
that the “brain is like Velcro for negative experiences and Teflon for positive ones” (Hanson and 
Mendius, 2009: 41). If this position is of merit, then extant typologies of irresponsibility as well as 
the broad findings of the market penalties perspective may be more representative of reputation 
penalties. However, there are a number of conflicting theories of attribution yet to be empirically 
explored in the reputation penalties context. Observational evidence from social psychology 
suggests that seldom do individuals alter their perceptions when faced with contradictory 
evidence (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 
1979). Scholars have suggested that only when certain contextual conditions are met are 
assessors likely to attribute irresponsibility for the event (Lange and Washburn, 2012). This 
conflict of attribution perspectives as well as the potential for a ‘negativity bias’ provides the 
basis for an initial exploration into extant research and typologies of irresponsibility akin to those 
found in extant reputation penalties research to date. 
Figure 4.1 below highlights the relevant concepts and line of research enquiry investigated in 
this empirical chapter. 
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Figure 4.1: Empirical Chapter 1 conceptual overview of the relationship between corporate 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation  
 
4.2. Do firms associated with acts of corporate irresponsibility subsequently incur 
reputation penalties? 
Though the majority of evidence to date suggests that acts of corporate irresponsibility are 
associated with significant reputation penalties (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009), research which faithfully 
captures the perceptions of stakeholders in this research context is considerably lacking. A 
noteworthy study by Zyglidopoulos (2001) using Fortune Magazines World’s Most Admired 
Companies (WMAC) annual survey data assess how categories of irresponsibility relate to 
reputational decline over a 6-year period between 1989-1995. Zyglidopoulos (2001) found that, 
contrary to extant research from the finance and economics perspectives, irresponsibility was 
not significantly penalised in most cases (Zyglidopoulos, 2001: 433). I propose that although 
assessors’ minds maybe more perceptive to negative events (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 
2012), it is unlikely to frequently translate into subsequent corporate criticality because often the 
firm may only be associated with irresponsibility and not perceived culpable for causing a 
negative social, economic or environmental outcome. This is the basis of the attribution theoretic 
ideas put forward by Lange and Washburn (2012) in that irresponsibility is only perceived as 
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such when some degree of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and or affected party non-
complicity are present. Therefore, I hypothesise that: 
H4.1: There is no significant relationship between the presence of corporate 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. 
 
4.3. Do Firms Associated with Broad Categories of Irresponsibility Incur Reputational 
Penalties? 
Potentially, firms may be more reputationally susceptible to certain types of irresponsibility. This 
idea forms much of the basis for theories proposed within the crisis management literature 
(Coombs, 2006; 2007). Historically, empirical reputation penalties research tends to segment 
observed irresponsibility on the basis of broad categories. These categories describe the 
underlying behaviour and/or outcome(s) of events. Often categories are employed such as 
human rights violations, working conditions controversies, environmental violations and product 
recalls which are broad in their potential scope and encompass events with varying perceived 
severity and significance. In this way, it is unclear whether broad categories of irresponsibility 
such as ‘product recalls’ are damaging to reputations because they inconvenience customers, 
physically harm them or are associated with significant financial harms. Individual differences in 
incident severity may thus have different effects on changes in corporate reputation. Again, 
empirical research from the market-penalties literature proposes that most categories of 
irresponsibility are significantly penalised with the exception of environmental violations 
(Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 
2005).  From an attribution perspective, this method of categorising events may be seen as 
overly simplistic because it lacks an appreciation for how individuals interpret information and 
what underlying features are most indicative of irresponsibility to organisational assessors 
(Lange and Washburn, 2012). Also, because cases of observed irresponsibility may be difficult 
to define, research may often classify events that span multiple categorisations into a single 
‘event type’. For instance, product recalls from the pharmaceutical industry are often associated 
with consumer health and safety issues, yet these both represent two distinct groups of 
irresponsibility potentially. Recalls which are not associated with health and safety outcomes 
may be perceived as less severe by reputational assessors. The result of representing 
irresponsibility in this way is that research may be testing somewhat arbitrary groups of events 
which are likened only by factors which do not adequately capture any substantive elements of 
the event’s undesirability.  
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Moreover, work which models for the effects of broad categories of irresponsibility on reputation 
or changes in reputation, may overlook multiple nuances of stakeholder expectations of the firm. 
For instance, firms from specific industries may be more commonly associated with specific 
types of irresponsibility, which desensitises stakeholders to news of such behaviour. More 
specifically, it may be that recalls are generally expected in the pharmaceutical or automotive 
industries but depart from norms set over time within the aviation industry. Furthermore, 
environmental harms caused by firms within the petrochemical industry may be largely expected 
by its stakeholders whereas environmental harms caused by consumer technology 
organisations may not be expected. Similarly, losses of human life may be considered an 
integral aspect of some organisations operating within the healthcare industry but are not within 
the catering industry. Stakeholders may therefore draw upon a host of prior knowledge to gauge 
the severity of events (Kelley, 1967). Therefore, broad categories of irresponsibility may be more 
or less relevant based on the industry in which a firm operates. Similarly, an idea that is 
currently undeveloped in the reputation penalties literature, is that organisations with certain 
business models may also be associated with different stakeholder expectations around 
particular behaviours. More specifically, through the lens of attribution theory it might be 
plausible to assume that firms with low cost business models may be held to lower human rights 
and social responsibility standards than firms adopting more premium priced models. The logic 
being that certain corporate behaviours are implicitly written into the contract of service between 
some stakeholders (such as customers) and low cost providers. Stakeholders of cost-leading 
organisations may expect a diminished ability of the firm to provide goods and services at low 
prices whilst also meeting high ethical standards. For instance, the Rana Plaza workplace safety 
incident seemingly had little effect on Primark’s reputation and did little to blunt its sales growth 
despite the deaths of factory workers due to unsafe working conditions (The Times, 2013). Wal-
Mart continues to be considered one of the world’s most reputable organisations (Fortune, 2016) 
despite a history of reported abuses within its supply chain. What these examples may imply is 
that the relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and reputation is more complex 
when considered from a more nuanced theoretical perspective. Yet, this method of broadly 
categorising events remains the status quo in the reputation penalties research to date.  
Indeed, human perception has been suggested to be biased towards negative events (Mishina, 
Block and Mannor, 2012). Thus, broad categories of irresponsibility may potentially provoke 
stakeholder criticality towards firms. Although I contend that, because the organisation may only 
be associated with an irresponsibility (and not perceived as culpable for causing it) broad 
categories of irresponsibility largely neglect the nuances of irresponsibility that impart their 
distinctiveness to reputational assessors. In light of these points, I argue that broad categories of 
irresponsibility have a less significant relationship with reputation than previously suggested in 
the majority of empirical reputation research. Therefore, I hypothesise that: 
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H4.2: There is no significant relationship between broad classifications of irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation. 
 
4.4. Harm Types: Physical, Emotional, Financial, Environmental and Civil Liberties Harms  
Another potential - yet broad - method for assessing observed irresponsibility is the nature of the 
undesirable outcome. One common feature of corporate irresponsibility is that each has, to a 
greater or lesser extent, some form of economic, social or environmental outcome which has the 
potential to be perceived as irresponsible in some manner. This outcome may be experienced 
by an organisation’s stakeholders or by the wider natural environment. Coombs (2007: 164) 
suggested three key ways in which stakeholders may be harmed, namely “physically, 
emotionally and/or financially”. Though categorising events on the basis of the type of 
stakeholder harm may be considered broader still than the previous ‘categories of 
irresponsibility’ (i.e. product recalls, accounting frauds and so on), research has yet to fully 
explore whether certain types of harm have general effects on reputation. From an attribution 
perspective, the merit to exploring broad harm types stems from the potential for some incidents 
to break widely held social norms and morality, which therefore may elicit a broadly negative 
response (Donaldson and Dumfee, 1999). To date, the finance and economics perspectives 
suggests that the market generally penalises events which impacts ‘people’ whilst 
irresponsibilities towards the environment are not sanctioned by the market (Engelen and Van 
Essen, 2011). However, preliminary research by Zyglidopoulos (2001) on the effects of physical 
harm using large-scale survey methods found no significant effects between physical harm and 
reputations, though harms toward the natural environment were, in fact, sanctioned 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001). However, thus far, empirical research remains salient on how significant 
these harm types are when compared to other forms of outcomes.  
Though distinctly stakeholder oriented, financial, physical and emotional harms neglect two 
broad irresponsibility outcomes; first, environmental harms are missing. Depending on the 
proximity of the stakeholder group to the environmental impact, stakeholders are often not 
directly impacted by environmental incidents. Cases such as the British Petroleum oil spill, 
illustrate the potential for environmental harms to affect stakeholders financially and/or 
physically as residents and businesses nearby were adversely affected because of their 
proximity to the spill. This said, environmental harms do not directly affect the lives, lifestyles or 
livelihoods of the majority of organisational stakeholders in the main. Therefore, this category of 
outcomes may be seen as distinctive and separate. This distinction to place environmental 
harms as separate here is an important one, particularly for research such as this which aims to 
empirically test equivocal research findings of a body of literature, for which, environmental 
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harms are considered insignificant by the market penalties strand of research (Engelen and Van 
Essen, 2011) and reputationally damaging by research utilising large-scale survey methods 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001). Similarly, a second and emerging category of harm sits unevenly within 
Coomb’s (2007) typology namely, events that harm stakeholders’ ‘civil liberties’. This specific 
category of harm is becoming increasingly more established as an issue of concern in the ether 
of corporate criticality (Hond et al., 2014; Pollach, 2010; Solove, 2007). The prevalence of this 
class of outcome, coupled with the distinctive feature of ‘putative’ or ‘potential’ losses that are 
not yet incurred - though purported to be damaging to reputations, distinguishes it from the other 
previously described outcomes. Civil liberties events include issues of privacy as well as the 
right to join groups of interest such as unions. This distinct group of harm outcomes emphasise 
the potential future losses incurred by stakeholders rather than any immediate costs incurred. 
What is more, the rationale to distinguish between these categories has some theoretical merit, 
as attribution theories posit that perceivers tend be more aware of events which they find 
personally threatening (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Therefore, because of the prevalence of 
issues such as privacy and global warming in recent years, research which assesses the current 
perceptions of stakeholders may find issues concerning civil liberties and the environment more 
personally threatening than prior research, such as that conducted by Zyglidopoulos (2001). 
With these points in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H4.3a: There is no significant relationship between financial, physical and emotional harms and 
changes in corporate reputation. 
H4.3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between environmental and civil liberties 
harms and changes in corporate reputation. 
 
4.5. Injuries and Fatalities 
Zyglidopoulos (2001: 434) called for more work which examines the reputational threats 
associated with damage to human life because “damage to human life has no impact on a firm’s 
reputation for social performance, no matter how tentative or preliminary at this point, is quite 
surprising because, if nothing else, it is clearly counterintuitive”. The observation that incidents 
harming human life does not have an effect on firm reputation for social performance, a 
seemingly more relevant and corresponding aspect of reputation affected by such events, is 
somewhat puzzling from a general reputation perspective. How can firms associated with events 
which harm human life not have their reputations decline? From an expectancy perspective, 
stakeholders may, to some extent, anticipate a certain behaviour by organisational actors 
(Burgoon, 1978). Incidents which result in harms to human life, particularly in the transportation 
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industries such as rail and aeronautics, and to a similar extent, the petrochemical industries 
(where spills and pollution have historically resulted in a number of cases of health related 
impacts), may be largely expected. Therefore, observers may have a diminished sensitivity to 
the news of such events. These exact industries comprise the focal sample of Zyglidopoulos’s 
(2001) research, which found no evidence to suggest irresponsibilities resulting in human harms 
had an effect on reputations for social performance.   
From an attribution perspective, the association with stakeholder harms may not be indicative of 
a firm’s culpability. Lange and Washburn (2012) cite the earlier work of Heider (1958), Jones 
and Nisbett (1972) and Kelley and Michela (1980) to suggest that “[j]udgments of causality and 
moral responsibility are the product of a rational knowledge-seeking process in which the 
perceiver considers the available evidence. With respect to causality, the perceiver develops lay 
theories – common sense explanations - about why or how effects have occurred” (p. 305). 
Further, they add that “the critical causal question to be resolved is to what extent the source of 
the negative effect is internal rather than external to the firm” (Lange and Washburn, 2012: 305). 
In other words, Lange and Washburn propose that assessors of irresponsibility consider the 
contextual information surrounding an event to diagnose who is to blame. If parties other than 
the firm are involved, this may weaken causal attributions. These ideas are speculative and are 
yet to be empirically explored in relation to reputation penalties. Though it also appears 
reasonable to extend this logic here, in that whilst employees of the firm are considered part of 
the firm from a legal standpoint, this may not be the case from a social psychology perspective. 
There may be some merit to suggest that assessors may perceive employees as somewhat 
morally separate from the firm, and therefore, if ample organisational oversights were present 
(i.e. such as safety checks and standards fulfilled) observers’ ‘common sense explanations’ may 
hold specific individuals to blame for human casualties, rather than the wider organisation.   
However, a key issue within research to date that models harms to human life on changes in 
corporate reputation is that generally they do not distinguish between events which injure and 
those that fatally injure. Zyglidopoulos (2001) for instance, states; “[d]amage to human life refers 
to people who were injured or killed because of a particular accident” (p420). However, the 
perceived effect undesirability may be potentially greater for events which lead to loss of human 
life compared to events that injure stakeholders. As previously discussed, a subsequent decline 
in reputation as a result of harms to human life may be largely dependent on culpability 
attributions and specific stakeholder expectations. Often events harming the health of 
stakeholders may be in the context of potential risks to health, such as travel, pharmaceuticals, 
alcohol, tobacco, catering and so on. Thus increasing the variety of alternative ‘common sense’ 
explanations for an event’s cause, may decrease the overall likelihood of culpability attributions 
that target the associated firm. What is more, in some industry contexts, news of harms to 
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human health may be, to some extent, expected. In turn, some incidents may break widely held 
social norms. The sanctity of life is generally considered one of them (Donaldson and Dunfee, 
1999; Donaldson, 2009). However, large-scale empirical work which assesses the reputational 
threat associated with human injuries independently from fatalities is currently lacking.  
In sum, due to the multi-contingent nature of how harms to human life may be perceived there is 
a reasonable conceptual argument to suggest that irresponsibility associated with human 
injuries would not have a broad effect on reputation. Specifically, culpability attributions and 
expectations may be highly context-specific. Whilst injuries may be perceived as fundamentally 
less severe than events with associated fatalities, contrastingly, fatalities seen through an 
attribution perspective have greater potential ‘effect undesirability’ - meaning greater potential 
for observers to view the situation as morally objectionable (Lange and Washburn, 2012). 
Furthermore, this specific moral objection, namely the sanctity of human life, has long been 
suggested to be one of the core social principles which spans beyond cultural differences 
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Whilst theories of attribution also contend that culpability is often 
not ‘clear cut’ and may be associated with significant ambiguities (Heider 1958; Jones and 
Nisbet, 1972; Kelley and Michela,1980), because the loss of human life is also associated with 
strong individual emotions, I hypothesise that:  
H4.4a: There is no significant relationship between cases of observed human injuries and 
changes in corporate reputation. 
H4.4b: There is a significant and negative relationship between cases of observed human 
fatalities and changes in corporate reputation. 
 
4.6. Deception, Discrimination and Job Losses 
Another key set of moral objections suggested by the extant literature is that the active 
deception and discrimination of individuals is widely considered to break social and or moral 
norms (Alsop, 2004; Dean, 2004). That being said, firms are also associated periodically with 
accusations of deceptive behaviour, such as unfulfilling promotional promises (Dell), tax frauds 
(Google), accounting fraud (Tesco), withholding information from the public (Facebook), which 
leads to a general sense that deception alone may not be a significant factor in the relationship 
between irresponsibility and reputation penalties. Whilst discrimination may undermine 
fundamental ideas of fairness and equity (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), particularly in the 
Western world, where individuals broadly subscribe to a ‘meritocratic’ political philosophy, 
meaning that individuals are believed to gain progress and achievements through personal 
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merits and abilities, rather than class, race, sex, age or ethnicity (Young, 1958; Castilla, 2008). 
Discrimination could be viewed as conflicting this belief. Attributions of discrimination may again 
be largely contingent on the context. The victimised party, for example, may elicit sympathy from 
the wider stakeholder community depending on the qualities of the individual that was 
discriminated against. Age discrimination, for example, may not be considered immoral by all 
assessor groups (Garstka et al., 2004). Furthermore, the financial, emotional or physical 
condition the stakeholder was in when the firm harmed them may also be considered by 
reputational assessors. Whilst it is difficult to advocate that victims can be perceived as complicit 
in cases of discrimination, attribution theories suggest that increased sympathy may be 
garnered by those in more disadvantaged circumstances (Lange and Washburn, 2012).  
From the viewpoint of the wider stakeholder community, some issues may become increasingly 
prevalent, such as that of civil liberties and environmental issues previously discussed in this 
chapter, whilst others seemingly become less so. Job losses have become a regular feature of 
the modern job market. News of jobs losses, from an expectancy perspective, may not violate 
expectations of wider stakeholder groups because the news of job losses is somewhat 
anticipated. The notion of a ‘job for life’ has been largely discharged by the majority of western 
workers, as evidenced in the Human Resource literature (Gilbert, 1998; Foster, 2015). Though 
on one level, job losses may be a largely accepted condition of modern employment, from an 
attribution perspective, managers and industry analysts (for which are participants in WMAC 
data) may consider some instances of job losses as indicative of both good and bad news for 
the financial health of the firm. Porritt, (2005: 199) observed that; “financial markets respond 
favorably to announcements of cost-cutting programs designed to increase profits by reducing 
staff costs - The wider community is less favorably disposed”. Lange and Washburn (2012: 301) 
propose that “corporate behaviour is socially irresponsible only to the extent that observers 
perceive it as such.”  As the majority of the wider stakeholder pool is not personally threatened 
by jobs losses (Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008) and layoffs do not conflict with moral or social norms 
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999) corporate criticality as a result may be minimal. Empirically 
unpacking the relationship between job losses and reputation penalties may have some merit to 
it, because there may be contexts where job losses are seen as indicative or diagnostic of the 
reputational or financial faltering of the firm. That said, I expect no significant effect of job losses 
on changes in corporate reputation, because the analysis in this chapter considers all firms 
irrespective of their particular characteristics. Thus I hypothesise that: 
H4.5: There is no significant relationship between cases of stakeholder deception, discrimination 
or job loss and changes in corporate reputation. 
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4.7. What are the Underlying Features of Irresponsibility that Reputational Assessors 
Penalise Firms Most Significantly for?: Unpacking Attribution Theory 
In the previous sections of this chapter it is discussed how I anticipate broad classifications and 
extant typologies of irresponsibility to impact corporate reputations. Though some theories of 
attribution suggest that individuals are subject to negativity biases, in that generally assessors 
are more perceptive of negative over positive information (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012), I 
suggest that the broad typologies of irresponsibility utilised by extant research will not elicit 
significant reputation penalties when assessing reputation penalties using a more ‘perception 
oriented’ (Wartick, 2002) measure of corporate reputation. I argue this position because the 
various characteristics of irresponsibility captured by extant typologies and classifications may 
not be perceived within themselves indicative of corporate irresponsibility by organisational 
assessors. Thus, from an attribution perspective, the treatment of irresponsibility by extant 
research to date may be considered as somewhat crude because this research generally 
neglects more nuanced and complex observer considerations. In contrast to this, in this study, I 
unpack how the attribution process may shape reputation penalties in light of corporate 
irresponsibility. I do so in order to systematically test the relevance of extant theories of 
attribution. Here, I adopt ideas from social psychology within the context of corporate 
irresponsibility. More specifically, this study draws on the framework offered by Lange and 
Washburn (2012) which conceptualises the potential considerations of organisational assessors 
in relation to corporate irresponsibility and how this may impact levels of subsequent criticality.  
 
4.7.1. Individually Assessing the Efficacy of Effect Undesirability, Perceived Culpability 
and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
Based largely on evidence from social psychology, Lange and Washburn’s 2012 Academy of 
Management Review article titled ‘Understanding Attributions of Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility’ describes a number of possible mechanisms by which organisational observers 
assess potentially irresponsible events. Building on the work of Heider (1958), Lange and 
Washburn (2012) argue that understanding individuals’ common sense explanations for 
irresponsibility is at the route of attributions of irresponsibility. The authors assume that 
observers are generally fairly rational (Lange and Washburn, 2012: 302). However, human 
observations suggest that the lay-person is increasingly prone to biases, particularly in instances 
whereby features of the behaviour are salient to the individual (Heider, 1958). Lange and 
Washburn (2012: 308) propose that “[o]bserver attributions of corporate social irresponsibility 
depend on the combined presence of three components: observer assessments that the effect 
is at least somewhat undesirable, observer assessments that the corporation is at least 
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somewhat culpable, and observer assessments that the affected party is at least somewhat 
noncomplicit”. However, here I discuss each component separately in view of later independent 
testing of these three explanatory factors. I do so in order to gain a sense about the degree of 
salience of each irresponsibility component to reputational assessors. 
The first aspect of the framework offered by Lange and Washburn (2012) articulates the initial 
observer calculation of the event’s ‘effect undesirability’. This in essence describes the level of 
perceived ‘severity’ observers ascribe to an event. The authors state that this is determined by 
one of two possible assessments; either an event is perceived as personally threatening to the 
lives, lifestyles or livelihoods of the observer (Crouch, 2006) or the event undermines the 
assessor’s moral values, in which case a degree of emotional response is provoked (Donaldson 
and Dunfee, 1999; Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008; Jones and Davis, 1965). The more wide-felt the 
personal threat and/or moral wrongdoing, the potentially greater the possibility for assessors to 
view the event as irresponsible. Here, with specific regard to effect undesirability, I propose that 
effect undesirability alone is a more accurate indicator of the potential for social disapproval 
when compared to extant typologies and categories of irresponsibility described previously in 
this chapter. This may be primarily attributed to a more concise measurement of ill-feeling. 
A secondary observer calculation outlined by Lange and Washburn (2012) is the degree to 
which an event’s cause resides endogenously within the firm’s control or factors within the 
organisation’s environment (Lange and Washburn, 2012). This information is considered 
important because it determines whether the focal firm is blamed for causing a social, economic 
or environmental harm. Lange and Washburn (2012) consider this at the level of the individual 
perceiver - but potentially – these perceptions aggregate over stakeholder assessments in order 
to direct the general focus of blame towards the firm or other culprits. It may therefore be the 
case that events elicit some degree of individual-level variation, particularly when culpability is 
somewhat ambiguous to determine. However, at the broader, aggregate level, stakeholder 
assessments of culpability culminate to a more general sense of whether the firm is perceived 
culpable for corporate irresponsibility. Whilst the individual-level is important, in terms of 
observed reputational decline, broad culpability attributed to the firm has greater potential to 
alter the reputation of the firm overall. Yet, as previously suggested in other research, the 
culpability for events may be somewhat difficult to determine, as often several parties are 
implicated in acts of corporate irresponsibility (Dean, 2004). In terms of the irresponsibility often 
associated with the multinational organisation, complex supply networks, multiple business units 
as well as the management of large employee bases may mean that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to determine causation. However, the media often illustrates an organisation’s 
involvement without mention of alternative causal agents if no other parties are involved or are 
perceived to own some culpability for causing an outcome. In these cases, culpability could be 
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expected to be much less ambiguous and would require increased cognitive resources by the 
interpreter to evaluate a different assessment. For events where less ambiguity is present, I 
argue, there is a greater potential for subsequent reputational decline. 
The level of sympathy generated by the victims of events has also been suggested to play a key 
role in the broader attribution process (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Whether the victims are 
perceived to be complicit in an event’s effect may determine levels of stakeholder sympathy 
(Alicke, 2000; Weiner, Graham and Chandler, 1982). Stakeholders’ identification with the parties 
victimised has also been said to play a role in assessors’ perceptions of victimhood (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012). Yet in the main, there are two primary indicators noted to affect perceptions of 
complicity; first, whether the victims have a degree of control over the effect, and secondly, 
whether the victims had prior knowledge or foresight regarding the effect (Shaver, 1985). Whilst 
these two factors may be considered highly subjective, some stakeholder groups may be less 
likely to be perceived as complicit. Specifically, these stakeholder groups may include the very 
young or the elderly, individuals with disabilities, the economically disadvantaged, pregnant 
women and individuals managing serious health conditions. Any organisational behaviour 
negatively impacting the previously described stakeholders may in turn generate subsequent 
reputational penalties because irresponsibility that victimises these parties may generate more 
stakeholder sympathy. With these points in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H4.6: When irresponsibility is associated with a single attribution component (effect 
undesirability [or] perceived culpability [or] affected party non-complicity) there is a significant 
and negative change in corporate reputation. 
 
4.7.2. Combinations of Effect Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and Affected Party 
Non-Complicity 
Though I proposed that there is some significant conceptual merit to analysing each component 
to Lange and Washburn’s framework separately, the authors articulated that only the presence 
of all three irresponsibility characteristics (to some degree) would elicit attributions of 
irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 2012: 308). However, notwithstanding this position, I 
argue that modelling combinations of irresponsibility elements may capture important 
interactions between assessments. To this end, here I articulate that combinations of these 
facets will elicit greater subsequent reputational penalties because the presence of multiple 
characteristics potentially increases the likelihood of assessor criticality. For instance, events 
displaying both effect undesirability and perceived culpability appear, at face value at least, to 
capture both the intensity of stakeholder emotion and direction of corporate criticality. Similarly, 
88 
 
the combination of effect undesirability and affected party non-complicity may capture events 
whereby assessors’ moral objections may be amplified by the presence of a vulnerable/non-
complicit party. Similarly, incidents that are believed to be solely caused by the firm and impose 
a negative effect on vulnerable/non-complicit stakeholders may amplify the event’s impact on 
changes in corporate reputation. With these points in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H4.7: When irresponsibility is associated with more than two attribution components (effect 
undesirability, perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) there is a stronger 
negative and significant effect on changes in corporate reputation than the presence of effect 
undesirability, perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity alone. 
 
4.7.3. The Combined Presence of all Three Assessor Perceptions 
The final hypothesis articulated for further empirical exploration in this chapter is the combined 
presence of all three components of irresponsibility attributions as offered by Lange and 
Washburn (2012). Here, firms associated with events perceived to have all three components 
are suggested be at risk for irresponsibility attributions (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Whilst the 
authors posit that irresponsibility attributions depend on the ‘combined presence’ of ‘some 
degree’ of all three elements – the degree of potential diagnosticity of each component 
independently remains largely speculative. In other words, unless each element is empirically 
explored separately, we remain unaware of which ‘calculation’ or element is driving attributions 
of irresponsibility. Here, where all three components are present, such conditions may elicit the 
most significant reputational affects. More specifically, events which elicit a significant emotional 
stakeholder response through the undesirability of its effect, coupled with an increasingly narrow 
set of alternative possibilities for its culpability and has associated with it victims that evoke 
greater assessor sympathy, culminate in, potentially, a more significant reputational effect. Here, 
I suggest that the presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability directed specifically 
towards the focal firm and the association with non-complicit victimised parties, captures from an 
event context perspective, the most severe set of attribution circumstances with regards to 
reputational risk. However, whilst these three components may not be an exhaustive list of 
salient features of irresponsibility, they signify the most nuanced theorisation of irresponsibility 
attributions to date.  With these points in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H4.8: The relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation is most 
significant (and negative) when event undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party 
non-complicity are all present. 
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4.8. Data 
This section provides a brief overview of the sample used in this study as well as a summary of 
the dependent, independent and control variables employed here (for more details on the 
methodology, please see Chapter 3). Reputation scores for this study were derived from 
Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most Admired Companies annual survey, a more commonly 
studied data source in the wider reputation and CSR literature (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Hammond and Slocum Jr, 1996; Wartick, 1992; 2002). As explicated in more detail in 
Chapter 3, these organisations tend to be larger and more often in the public eye. The 
independent variables explored, namely irresponsibility data (e.g. event classifications, 
stakeholder harm types and so on) were derived, in part, from Thompson Reuters ASSET4 
dataset and supplemented with additional data regarding each observation of irresponsibility 
accounted by ASSET4 which was drawn from media reports using the LexisNexis search portal. 
This study also uses a number of firm level control variables courtesy of DataStream. 
4.8.1. Sample 
This study focuses on the reputations of firms listed by Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most 
Admired Companies annual survey, thus comprising of 500 US organisations classified 
according to their respective SIC codes. Moreover, this study analyses the associated corporate 
irresponsibilities of sample firms as depicted within the media by drawing on data from 
Thompson Reuters ASSET4 database as well as additional supplementary details on each 
observation compiled from searching the media search tool LexisNexis. A full list of 
irresponsibility characteristics in the sample is provided in the table below. I use firm reputation 
ratings across 8 annual surveys (2004-2012) in order to develop a longitudinal assessment of 
the reputation penalties process over time. This yielded a total of 3850 company year 
observations, or an average of 226 firms per survey.   
4.8.2. Dependent Variable 
Corporate Reputation 
To test propositions derived from the previous hypotheses presented in this chapter, I utilise 
Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most Admired Companies survey. In the WMAC survey each 
corporation is rated by two participant groups, namely senior management and industry 
analysts, relative to its competitors on eight key attributes. These attributes are (a) quality of 
management; (b) quality of products or services; (c) innovativeness; (d) ability to attract, 
develop, and keep talented people; (e) long-term investment value; (f) financial soundness; (g) 
use of corporate assets; and (h) community and environmental responsibility. For this rating, an 
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11-point scale is used (0 = poor, 10 = excellent). In this study, the dependent variable measures 
specifically whether there are any changes in reputation scores from one year to another as a 
result of corporate irresponsibility acts.  
4.8.3. Independent Variables 
Corporate Irresponsibility 
Data regarding observations of irresponsibility was derived partially from Thompson Reuters 
ASSET4 dataset. Each independent variable measures a specific aspect of corporate 
irresponsibility. To validate the ASSET4 data on irresponsibility I then searched for media 
reports related to each observation via the LexisNexis online search directory. I cross-
referenced the results from LexisNexis with ASSET4 to validate each observation. When results 
were missing, I excluded them from the database. As detailed in Chapter 3, using the 
supplementary data on irresponsibility events collected from LexisNexis, I then developed a 
comprehensive coding framework with a number of key objectives in mind; namely to reflect the 
underlying nature of events, including the harms presented, identify additional parties implicated, 
identify the association of physical human harm and so on. The pro forma document was then 
used as the basis for all subsequent coding of files from LexisNexis. 
I use the variable ‘ANY_EVENT’ to broadly measure all identified acts of corporate 
irresponsibility per firm year without initially distinguishing between the different types of acts of 
irresponsibility. Then, the variables ‘EVENT_1’ … ‘EVENT_20’ classify incidents of 
irresponsibility using general thematic categories identified in the ASSET4 database. A reminder 
of the types of events that the observations most closely conform to is presented in Table 4.1. In 
turn, Table 4.2 includes a reminder of broad ‘HARM_TYPES’ (i.e. financial, physical, emotional, 
civil liberties and environmental) measuring the specific influence an act of corporate 
irresponsibility has upon the victimised stakeholder group; as well as more specific types of 
associated stakeholder harm (i.e. associated injuries, associated fatalities, accused of 
deception, accused of discrimination and associated with job losses).  Data on broad categories 
of harm was compiled by hand via content analysis of media reports. Furthermore, it should also 
be highlighted here as well that the ability to distinguish between these types of physical harm 
was due to having conducted content analysis of media reports gathered after extensive 
searches of the LexisNexis database. 
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Table 4.1: Event categories of corporate irresponsibility 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Harm categories associated with corporate irresponsibility 
 
 
The variable ‘EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY’ measures events that are associated with an 
associated degree of moral disregard by organisational observers. This is a continues variable; 
this variable was analysed by running the content of media reports with LIWC software which 
counts qualitative aspects of the data and orders them in terms of their semantic orientation by 
referencing them to a preexisting database. ‘CULPABILITY’ measures whether an incident was 
reported alongside other potential causal agents. This was also derived by analyzing the content 
of media reports by hand. When a firm was solely implicated in the cause of an event without 
Event no. Event type 
1 Management Compensation 
2 Shareholder Rights 
3 Earnings 
4 Insider Trading 
5 Accounting 
6 Customer/Consumer 
7 Product & Service Quality 
8 Spills and Pollution 
9 Product Recalls 
10 Intellectual Property 
11 Public health 
12 Taxation 
13 Anti-competition 
14 Human rights 
15 Child labor 
16 Freedom of association 
17 Diversity and opportunity 
18 Wages and working conditions 
19 Employee health and safety 
20 Ethics  
Harm 
no. 
Broad categories of associated 
stakeholder harm 
Specific types of associated stakeholder harm 
1 Financial   
2 Physical  
Injuries  
Fatalities  
3 Emotional  
Deception  
Discrimination 
4 Civil liberties  Job losses  
5 Environmental   
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mention of other potential attributable parties, the variable noted culpability. This proxy of 
culpability is in line with extant theorisation (notably, Lange and Washburn, 2012). The rationale 
here is that, restricting the availability of suggested causal agents may increase the potential of 
perceived corporate culpability because other possible explanations for the cause of an effect 
are not considered. In turn, ‘NON-COMPLICITY’ specifically measures incidents that are 
associated with groups of stakeholders likely to be seen as non-complicit (e.g., the elderly, 
pregnant women, disabled individuals and so on) and evoke increased sympathy from the 
general stakeholder pool. From an attribution perspective, the main thrust of non-complicity or 
vulnerability is the identification of sympathy elicited by broader assessors (c.f. Lange and 
Washburn, 2012, p. 307). ‘CULPABILITY’ and ‘NON-COMPLICITY’ are dichotomous variables.  
‘EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY’ measures the presence of both observed 
effect undesirability and observed culpability in that a variable which measures the combined 
effect of organisational actions perceived as immoral for which the firm is considered as the 
main culprit may better explain changes in reputation. In the same vein, ‘EFFECT 
UNDESIRABILITY AND NON-COMPLICITY’ measures when the event is characterized by both 
moral disregard and the affected party is perceived as non-complicit; whilst ‘CULPABILITY AND 
NON-COMPLICITY’ is a proxy that measures cases when the firm is perceived as culpable for 
an event where the affected party is perceived as non-complicit or vulnerable. Finally, ‘EFFECT 
UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY AND NON-COMPLICITY’ tests for the effect of all three 
event characteristics being present on changes in corporate reputation.  
 
4.8.4. Control Variables 
A measure of each firm’s ‘LEVERAGE’ (ratio of total debt to total assets), and ‘ROA’ (ratio of 
pre-tax profits to total assets) were extracted from DataStream. Since firm growth can be 
associated with some level of managerial effectiveness and internal performance, a measure of 
‘FIRM SIZE’ (the natural logarithm of the value of total assets) was collected from DataStream 
and included in all models. Furthermore, given the link drawn previously between firm reputation 
and product range (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), each firm’s ‘R&D intensity’ (RDASS) (ratio of 
R&D expenditures to total assets) was also collected using the data available in DataStream.  
Furthermore, I controlled for how well the firms score in three main areas associated with 
reputational performance. Specifically, ‘SOCIAL SCORE’ (SOC_SCORE) is a proxy that 
measures the nature of a firm’s relationship with stakeholders such as customers and the 
society. ‘ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE’ (ENV_SCORE) measures a firm’s practices concerning 
avoidance of environmental risks. ‘CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE’ (CGV_SCORE) 
refers to how much firm equity is owned by institutional investor groups. These continuous 
variables (ranked from 0 to 100) are also available in DataStream. 
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Each year was controlled for (respectively, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012), with the 
exception of 2008 which was omitted in order to avoid the dummy variable trap (also, during the 
financial crisis these firms may have suffered reputational damage that does not reflect their 
overall reputations). Finally, I included dichotomous industry sector variables which took the 
value of ‘1’ if the firm belonged to a specific industry and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. 
 
4.9. Model specification 
I present linear regression results modelling the relationships between changes in corporate 
reputation and the explanatory variables described in the previous section. Linear regression 
modelling is the statistical method extensively used in the reputation literature to model the 
relationship between corporate reputation and the variables expected to have a significant effect 
on an organisation’s reputation score (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Janney and Gove, 2011; 
Zyglidopoulos, 2001). In this case, I can analyse whether corporate irresponsibility variables 
such as irresponsibility events and stakeholder harms, predict changes in reputational scores. 
The potential number of firm-year observations was 3,696, for which corresponding reputation 
data was available for a total of 1,312 results for analysis. Omitting one of the year dummy 
variables (i.e. 2008) as well as one industry (IND33) dummy variable is a widely utilised method 
for avoiding the ‘dummy variable trap’ (see Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  
Table 4.3 reports the standard deviations and the correlation matrix. There is some degree of 
correlation between social and environmental performance variables, which is not surprising 
considering that firms with better environmental performance would also be morally inclined to 
perform better socially. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated to verify for the existence 
of multicollinearity between predictor variables (see Table 4.4). The VIFs range between 1.09 
and 10 suggesting that there is no significant evidence of multicollinearity; although there is no 
clear cut-off point for VIFs, values over 10 have generally been suggested to show signs of 
multicollinearity (Field, 2009); with the exception ANY_EVENT and EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
because the events being analysed here are, by definition, all undesirable to some extent. 
Importantly, there is no single regression model in which both dummy variables indicating the 
presence of a negative event and the extent of the undesirability of those events jointly appear. 
Thus, overall, concerns regarding multicollinearity appear relatively modest. Additionally, Table 
4.4 also confirms that social and environmental performance do not present a concern since 
their VIFs are 3.21 and 3.89 respectively.  
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10) 
Variables  Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Reputation  .99 1 .17** .01 -.02 -.01 .04 -.05* .03 .08** .09** .08** .10** .04* .06** .09** .08** .09** .03 .07** .06** .06** .05** .13** .14** .05* .07** .10** .11** .08** .12** .07** .06** 
ANY_EVENT .46 .17** 1                               
Management comp. .12 .01 .18** 1                              
Shareholder rights  .17 -.02 .25** .02 1                             
Earnings  .04 -.01 .06** .04** .02 1                            
Insider trading .07 .04 .11** .13** .02 .07** 1                           
Accounting  .11 -.05* .16** .04** .10** .05** .05** 1                          
Customer/Consumer .31 .03 .50** .12** .13** .02 .04* .09** 1                         
Prod. & Serv. qual. .15 .08** .23** .06** .11** -.01 .07** .04** .13** 1                        
Spills & Pollution .21 .09** .33** .05** .01 .01 .01 .01 .06** .06** 1                       
Product recalls .21 .08** .33** .02 .06** .01 .03 .01 .19** .11** .06** 1                      
Intellectual property .24 .10** .38** .06** .09** .01 .02 .07** .19** .11** .03* .21** 1                     
Public health .09 .04* .13** .01 .00 -.00 .06** -.01 .07** .02 .11** .05** .03* 1                    
Taxation  .10 .06** .15** .02 .03* .05** -.01 .03 .12** .03 .05** .03 .02 .04** 1                   
Anti-corruption .25 .09** .39** .04** .12** .06** .06** .08** .23** .12** .11** .16** .22** .08** .10** 1                  
Human rights .09 .08** .14** .07** -.00 -.00 -.01 -.01 .05** .03* .10** .09** .09** .02 .01 .07** 1                 
Child labour  .05 .09** .07** -.01 .04** -.00 .06** -.01 .04** .05** .03* .10** .06** -.01 .04* .00 .25** 1                
Freedom of assoc. .04 .03 .06** -.01 -.01 -.00 -.00 -,.01 .06** .03* .07** .10** .08** .06** -.01 .08** -.00 -.00 1               
Div. and opport. .21 .07** .33** .06** .11** .04** .01 .06** .21** .11** .10** .13** .05** .05** .06** .14** .08** .05** .13** 1              
Wages  .23 .06** .36** .09** .07** .01 .06** .03* .22** .13** .18** .19** .19** .08** .06** .16** .08** .07** .09** .17** 1             
Employee H&S .18 .06** .27** .04** .01 -.01 .07** -.02 .07** .05** .31** .11** .05** .18** .05** .12** .11** .06** .02 .14** .21** 1            
Ethics  .22 .05** .33** .14** .12** .01 .12** .12** .24** .07** .11** .08** .12** .04** .12** .19** .12** .05** .04** .14** .14** .10** 1           
Financial harm .44 .13** .87** .19** .28** .07** .12** .18** .48** .23** .23** .23** .43** .12** .18** .45** .11** .07** .07** .32** .41** .21** .34** 1          
Physical harm .32 .14** .52** .06** .08** .00 .03* .03* .36** .25** .35** .34** .12** .24** .10** .23** .20** .11** .08** .22** .27** .52** .19** .38** 1         
Emotional harm .14 .05* .20** .16** .03 -.01 .03* .00 .19** .07** .10** .07** .05** .01 .03* .07** .18** .20** .08** .24** .13** .10** .25** .17** .22** 1        
Civil liberties  .23 .07** .36** .10** .13** -.01 .02 .06** .29** .09** .12** .13** .18** .05** .03* .18** .21** .15** .14** .43** .20** .13** .26** .30** .18** .17** 1       
Environmental  .21 .10** .32** .05** .02 .01 .01 .01 .08** .07** .84** .07** .03 .14** .07** .11** .10** .03* .04** .09** .16** .33** .12** .23** .37** .07** .08** 1      
Injuries  .24 .11** .38** .01 .06** -.01 .03* .02 .29** .18** .21** .32** .12** .21** .10** .17** .22** .10** .08** .19** .21** .44** .17** .29** .69** .19** .19** .24** 1     
Fatalities  .21 .08** .32** .03 .03* -.01 .04** .03 .22** .13** .26** .15** .07** .16** .11** .10** .20** .10** -.01 .12** .19** .49** .13** .23** .62** .08** .09** .31** .46** 1    
Deception .41 .12** .76** .20** .29** .06** .13** .20** .52** .20** .23** .20** .22** .11** .18** .47** .15** .09** .08** .39** .30** .19** .36** .78** .40** .20** .37** .23** .30** .26** 1   
Discrimination  .22 .07** .35** .04** .12** .04** .01 .06** .23** .11** .11** .14** .06** .05** .06** .15** .06** .05** .15** .91** .21** .15** .15** .35** .21** .25** .43** .09** .20** .11** .42** 1  
Job losses  .23 .06** .36** .11** .06** .06** .06** .04** .20** .13** .17** .16** .15** .05** .06** .15** .09** .02 .14** .33** .63** .18** .15** .41** .23** .13** .22** .15** .23** .15** .33** .47** 1 
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Table 4.4: Variance inflation factors and collinearity diagnostics  
Variable name Mean N Collinearity 
Tolerance 
VIFs 
REPt 6.18 2006 .25 3.98 
Lag REPt   .51 1.94 
ANY_EVENT .32 3696 .04 22.99 
EVENT 1_Management compensation .01 3696 .81 1.22 
EVENT 2_Shareholder rights .03 3696 .81 1.22 
EVENT 3_Earnings .00 3696 .91 1.09 
EVENT 4_Insider Trading .00 3696 .86 1.15 
EVENT 5_Accounting .01 3696 .87 1.15 
EVENT 6_Customer/Consumer .10 3696 .51 1.92 
EVENT 7_Product & Service Quality .02 3696 .80 1.24 
EVENT 8_Spills and pollution .05 3696 .18 5.53 
EVENT 9_Product recalls .05 3696 .58 1.69 
EVENT 10_Intellectual property .06 3696 .60 1.65 
EVENT 11_Public Health .00 3696 .85 1.17 
EVENT 12_Taxation .01 3696 .83 1.20 
EVENT 13_Anti-corruption .07 3696 .65 1.53 
EVENT 14_Human rights .00 3696 .72 1.38 
EVENT 15_Child Labor .00 3696 .78 1.27 
EVENT 16_Freedom of association .00 3696 .88 1.13 
EVENT 17_Diversity and opportunity .05 3696 .11 8.72 
EVENT 18_Wages and working conditions .05 3696 .45 2.21 
EVENT 19_Employee health and safety .03 3696 .51 1.92 
EVENT 20_Ethics .05 3696 .70 1.42 
HARM 1 .26 3696 .15 6.42 
HARM 2 .11 3696 .27 3.67 
HARM 3 .02 3696 .69 1.43 
HARM 4 .05 3696 .61 1.63 
HARM 5 .04 3696 .17 5.81 
Injuries .06 3696 .40 2.44 
Fatalities  .05 3696 .48 2.06 
Deception  .22 3696 .25 3.88 
Discrimination  .05 3692 .11 8.95 
Job losses .06 3692 .38 2.59 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 8.30 3696 .79 1.26 
CULPABILITY .29 3696 .15 6.58 
NON-COMPLICITY  .10 3696 .46 2.17 
CORPORATE_LEVERAGE 20.55 3487 .52 1.92 
RETURN_ON_ASSETS (ROA) 6.86 34.88 .60 1.66 
FIRM_SIZE 10.10 3467 .26 3.74 
R&D INTENSITY (RDASS) 1.57 3690 .47 2.09 
SOC_SCORE 56.60 2967 .31 3.21 
ENV_SCORE 51.86 2967 .25 3.89 
CGV_SCORE 77.50 2967 .52 1.89 
MARKET_CAP 2.50 1420 .23 4.32 
PRIOR_CI 2.28 1312 .35 2.82 
YEAR 2006 .12 3696 .48 2.07 
YEAR 2007 .12 3696 .51 1.94 
YEAR 2009 .12 3696 .27 3.68 
YEAR 2010 .12 3696 .26 3.77 
YEAR 2011 .12 3696 .25 4.00 
YEAR 2012 .12 3696 .35 2.80 
Note: Dependent variable was REPt, followed by NON_COMPLICITY to assess the VIF of the dependent. 
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Table 4.4: Variance inflation factors and collinearity diagnostics (continued) 
Variable name Mean N Collinearity 
Tolerance 
VIFs 
Mining  .00 3680 .72 1.37 
Petroleum and natural gas .02 3680 .45 2.21 
General building contractors .02 3680 .53 1.86 
Heavy construction  .00 3680 .83 1.20 
Food and kindred products .04 3680 .20 5.00 
Tabaco products  .01 3680 .47 2.12 
Apparel and other materials  .01 3680 .62 1.59 
Lumber and wood products  .01 3680 .69 1.44 
Household furniture .01 3680 .49 2.00 
Papers and allied products .02 3680 .45 2.22 
Chemicals and allied products  .05 3680 .16 6.01 
Products of petroleum and coal  .01 3680 .34 2.87 
Tires and plastic products  .01 3680 .53 1.88 
Glass and glassware   .00 3680 .93 1.06 
Fabricated metal products  .01 3680 .80 1.24 
Machinery and tools .06 3680 .19 5.05 
Electronic and other electrical equipment .05 3680 .19 5.02 
Motor vehicles and passenger cars .02 3680 .28 3.54 
Industrial instruments and apparatus  .05 3680 .22 4.43 
Railroads and passenger trains .01 3680 .70 1.41 
Trucking and courier services .01 3680 .71 1.40 
Transportation services  .01 3680 .57 1.73 
Electric, gas and sanitary services .06 3680 .29 3.34 
Wholesale – durable goods .02 3680 .33 2.96 
Wholesale – paper and paper products  .02 3680 .41 2.41 
Retail building materials, hardware, garden 
supply 
.00 3680 .54 1.84 
Retail- department stores .02 3680 .27 3.58 
Retail- food stores .01 3680 .46 2.15 
Retail- apparel and accessory stores .02 3680 .37 2.65 
Retail- home furniture, furnishings and 
equipment stores 
.01 3680 .61 1.62 
Retail- eating and drinking places .02 3680 .51 1.94 
Retail- miscellaneous retail .02 3680 .35 2.81 
Lenders and commercial banks  .04 3680 .20 4.86 
Federal credit agencies  .00 3680 .92 1.08 
Security and commodity brokers, dealers, 
exchanges and services 
.03 3680 .48 2.06 
Life insurance .04 3680 .19 5.08 
Real estate .00 3680 .84 1.18 
Traders and investment trusts .02 3680 .54 1.83 
Hotels .02 3680 .39 2.55 
Services- advertising  .10 3680 .14 7.09 
Services- automotive repair, services and 
parking 
.01 3680 .79 1.25 
Services- motion picture .00 3680 .70 1.41 
Services- health services .02 3680 .36 2.71 
Services- engineering, accounting, research, 
management  
.01 3680 .54 1.85 
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4.10. Results 
The results pertaining to the linear regression analysis are shown in Tables 4.5 - 4.7. Model 
1 incorporates only the effect of the control variables on the outcome variable, namely 
changes in corporate reputation. Model 2 tests broadly for the effect of corporate 
irresponsibility (ANY_EVENT) on corporate reputation changes, whilst Model 3 adds the 
main effects of 20 types of corporate irresponsibility events on changes in corporate 
reputation (EVENT 1…EVENT 20). Model 4 adds the effect of stakeholder harms (financial 
harm, physical harm, emotional harm, civil liberties harm and environmental harm) on 
reputation changes. Models 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 test for the effects of each of the following 
features of irresponsibility, namely; cases of observed human injuries (Model 5), human 
fatalities (Model 6), stakeholder deception (Model 7), discrimination (Model 8) and 
associated job losses (Model 9) on changes in reputation. Models 10 to 16 test the 
attribution theoretical framework offered by Lange and Washburn (2012) concerning the 
condition of EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, perceived CULPABILITY and affected party NON-
COMPLICITY. Specifically, Models 10 – 12 test for the main effects of 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, perceived CULPABILITY and affected party NON-
COMPLICITY. Model 13 tests for when EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY and perceived 
CULPABILITY are present simultaneously. Model 14 tests for when 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY and affected party NON-COMPLICITY are present 
simultaneously; whereas Model 15 looks at the effect on corporate reputation changes of 
having both perceived CULPABILITY and affected party NON-COMPLICITY simultaneously. 
Finally, Model 16 tests the combined presence of EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, perceived 
CULPABILITY and affected party NON-COMPLICITY on changes in corporate reputation.  
Model 1 illustrates a number of significant effects of the control variables utilised. For 
example, the base model shows that prior year reputation (the LAG variable) is strongly 
associated with current year reputation scores. This implies that reputation updating is only a 
modest phenomenon. Firm size also has a positive and significant effect on changes in 
corporate reputation (β=0.05, p<0.01), in that large firms are more likely to receive higher 
reputation scores. A positive and significant effect on changes in corporate reputation is also 
found for the variables return on assets (β=0.01, p<0.001), whilst leverage has a negative 
and significant effect on changes in corporate reputation (β=-0.01, p<0.001). Environmental 
scores appear to positively influence corporate reputation changes; this relationship is also 
significant (β=0.01, p<0.01). In turn, no significant effects were found for the variables social 
responsibility and corporate governance. Similar results for control variables are mirrored 
throughout the regression models. These results are in line with extant empirical research in 
corporate reputation (see Brammer and Millington, 2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  
Hypothesis 4.1 predicted that, all else considered, there would be no significant relationship 
between generally the presence of corporate irresponsibility acts and changes in corporate 
reputation. Model 2 in Table 4.5 shows that the variable labelled ‘ANY EVENT’ has a 
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positive relationship with corporate reputation changes; however, the effect is in fact not 
statistically significant (β=0.03, n.s.). These results contradict the increasingly large body of 
literature on corporate reputation which advocates that, broadly, cases of corporate 
irresponsibility have a significant and detrimental effect on corporate reputations or changes 
in reputations (Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 
2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009). Thus, Hypothesis 4.1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 4.2 predicted that there would be no significant relationship between broad 
classifications of corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. In Model 3, I 
tested for the main effects of 20 event classifications (product and service quality, product 
recalls, intellectual property, public health, child labor, freedom of association, diversity and 
opportunity, wages and working conditions, employee health and safety, management 
compensation, shareholder rights, earnings, insider trading, accounting, 
customer/consumer, spills and pollution, taxation, anti-competition, human rights, ethics). 
Only three events have some level of significance on the predictor variable. Perhaps 
surprisingly given previous research, there is a positive and significant effect of event 
‘product and service quality’ controversies (β=0.17, p<0.01) and ‘child labor’ controversies 
(β=0.60, p<0.01) on changes in corporate reputation. In turn, there is a negative and 
significant effect of ‘accounting’ controversies on corporate reputation changes (β=-0.25, 
p<0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 4.2 is, in part, supported as there are no significant relationships 
between different broad types of corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation except for the case of product and service quality, child labor and accounting 
controversies. As elaborated in more detail in the next section, these results may signal a 
tendency of reputational assessors to punish events of corporate irresponsibility that are 
more directly linked to a firm’s financial status. 
Model 4 tests for the effects of five harm types (financial, physical, emotional, civil liberties 
and environmental harms) on changes in corporate reputation. Specifically, in Hypotheses 
4.3a and 4.3b, I predicted that there would be no significant relationship between harm 
types, namely financial, physical and emotional harms (Hypothesis 4.3a) yet a significant 
and negative relationship on reputational changes for civil liberties and environmental harms 
(Hypothesis 4.3b). Of the harm types tested, only civil liberties had a negative and 
marginally significant effect on changes in corporate reputation (β=-0.09, p<0.10), whilst the 
others did not have a significant effect. Thus, the hypotheses were only partly supported. 
Most importantly, the analysis illustrates that by looking at broad types of stakeholder harm, 
one may not be able to explain to a great extent changes in corporate reputation.  
In Hypothesis 4.4a I argued that there is no significant expected relationship between cases 
of observed human injuries and changes in corporate reputation. In Model 5, the relationship 
between firms being visibly involved in human injuries and changes in corporate reputation 
is found to be positive (β=0.01, n.s.), although the effect is, as assumed, insignificant; thus, 
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supporting Hypothesis 4.4a. This result is also in line with findings of earlier work using the 
same large-scale survey data (c.f. Zyglidopoulos, 2001). 
In turn, I expected a negative and significant effect of companies being visibly involved in 
fatalities on changes in corporate reputation as formulated in Hypothesis 4.4b. As observed 
in Table 4.6, Model 6 does not support Hypothesis 4.4b, in that, contrary to the expectations, 
there is no significant relationship between companies being visibly involved in fatalities 
events and changes in corporate reputation, although the direction of this relationship is, 
indeed, negative (β=-0.07, n.s.). This too is in line with the previous findings of Zyglidopoulos 
(2001). Similar to Zyglidopoulos (2001), I note that, although these results may seem 
counterintuitive and perhaps unexpected, an explanation for this result is that being 
associated with fatalities may not necessarily imply that the firm was perceived as culpable 
for causing the conditions which resulted in those fatalities. 
Hypotheses 4.5 predicted no significant relationships between firms being accused of 
deception, discrimination or associated with job losses and changes in corporate reputation. 
Model 7, tests for deception in relation to reputation penalties and found its effect not to be 
significant (β=-0.02, n.s.); In Model 8, I found a negative but also insignificant effect of acts 
of discrimination on changes in corporate reputation (β=-0.02, n.s.). Whilst Model 9 tests for 
the effect of companies causing job loss on their reputations’ changing; here also the effect 
of job loss on changes in reputation is insignificant (β=0.02, n.s.). Thus Hypothesis 4.5 is 
supported. An interpretation of these results, particularly concerning the effect of job losses 
on changes in reputation is that layoffs may be considered necessary in some contexts to 
insure the financial health of the firm, thus offsetting the reputational effect of job losses.  
In Models 10-16, I tested for the main effects of Lange and Washburn’s (2012) attribution 
framework on changes in corporate reputation. I tested for the main effects of 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY (Model 10), CULPABILITY (Model 11) and NON-COMPLICITY 
(Model 12). No significant results were found when independently testing for the effect of 
these variables on changes in corporate reputation. Thus, Hypothesis 4.6, which assumed a 
significant and negative relationships between EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, CULPABILITY 
and respectively, NON-COMPLICITY on changes in corporate reputation, has not been 
supported. Subsequently, I tested for the presence of two of these criteria simultaneously. In 
Model 13, I found a positive but insignificant effect for the simultaneous presence of 
corporate CULPABILITY and EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY on changes in corporate 
reputation (β=0.00, n.s.). Model 14 shows a positive and significant relationship between 
effect undesirability and affected party non-complicity (β=0.00, p<0.05). Furthermore, Model 
15 found a positive and significant relationship between the presence of both culpability and 
affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation (β=0.00, p<0.05). 
Consequently, I found no support for Hypothesis 4.7 in the regression models. As discussed 
in more detail later, this could mean that highly severe events affecting non-complicit parties 
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may subsequently be interpreted by firms to be a significant threat to reputations and thus, 
allocate increased resources to the remedial actions of these in spite of potential culpability.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4.8 predicted that the relationship between irresponsibility and changes 
in corporate reputation is most significant and negative when event undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity are all present. Model 16 simultaneously tests 
for the effects of effect undesirability, corporate culpability and affected party non-complicity 
on changes in corporate reputation. There is a positive and significant relationship between 
the simultaneous presence of effect undesirability, corporate culpability and affected party 
non-complicity on changes in corporate reputation (β=0.00, p<0.05). Overall, the regression 
results in Model 16 appear to indicate that the assumption put forward by Lange and 
Washburn (2012) is not confirmed when looking at changes in reputation scores; thus, 
Hypothesis 4.8 has also not been supported here. One explanation for these results may be 
that the three components of irresponsibility attributions posed by Lange and Washburn 
(2012) may be relevant but contingent on ‘who is being accused’ of irresponsibility, their 
history and the qualities associated with them such as whether they are known to be socially 
responsible or irresponsible. To unpack this supposition, the following empirical chapters 
model for a set of subsampled firms with respect to specific firm characteristics, namely the 
level of organisational celebrity, social responsibility, history of crisis and financial stability. In 
this way, I unpack how prior beliefs may potentially shape the attribution process.  
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Table 4.5: Results of the linear regression for Models 1-4a,b,c 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant  0.77** 0.80** 0.84*** 0.76** 
ANY_EVENT  0.03   
EVENT 1_Management compensation   -0.08  
EVENT 2_Shareholder rights   -0.04  
EVENT 3_Earnings   -0.04  
EVENT 4_Insider Trading   -0.01  
EVENT 5_Accounting   -0.25**  
EVENT 6_Customer/Consumer   -0.04  
EVENT 7_Product & Service Quality   0.17**  
EVENT 8_Spills and pollution   -0.07  
EVENT 9_Product recalls   0.02  
EVENT 10_Intellectual property   0.03  
EVENT 11_Public Health   0.10  
EVENT 12_Taxation   -0.04  
EVENT 13_Anti-corruption   -0.02  
EVENT 14_Human rights   -0.13  
EVENT 15_Child Labor   0.60**  
EVENT 16_Freedom of association   0.33  
EVENT 17_Diversity and opportunity   0.04  
EVENT 18_Wages and working conditions   0.01  
EVENT 19_Employee health and safety   0.07  
EVENT 20_Ethics   -0.08  
HARM 1 – Financial    8.85 
HARM 2 – Physical    0.06 
HARM 3 – Emotional    0.04 
HARM 4 – Civil Liberties    -0.09┼ 
HARM 5 – Environmental    -0.04 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.73*** -0.07 
FIRM SIZE  0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
RDASS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
ROA 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
F 53.437 52.587 40.803 48.778 
R square 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 4.6: Results of the linear regression for Models 5-9a,b,c 
Independent variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant  0.77** 0.73** 0.75** 0.76** 0.78 
INJURIES 0.01     
FATALITIES   -0.07    
DECEPTION    -0.02   
DISCRIMINATION     -0.02  
JOB LOSSES     0.02 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74** 0.74** 
FIRM SIZE  0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
RDASS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
ROA 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
F 52.551 52.632 52.561 52.554 52.553 
R square 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
 
Table 4.7: Results of the linear regression for Models 10-16a,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 
10 
Model  
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
Constant  0.75*** 0.73** 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00   -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CULPABILITY  -0.02  -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
NON-COMPLICITY    0.06 0.07┼ 0.05 -0.12 0.05 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND 
CULPABILITYc 
   0.00    
EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY AND 
NON-COMPLICITYc 
    0.00*   
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
     0.20  
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND 
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITYc 
      0.00* 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.05** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
RDASS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
ROA 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
F 52.547 52.559 52.671 50.219 50.417 50.288 50.442 
R square 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
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4.11. Discussion 
In this chapter I began to explore the relationship between corporate irresponsibility on 
changes in corporate reputation. By modelling broad aspects of irresponsibility on changes 
in corporate reputation, this chapter explored (1) whether firms associated with acts of 
corporate irresponsibility subsequently incur reputation penalties? (2) Do organisations 
experience more significant reputation penalties when they are associated with certain types 
of irresponsibility? (3) What are the characteristics of irresponsibility that reputational 
assessors penalise firms most severely for? With regards to whether irresponsibility is 
broadly associated with subsequent reputation penalties, I find evidence which suggest that 
this appears not to be the case, in that reputational updating is only a somewhat moderate 
and infrequent phenomenon. These results support a long history of observational research 
in social psychology which suggests that rarely do individuals update their beliefs (Asch, 
1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). The 
research findings of this chapter also suggest that the relationship between irresponsibility 
and reputation penalties may be significantly more complex than previously understood.  
In this chapter, I theorised that many of the broad categories and typologies utilised by 
extant research to describe and distinguish between acts of corporate irresponsibility would 
not be indicative of reputational harms. Though I found this to be broadly the case, out of 
twenty broad categories of irresponsibility tested by Model 3 in Table 4.5, three categories 
related to matters of accounting, product and service quality and child labor were found to be 
significant. Only irresponsibility related to accountancy practices were significant and 
negatively related to changes in reputation, whilst product and service quality issues as well 
as child labor use was significant and positively related to alterations in reputation scores. A 
possible explanation for these results is that accounting-related irresponsibility may signal 
issues regarding the underlying financial health of the organisation to assessors. Extant 
research has pointed out that the data source used by this research, namely Fortune’s 
WMAC data does have a notable financial orientation (Fryxell and Wang, 1994). ‘Economic’ 
elements of reputation are potentially most salient to these groups of assessors. Therefore, 
irresponsibility that specifically undermines issues related to the financial well-being of the 
organisation, as well as potential efforts to conceal it, may damage perceptions of the firm 
most significantly.  
Counterintuitively though, I find some evidence of reputational enhancement associated with 
irresponsibility. Here, issues related to ‘product and service quality’ as well as ‘child labor’ 
may also be associated with distinct financial advantages through cost-reduction, which, 
may in turn actually promote increased perceptions of the firm. Another potential 
interpretation for reputational enhancements in light of irresponsibility may be the 
appropriate and effective management of events. Here, crisis management scholars have 
long suggested that firms may be able, not only counteract the reputational risks associated 
with corporate irresponsibility with remedial actions and communications, but also enhance 
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stakeholder perception of the firm by demonstrating their commitment to their social 
responsibilities (e.g., Ansoff, 1975; Coombs, 1995; 2006; Kash and Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 
1994; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997; Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). 
In terms of the broad outcomes of irresponsibility, I argued that there would not be any 
measurable effects of categories of stakeholder harm, namely financial, physical or 
emotional harms on changes in reputation because these categories offer little features 
suggested as salient by theories of attribution. This was confirmed by the regression 
analysis. However, I also argued that environmental harms as well as civil liberties harms 
would elicit broad reputational effects because these types of harm have become 
increasingly topical during the period studied, specifically the years 2004 - 2011. I articulate 
that the increased awareness and perception of environmental issues through the global 
warming debate as well as the increased prevalence of conversations around privacy issues 
would in turn expose firms associated with these issues to more stakeholder criticality than 
those found in extant research (Zyglidopoulos, 2001). However, I found no evidence to 
suggest that issues related to environmental harms had a significant effect on reputation. 
Yet, firms associated with harms to stakeholders’ civil liberties were associated with negative 
but only marginally significant reductions in reputation. Though, from an attribution 
perspective, neither outcomes on the environment nor harms to stakeholder liberties are 
viewed as indicative to the attribution process, a negative and marginally significant result for 
civil liberties harms could be interpreted as some preliminary and tentative evidence towards 
the theorisation that perceptions of irresponsibility change over time due to specific issues 
becoming topical in the ‘ether’ of social assessment. 
In this chapter I also tested the assumption that incidents that injure stakeholders were less 
reputationally damaging than those that fatally injure stakeholders. Unlike prior research 
which fails to distinguish between the two forms of stakeholder harm (Zyglidopoulos, 2001), I 
empirically tested both human injuries and fatalities separately. I found that neither injuries 
nor fatalities have a significant impact on corporate reputation changes. This may be 
because human injuries and fatalities may be largely expected by reputational assessors, 
particularly in industries that are associated with risks to human health, of which there are 
many. Another potential interpretation of these results is that reputational assessors may 
expect different behaviours from different firms, it may be that the subsequent decline in 
reputation, following physical harms that injure or lead to loss of human life, is largely 
dependent on stakeholder perceptions of firm characteristics, such as whether they are a 
socially responsible corporation or whether they are associated with a history of stakeholder 
injuries and/or fatalities. Assessors may also become somewhat desensitised to such 
offences, particularly when considering the increase of this form of news in the media 
(Scharrer, 2008). What is more, I also found no significant relationship between stakeholder 
deception, discrimination and job losses and reputational damages.  I interpret these 
findings to be due to the variance in potential severity within each category tested.  For 
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instance, issues of discrimination may be perceived to be contingent on a number of 
contextual variables including the firm’s history of past offences or whether the 
discrimination was age, gender, sexuality, race or disability-related. What is more, the 
relevance of job losses in terms of reputation penalties may also be contingent on whether 
the losses are perceived to be as a result of financial difficulties or as part of efforts to 
financially enhance the organisation. Results suggest that few categories of irresponsibility 
have significant reputational effects. These results were largely expected because theories 
of attribution suggest that initial perceptions of irresponsibility are contingent on factors not 
specified by broad categories of irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 2012). 
The final part of this chapter empirically explored the attribution framework offered by Lange 
and Washburn (2012). Although the authors suggested that irresponsibility attributions are 
present when there is the “combined presence” of effect undesirability, perceived culpability 
and affected party non-complicity (Lange and Washburn, 2012: 307), in order to develop an 
understanding of which aspects of this framework are most relevant, I tested each 
independently as well as several combinations of these characteristics. The findings of my 
regression analysis indicated that, alone, aspects of affect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity are not independently salient to the reputation 
penalties process. An explanation for this may be that, perceivers may assess many 
different aspects of events and arrive at a common sense explanation for them based their 
entirety, rather than independently. What this may imply is that social impressions in light of 
irresponsibility is a more comprehensive process of social navigation that does not draw 
from any single aspect of irresponsibility in a simple heuristic manner. This study suggests 
that the socio-cognitive process that results in reputation penalties is more complex and 
rather than stakeholders using ‘cognitive short hands’ to make fast judgements, assessors 
may instead draw from a variety of information sources to arrive at a more nuanced 
perspective on firm reputation.  
To unpack whether certain combinations of elements within the socio-cognitive process of 
irresponsibility attributions were together diagnostic of overall corporate irresponsibility, I 
analysed for the effects of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-
complicity in pairs. Interestingly, I found that only the combined presence of effect 
undesirability and non-complicity has a significant (and positive) effect on changes in 
corporate reputation. Again, whilst this result may seem counterintuitive, this combination of 
event characteristics may motivate firms to better manage the event. Finally, I model the 
effects for the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected 
party non-complicity, finding no evidence to suggest reputation penalties as a result of 
events with these combined features. One explanation for this finding is that the process of 
social judgements and impressions is more complex than conceptualised in this chapter as 
reputation penalties may be largely contingent on stakeholders’ prior knowledge and beliefs. 
In other words, ‘who’ is being observed may be as important as ‘what’ is being observed. To 
106 
 
assess whether stakeholders’ prior beliefs and knowledge of the firm shape the attribution 
process in light of corporate irresponsibility, the following chapters empirically explore how 
different organisational qualities affect the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation. 
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CHAPTER 5 – EXPLORING THE CONTINGENCIES OF SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY PERCEPTIONS AND CELEBRITY STATUS  
 
5.1. Introduction 
In this second empirical chapter I explore the contingencies between the relationship of 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation by modelling for a sample of US firms for 
an 8-year period between 2003 and 2011. More specifically, in this chapter I subsample 
firms based on their believed organisational qualities relative to other firms within the 
specified sample. In this empirical chapter I explore the contingent role of prior stakeholder 
perceptions and how these may shape the social judgements and impressions process in 
light of corporate irresponsibility. The focus in on two broad organisational characteristics, 
namely perceptions of social responsibility and celebrity status. The subsequent 
longitudinal research offered in this chapter therefore seeks to explore the questions; (1) 
broadly, which perceived organisational characteristics influence the relationship between 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation? And in what incidences do these 
characteristics play a role? (2) Does the organisation’s prior social responsibility perceptions 
shape the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in reputation? And in which 
circumstances does it do so? (3) Does the organisation’s level of celebrity status influence 
the relationship between irresponsibility and corporate reputation changes? And in which 
contexts does this seem to be most apparent? With this in mind, the aims of this chapter are: 
 To examine whether reputation penalties in light of irresponsibility are contingent on 
prior stakeholder beliefs regarding the firm and its perceived attributes. 
 To explore whether prior perceptions of social responsibility influence the 
relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. 
 To assess whether the level of celebrity status of the firm influences the relationship 
between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. 
In light of the findings in the previous empirical chapter I propose that reputation penalties 
may be largely contingent on ‘who’ is being assessed - which includes facets of corporate 
character and capabilities believed within the wider stakeholder pool, such as perceptions of 
celebrity status and social responsibility. In this chapter I empirically explore the 
contingencies of prior perceptions of social responsibility as well as celebrity status as they 
relate to reputation penalties. 
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5.2. Exploring the Contingency of Social Responsibility: Background 
Research in CSR has suggested that a good reputation can provide a form of ‘reputation 
insurance’ which shields firms who have invested in building a positive reputation from the 
negative outcomes associated with irresponsibility (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, 
2005; Minor and Morgan, 2011). The rationale being that the more reputed organisation may 
be given the benefit of the doubt in light of news of irresponsibility, whereas firms believed to 
be less reputable, may not. Thus, the positive associations with certain firms may ‘buffer’ or 
‘offset’ some of the potential negative impacts of irresponsibility. Empirical evidence 
suggests that firms with positive associations suffered significantly less market-penalties 
after revelations of corporate irresponsibility (Ducassy, 2013; Jones, Jones and Little, 2000; 
Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010; Sanchez, Sotorrio and Diez, 2012). Interestingly, 
evidence presented by Janney and Gove (2011) suggests that firms with an enhanced 
reputation for certain characteristics, such as governance, were penalised more for events 
which pertained specifically to governance failures (Janney and Gove, 2011: 1581), possibly 
indicating that organisational assessors interpret specific types of irresponsibility as 
hypocritical in certain situations. These assumptions are consistent with the findings of Rhee 
and Haunschild (2006), who concluded that automotive firms with increased reputations for 
product/service quality tend to undergo significantly greater market penalties following 
product recall announcements. Having said this, at present, there is uncertainty within the 
broader reputation literature regarding the conditions that prompt organisational assessors 
to endow firms with ‘the benefit of the doubt’ or ignore contradictory evidence, and those that 
stimulate reputational assessors to perceive the firm as culpable or hypocritical. These 
uncertainties then lead to the following question, namely ‘which corporate characteristics are 
associated with reputation penalties in light of corporate irresponsibility?’ 
Looking back at the literature from social psychology, research indicates that individuals are 
often reluctant to update their beliefs when presented with contradictory evidence (Asch, 
1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). This may 
indicate that contrary to the thematic assumption that reputations are fragile assets, 
stakeholder beliefs may become crystalised and remain stable even in the face of corporate 
irresponsibility. Nonetheless, greater stakeholder expectations may lead some firms to be 
held to higher moral standards than others (Kim, 2014). Implicit in this logic is that, 
conversely, low stakeholder expectations of the firm may lead organisations to be held to 
lower moral standards. This idea was put forward by Mishina, Block and Mannor (2012) who 
posit that reputational assessments tend to be ‘path dependent’, meaning that new 
information is interpreted on the basis of prior beliefs. In this chapter, I incorporate rationales 
from this theory of attribution offered by Mishina, Block and Mannor (2012) in order to 
explore how reputational assessments are impacted by varying levels of perceived corporate 
social responsibility. Below, Figure 5.1 highlights the relevant theoretical concepts explored 
in the first part of Chapter 5. 
109 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual overview of the contingent effect of prior social irresponsibility on the 
relationships between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
 
5.2.1. The Influence of Social Responsibility in the Context of Observed 
Irresponsibility 
Although there are multiple components to the attribution framework suggested by Mishina 
and his collogues, here I adopt the specific theoretical position that attributions in light of 
irresponsibility are ‘path dependent’ (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012: 465). The 
perspective that social judgements and impressions of the firm are based on prior beliefs is 
a promising yet empirically unexplored position in reputation research. Whilst my previous 
findings suggested that there is no broad relationship between irresponsibility and changes 
in corporate reputation (Hypothesis 4.1 of the previous chapter), the potential contingency of 
path dependency problematises the assumption that presence of irresponsibility does not 
impact corporate reputations because irresponsibility may elicit different outcomes for 
different firms. Organisations with strong social responsibility associations may, on the one 
hand, create greater expectations amongst its wider audiences. Resultantly, stakeholder 
observations of incongruent behaviour are more severely penalised for socially responsible 
organisations (King and McDonnell, 2012). However, prior research generally agreed that 
stronger social responsibility associations are likely to offset the reputational risks of 
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corporate irresponsibility (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, 2005; Jones, Jones 
and Little, 2000; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). Whilst this body 
of CSR research largely attributes this phenomenon to stakeholders giving the firm ‘the 
benefit of the doubt’; through the lens of attribution theory, rather than a comprehensive 
calculation to give otherwise responsible firms’ pardon, assessors may instead bring to bear 
their prior beliefs as a judgement ‘heuristic’ or cognitive short-cuts to quickly assess the 
relevancy of information available to them (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). This cognitive 
shorthand may, in turn, enable assessors to quickly decide whether new information is 
relevant and indicative of the firm’s character/capabilities or whether it should be ignored.  
Conversely, firms that have cemented predominantly negative associations in the minds of 
their observers may be largely expected to behave irresponsibly (Burgoon, 1978; Rhee and 
Haunschild, 2006), thus blunting the potential for negative social revisions of the firm. In 
other words, in the presence of irresponsibility, firms with negative social responsibility 
associations may, to some extent, experience less reputational penalties because social 
irresponsibility is largely expected of them. This has historically been the position adopted by 
expectancy violations theory (Bailey and Bonifield, 2010; Burgoon, 1996; Sohn and Lariscy, 
2012). These ideas then lead to the following question: ‘what about firms with neither 
particularly positive nor negative associations for social responsibility?’  
Firms with ‘average’ or neutral social responsibility associations, from an attribution 
perspective, may be at a distinct disadvantage. Having a neutral reputation may imply that 
these firms can neither take advantage of ‘offsetting’ the damage associated with 
irresponsibility through building distinctly positive associations for corporate social 
responsibility, nor are their reputations markedly negative enough for organisational 
assessors to largely expect irresponsible behaviour from them. The concept of path 
dependency is supported by a long history of observations in social psychology which 
suggest that individuals seldom update their beliefs when confronted with contradictory 
evidence (Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 
1979). Consequently, one might argue that firms with average social responsibility 
perceptions may be distinctly vulnerable in light of corporate irresponsibility, as assessments 
for these firms tend not to be path dependent. With these points in mind I hypothesise that, 
H5.1a: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms in the first (top) and fourth (bottom) quartiles of 
reputation for social responsibility scores. 
H5.1b: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the second (above average) 
and third (below average) quartiles of reputation for social responsibility scores. 
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5.2.2. The Influence of Social Responsibility on Extant Typologies and Categories of 
Irresponsibility 
In the previous empirical chapter my theoretical position, drawn from theories of attribution, 
motivated an initial exploration into previous typologies and categories of irresponsibility 
proposed by the extant literature. This was because the possibility that irresponsibility poses 
broad reputational risks in most instances was a potentially relevant position when 
considering that theories of attribution have also suggested that individuals own distinct 
cognitive biases referred to as ‘negativity biases’. This idea has now been supported by 
research in neuroscience, in that our attention and memories become drawn towards, and 
activated by, negative information significantly more compared to positive information 
(Gordon et al, 2008; Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom, 2010; Hanson and Mendius, 2009); a 
mechanism suggested to be manipulated in order to increase the newsworthiness of stories 
within the wider media (Hilbig, 2009). That said, whilst extant evidence from the market 
penalties perspective could be potentially the result of our negativity biases, in that most 
categories of irresponsibility are suggested to be associated with significant reputational 
impacts (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and 
Tibbs, 2009), it does not explain whether the firm would receive reputational revisions from 
being simply ‘associated’ with irresponsibility, rather than being thought culpable. This was 
the general position of the attribution framework posed by Lange and Washburn (2012). In 
light of these conflicting theories of attribution, my findings suggested than irresponsibility did 
not have significant reputational effects for most classifications of irresponsibility, in fact, only 
under certain conditions appeared to be reputationally relevant. Here, I return to extant 
categories and typologies of irresponsibility in order to review the contingent cognitive 
mechanism of path dependency. 
The idea that new information, such as revelations of corporate irresponsibility, is interpreted 
on the basis of prior assessor beliefs may largely explain why individuals repeatedly 
overlook or dismiss information when it contradicts their pre-established beliefs (Asch, 1946; 
Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). What is more, the 
idea that irresponsibility may be path dependent may also explain why research shows that 
the most socially reputed firms suffer lower reputation penalties in light of irresponsibility 
(Coombs and Holladay, 2006; Ducassy, 2013; Jones, Jones and Little, 2000; Sanchez, 
Sotorrio and Diez, 2012) because generally, their behaviours are not thought of as ‘typical’ 
of those firms’ past actions and behaviours, and therefore irresponsibility tends to be 
overlooked. Interestingly, firms with moderate reputations for social performance may be at 
a distinct disadvantage when assessing reputation penalties through this lens, as these firms 
are seemingly unable to take advantage of the protective properties of owning either a 
distinctly positive reputation, nor are expectations of them markedly low enough for negative 
behaviour to be expected by wider stakeholder audiences. However, some sub-categories of 
irresponsibility ‘types’ may be more indicative to reputational assessors than others.  
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I previously theorised that the relationship between broad aspects of irresponsibility such as 
broad categories, outcomes of irresponsibility, the presence of injuries, fatalities, deception, 
discrimination and job losses were, for the most part (with the exception of environmental 
and civil liberties harms) too general because, from the attribution perspective proposed by 
Lange and Washburn (2012), they do not adequately capture the nuanced elements of 
social evaluations that assessors find indicative of irresponsibility. Here, I propose that rather 
than lacking the diagnostic elements within themselves, these categories and typologies of 
irresponsibility may instead be largely contingent on the perceived characteristics of ‘who’ 
organisational observers are assessing. In this way, path dependency may lead assessors 
to the heuristic that socially responsible firms are unlikely to be culpable for causing a 
negative social outcome, whilst firms with distinctly negative social perceptions associated 
with them may be considered culpable, but their moral objections are largely expected. A 
reputationally vulnerable group of firms in light of corporate irresponsibility through the lens 
of path dependency may be those which are neither considered to have very strong positive 
nor negative associations. In these instances, the cognitive bias of path dependency may be 
somewhat weakened, leaving social evaluators without the potential heuristic or cognitive 
shorthand to make inferences as to the culpability of the firm or the diagnosticity of the event 
(Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). With these points in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H5.2a: There is no significant relationship between broad categories and typologies 
of irresponsibility (including broad categories of irresponsibility, outcomes of irresponsibility, 
human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and changes in 
corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and bottom (fourth) quartiles of social 
responsibility scores. 
H5.2b: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories 
and typologies of irresponsibility (including broad categories of irresponsibility, outcomes of 
irresponsibility, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) 
and changes in corporate reputation for firms that are above (second quartile) and below 
(third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
 
5.2.3. Unpacking the Effect of Social Responsibility as it Relates to Attribution Theory 
Here, I return to explore the specific attribution theoretic ideas offered by Lange and 
Washburn (2012). Though the authors positioned attribution theory specifically within the 
area of corporate social irresponsibility, they also pointed towards its application to 
understand “how individual-level attributions for social irresponsibility or irresponsibility that 
correlate across individuals may underlie the structural influences often studied in CSR 
research, including institutional and stakeholder pressures on the firm” (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012: 319). Here I contend that other cognitive influences may act upon the 
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mechanisms outlined by Lange and Washburn, in that irresponsibility attributions may also 
be contingent on perceptions of the firm, as the literature in CSR points out that 
organisations with more enhanced reputations often suffer less reputational penalties 
following revelations of irresponsibility (Ducassy, 2013; Jones, Jones and Little, 2000; 
Sanchez, Sotorrio and Diez, 2012). With this in mind, this chapter examines the effect of 
prior stakeholder perceptions of corporate social responsibility, specifically the level of prior 
social responsibility attributed to the firm. The addition of reputation for social responsibility 
to the principles put forward by Lange and Washburn (2012) helps explore not only the 
nuances of what stakeholders are assessing but also who is being assessed, as other, 
similarly nuanced theories of attribution have contended that reputation penalties are ‘path 
dependent’ and thus organisational assessors may call upon their prior beliefs and 
knowledge regarding the firm in order to make assessments of whether present information 
is indicative of the associated firm’s character or  capabilities (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 
2012: 465).  
 
5.2.4. The Influence of Social Responsibility in relation to Effect Undesirability, 
Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity Independently 
Lange and Washburn (2012) posit that irresponsibility assessments are stimulated primarily 
by either the degree to which organisational assessors find the behaviour of the firm to be 
personally threatening – or - the degree to which the firm’s behaviour undermines their moral 
values. As with most cases of irresponsibility that relate to the behaviours of large 
multinational corporations, the majority of stakeholders may not find the actions of the firm to 
be personally threatening in most instances, as seldom does the entirety of a firm’s 
stakeholders learn of irresponsibility through direct experience. Therefore, the most common 
motivation for stakeholder criticality may be the emotional response elicited through the 
actions carried out by the firm on another, which observers may then find morally 
objectionable. Yet, individual responses to a firm’s morally objectionable actions may also be 
dependent on the actor who initiated that it, in this case, organisational characteristics such 
as prior perceptions of reputation for social responsibility may play a role, because the 
undesirability of an event may also be interpreted on the basis of how undesirable they 
believe the wrongdoer to be. Here, research on the halo effect contends that the positive 
reputational characteristics associated with some firms offset the reputational risks 
associated with irresponsibility, providing a form of reputational insurance in times of scrutiny 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Jones, Jones and Little, 2000; 
Minor and Morgan, 2011; Sanchez, Sotorrio and Diez, 2012). Contrastingly, firms with 
negative associations or reputations for corporate social irresponsibility are generally 
expected to behave irresponsibly, therefore potentially mitigating the possible reputational 
effects. Interestingly, firms with neither enhanced nor negative reputations may be at 
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particularly high risk when associated with events of considerable effect undesirability, as 
neither are they aided by a potential halo effect in light of positive prior associations, nor are 
they expected to behave irresponsibly because of negative social responsibility associations.  
The second component of irresponsibility attributions offered by Lange and Washburn 
(2012) is the degree of perceived culpability. This alone may not be indicative of corporate 
criticality within the wider stakeholder pool, but does focus stakeholders’ causal inferences 
either towards the focal firm or within the firm’s environment (Green and Mitchell, 1979; 
Heider, 1958). Again, prior reputation for social responsibility may play a role in here in 
determining assessors’ perceptions of culpability. Well reputed firms are generally expected 
to behave in accordance with societal expectations and the negative consequences of social 
irresponsibility may be largely offset by the crystallisation of positive social responsibility 
attributions related to the firm within the wider stakeholder community (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2005; Coombs and Holladay, 2006; Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Jones, Jones 
and Little, 2000; Minor and Morgan, 2011). In turn, societal expectations of firms with 
distinctly poor reputations for social performance may decrease social expectations over 
time. Prior research has suggested that the CSR efforts of firms with poor reputations tend 
to be received with suspicion by reputational assessor, thus blunting the potentially positive 
outcomes of targeted CSR efforts (Bae and Cameron, 2006). What is more, good behaviour 
may be socially unexpected following a long history of social irresponsibility. Over time, this 
may culminate in reputational associations for being generally irresponsible. Revelations of 
poor behaviour may therefore be largely expected and thus irresponsibility may not be 
associated with significant reputation penalties for firms owning negative social responsibility 
reputations. Irresponsibility, however, may be increasingly problematic for firms with neither 
particularly good, nor bad social responsibility associations. Firms that are considered 
neither particularly socially reputed, nor socially irresponsible may be subject to the ‘worse of 
both worlds’ potentially - as again - these organisations may neither benefit from a reservoir 
of goodwill akin to those owning positive associations for social responsibility, nor are they 
subject to low enough social expectations for irresponsibility. Therefore, firms with above or 
below average social reputation scores may be distinctly more susceptible to being 
perceived as culpable.  
The final component of Lange and Washburn’s framework suggests that the sympathy 
garnered by the wider stakeholder community may be a significant factor in the attribution of 
irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Particularly, those events which victimize a 
party perceived as ‘non-complicit’ by wider stakeholder audiences are suggested to elicit 
broader sympathy, and thus may amplify the potential criticality of stakeholders towards the 
firm. Again, firms with neither particularly enhanced nor poor stakeholder social 
responsibility associations may be particularly vulnerable to reputation penalties in light of 
irresponsibility in instances which harm parties with low complicity. This is because firms 
with generally positive social responsibility associations and those with broadly negative 
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associations may be protected by the socio-cognitive mechanism of ‘path dependency’. In 
turn, firms which do not possess either distinctly positive or distinctly negative attributes in 
the area of social responsibility are unlikely to have built any salient attributes in the minds of 
reputational assessors to then benefit from stakeholder expectations in the process of 
corporate irresponsibility assessments. Again, the relevance of corporate irresponsibility 
characteristics outlined by Lange and Washburn (2012) is tested in order to examine the 
potential significance of each of the three irresponsibility characteristics as they relate to 
reputation penalties. With this in mind, I hypothesise that:  
H5.3a: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and bottom (fourth) 
quartiles of social responsibility scores. 
H5.3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms that are above (second quartile) 
and below (third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
 
5.2.5. The Influence of Social Responsibility in Relation to Combinations of Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
As described in the previous chapter, the irresponsibility characteristics identified by Lange 
and Washburn (2012) are combined in order to identify potentially salient combinations of 
features within this framework. Here I explore the combined presence of the irresponsibility 
characteristics, as theoretically, the combined presence of these attribution components 
should enhance the potential likelihood for reputation penalties following revelations of 
irresponsibility. Combining irresponsibility characteristics is therefore expected to lead to an 
increase in the explanatory power of attributions of irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 
2012). However, the conceptual argument put forward in this section is that social 
expectations and the perceived ‘diagnosticity’ of events (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012) 
are critical co-factors in the relationship between irresponsibility and the potential for 
subsequent reputation penalties because a long history of observation in social psychology 
suggests stakeholders rarely update their beliefs in light of contradictory evidence (Asch, 
1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Again, 
problems may mostly arise for firms that are not associated with particularly strong 
stakeholder beliefs oriented either positively or negatively in terms of social responsibility 
reputations because, for these firms, organisational assessors may not possess strong 
beliefs to contradict observations of irresponsibility. Thus, revelations of irresponsibility 
exhibiting both effect undesirability and perceived culpability may be significant only for 
116 
 
those firms with ‘average’ or ‘moderate’ reputations for social responsibility because of 
vulnerabilities exposed by not owning particularly strong organisational characteristics (i.e. 
social responsibility performance) in the minds of reputational assessors. In light of these 
points, I hypothesise that: 
H5.4a: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and 
bottom (fourth) quartiles of social responsibility scores. 
H5.4b: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms that are above (second 
quartile) and below (third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
 
5.2.6. The Influence of Social Responsibility in relation to Effect Undesirability, 
Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
Lange and Washburn (2012: 307) suggest that, it is the combined presence of the three 
irresponsibility elements ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected party non-
complicity’, that elicits irresponsibility attributions from organisational assessors. For a 
sample of firms with a range of prior reputations for social responsibility, it again may be 
possible for organisations with either generally positive or generally negative prior social 
responsibility associations to be interpreted differently by assessors. Specifically, some firms 
may be largely shielded from experiencing subsequent reputational penalties because those 
firms would have gained distinct advantages stemming from the socio-cognitive mechanism 
of ‘path dependency’ - in that once attributed reputational constituents are achieved, 
assessors largely view irresponsibility on the basis of prior beliefs (Mishina, Block and 
Mannor, 2012). Particularly, firms with enhanced prior reputations for social performance 
may be given the benefit of the doubt or the event may not be considered diagnostic by 
reputational assessors because the firm had, in the past, behaved generally well. Also, 
assessors may disregard contradictory evidence because they perceive the event, at some 
level, not to be indicative of firm attributes. In turn, firms with generally negative overall 
reputations for social responsibility are often expected to be associated with irresponsible 
behaviours. What this may imply for organisations which neither own particularly good nor 
bad reputations for social responsibility, is that they are unlikely to benefit from socio-
cognitive processes, leaving the reputations of these firms distinctly vulnerable in light of 
irresponsibility. This may be particularly the case when all three irresponsibility 
characteristics suggested by Lange and Washburn (2012) are present. Based on this 
rationale, this study hypothesises that: 
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  H5.5a: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of 
effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in 
corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and bottom (fourth) quartiles of social 
responsibility scores. 
H5.5b: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined presence 
of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes 
in corporate reputation for firms that are above (second quartile) and below (third quartile) 
average in social responsibility scores. 
 
5.3. Exploring the contingency of Celebrity Status: Background 
From an attribution perspective, celebrity firms are in a distinct position when compared to 
their peer corporations. Celebrity firms may be considered bastions for their respective 
industries and held in high regard; consequently, these firms may garner significantly more 
stakeholder attention than non-celebrity firms (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006). In this 
way, the degree of celebrity status of the firm may also have an influence on the relationship 
between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputations. Celebrity firms are distinctly 
more ‘visible’ to organisational assessors because external audiences follow prominent firms 
more closely (Brooks et al., 2003) and the “[n]ews media have a fascination with elites and 
celebrity status” (Carroll and McCombs, 2003: 44). However, this ‘fascination’ may have 
both positive and negative implications for celebrity firms. On the one hand, it appears 
logical to assume that celebrities may have distinct advantages over non-celebrity firms 
because they are abler to command premium prices (Rindova et al., 2005), form strategic 
alliances (Pollock and Gulati, 2007), and attract more investor and media attention (Pollock, 
Rindova and Maggitti, 2008). However, the ability to generate increased stakeholder 
attention may not be as advantageous when the firm engages in, or is associated with, acts 
of corporate irresponsibility. In such instances, news of corporate misdemeanors may, in 
fact, garner greater scrutiny. In their analysis of earnings surprises using US stock market 
data, Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova (2010: 1144) found evidence of a halo-effect in that “firms 
possessing either high reputation or celebrity, experienced greater rewards for positive 
surprises and smaller penalties for negative surprises than firms that did not possess these 
assets.” Whilst their findings indicate that increased celebrity status may shield firms from 
stock market losses, it remains unclear how celebrity status influences firms in light of 
irresponsibility when more robust, non-market based reputation measures are used. 
From an attribution perspective, the more known an organisation’s misdemeanors are, the 
more susceptible to assessor criticality the firm becomes. Figure 5.2 below highlights the 
relevant concepts and relationships investigated in this second part of Chapter 5. 
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Figure 5.2: Conceptual overview of the contingent effect of celebrity status on the 
relationships between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
 
By unpacking the contingent relationship of celebrity status as it relates to general 
observations of irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation, this study proposes that 
celebrities are at greater risk than non-celebrity firms because their behaviour tends to 
attract considerable more attention. In this way, I contend that celebrity status may be a 
‘double edged sword’ of sorts, in that increased celebrity status may be considered an 
invaluable asset in order to promote the firm’s positive business activities, yet celebrity 
status may also prove a liability when the firm is associated with irresponsibility because 
celebrity firms tend to garner more unwanted publicity. Thus far, evidence from market-
based literature suggests that celebrity firms are, in fact, protected by their status (Pfarrer, 
Pollock and Rindova, 2010). Therefore, in line with this study’s theoretical position, I argue 
that lower status firms potentially garner significantly less stakeholder attention, therefore 
decreasing the ‘circulation’ of news of irresponsibility and the number of assessors that may 
potentially revise-down their assessments of the firm. However, the effect of celebrity status 
on the relationship between broad observations of irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation tends to be more complex. From an attribution theory perspective, the presence 
of irresponsibility alone is unlikely to be indicative of perceived irresponsibility, in that the 
119 
 
simple association with irresponsibility does not capture stakeholder assessments of 
whether the firm is perceived culpable for the event, nor does the simple observation of 
irresponsibility capture other substantive aspects of the event which assessors may find 
indicative of irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Thus, I hypothesise that: 
H5.6a: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market 
capitalization). 
H5.6b: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market capitalization), 
below-average (third quartile market capitalization) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile 
of market capitalization). 
 
5.3.1. The Influence of Celebrity Status on Perceptions of Broad Categories and 
Extant Typologies of Irresponsibility 
In the first empirical chapter, this study adopted the attribution perspective akin to that 
proposed by Lange and Washburn (2012) namely that stakeholders’ attributions of 
irresponsibility are fundamentally complex, nuanced social evaluations drawn from multiple 
underlying facets of events. Thus, broad categories and typologies of irresponsibility may be 
considered too general as they may not adequately capture the social evaluations made in 
light of irresponsibility. Nonetheless, I explored a number of broad categories as well as 
typologies of irresponsibility utilised by extant research because, fundamentally, some 
theories of attribution often conflict. On the one hand, it is assumed that individuals have 
distinct negativity biases in which negative information is considerably more salient than 
positive information. The general idea here is that the “brain is like Velcro for negative 
experiences and Teflon for positive ones” (Hanson and Mendius, 2009: 41).  
On the other hand, a long history of observations in social psychology suggests that 
individuals do not often update their beliefs even when contradictory evidence emerges 
(Asch, 1946; Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). 
These conflicting evidence bases motivated an exploration of more nuanced attribution 
frameworks as well as an initial investigation into extant categories and typologies of 
irresponsibility. Evidence from the market penalties literature suggests that, broadly, 
irresponsibility tends to exert a significant and negative impact on changes in corporate 
reputation (e.g., Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005), thus reflecting the perspective that individuals tend to be 
cognitively biased towards negativity and sanctions. Although this study’s initial results did 
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not support this proposition, adding celebrity status may amplify the potential innate 
negativity biases for celebrity firms specifically.  
Further, this study theorises that celebrity firms are at a distinct disadvantage in light of 
revelations of irresponsibility because their capabilities of generating significant stakeholder 
attention may prove largely unwanted in this context. Increased media attention too may 
play a role in circulating news of the firm’s wrongdoing, thus increasing the potential 
frequency of stakeholder criticality. Those firms without the celebrity status may not be 
considered as newsworthy when compared to celebrities. The activities of firms considered 
non-celebrities may often go largely unnoticed. Whilst this may be disadvantageous in other 
situations (i.e. when firms attempt to enhance their status and reputations), being ‘under the 
radar’ may prove useful for firms that engage in, or are associated with, irresponsible 
business activities, including the various harm types, harms to human life, deception, 
discrimination, job losses and alike. Therefore, I hypothesise that: 
H5.7a: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market capitalization). 
H5.7b: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market capitalization), 
below-average (third quartile market capitalization) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile 
of market capitalization). 
 
5.3.2. Unpacking the Effect of Celebrity Status as it Relates to Attribution Theory 
Here I explore specifically how stakeholder perceptions regarding the celebrity status of the 
firm may amplify or attenuate the relationship between discreet aspects of the attribution 
process and reputation penalties. More specifically, I theorise how variations in celebrity 
status may alter assessors’ attributions of irresponsibility by returning to the framework 
offered by Lange and Washburn in their 2012 Academy of Management Review article titled 
‘Understanding Attributions of Corporate Social Irresponsibility’, in which the authors suggest 
that irresponsibility attributions are comprised namely of three distinct calculations; the 
degree of effect  undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity 
(Lange and Washburn, 2012). Lange and Washburn’s (2012) model of irresponsibility 
attributions starts primarily with an appreciation that some events are considered to be more 
undesirable than others (Lange and Washburn, 2012). The underlying motivations for 
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perceptions of effect undesirability are expected to arise out of the assessors’ self-
preservation instincts (Pratto and John, 1991) and could be likened to the ‘lemon’s problem’ 
described in economics, whereby assessors evaluate firms in order to avoid potentially 
negative interactions (Emons, 1988). Here, assessors are expected to evaluate whether the 
event may be personally threatening to them (Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008) or determine how 
morally objectionable they believe the event to be (Appiah, 2009). This moral objection may 
then further motivate corporate criticality. In the presence of effect undesirability, my 
previous analysis suggested that alone, effect undesirability is not a sufficient predictor of 
reputation penalties. However, the celebrity status of the organisation may play a role in 
amplifying the frequency with which the wider stakeholder pool concludes whether an 
undesirable effect has taken place. Here I continue the argument that generally, celebrity 
firms are more at risk in light of irresponsibility than non-celebrity firms because celebrities 
garner significantly more negative attention and media press. In turn, non-celebrity firms 
may often be considered as less newsworthy, thus decreasing the circulation of news of 
irresponsibility associated with non-celebrities and lowering the potential for stakeholder 
awareness.  
In light of irresponsibility, being a celebrity firm may therefore have its downsides. These 
disadvantages may be particularly salient in incidents where stakeholders find it implausible 
to attribute responsibility for an event on external factors. As suggested earlier in this 
chapter, Lange and Washburn (2012) identified the degree of corporate culpability as an 
important aspect of assessors’ irresponsibility attributions because causal attributions are 
suggested to describe the direction of stakeholder discontent. If causal attributions are 
directed toward a focal firm because alternative causal agents are lacking and the incident 
involves a firm with greater celebrity status, the celebrity status of the firm may magnify the 
number of potential stakeholders that will conclude the firm to be culpable for causing the 
event. Equally, firms which do not have elevated celebrity status, particularly those with very 
low visibility amongst potential organisational assessors, may garner less attention following 
instances of discreditable corporate behaviours, thus attenuating the relationship between 
focused stakeholder criticality and the corporate reputation of the firm.  
The final calculation that Lange and Washburn (2012) suggest assessors of irresponsibility 
consider in light of irresponsibility, is the level of complicity the victimised parties have in 
relation to the event’s effects. Perceptions of victim complicity are considered important 
because they are related to the level of sympathy garnered from the broader stakeholder 
pool. Events which victimise parties with a reduced capacity of foresight and abilities to 
maneuver potentially harmful events, are suggested to be perceived as having low 
complicity. Again, firms with moderate to low levels of celebrity status may be at less risk 
following incidents associated with non-complicit parties because they are likely to generate 
less stakeholder attention and press. In turn, celebrity firms may be considerably more 
susceptible to stakeholder scrutiny following irresponsibility events associated with non-
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complicit victims broadly because celebrities tend to be the focus of much greater media 
attention. Following this rationale, I hypothesise that:  
H5.8a: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market 
capitalization). 
H5.8b: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market 
capitalization), below-average (third quartile market capitalization) and non-celebrity firms 
(bottom quartile of market capitalization). 
 
5.3.3. The Influence of Celebrity Status in relation to Combinations of Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and/or Affected Party Non-Complicity 
As described previously in this chapter, I also interact combinations of irresponsibility 
characteristics articulated in the framework offered by Lange and Washburn (2012) in order 
to identify potentially salient combined features of the attribution of irresponsibility process. 
The presence of the multiple irresponsibility characteristics may potentially enhance the 
likelihood for reputation penalties following revelations of irresponsibility. From an attribution 
perspective, ‘effect undesirability’ and ‘perceived culpability’ signify two key factors in 
examining the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and potential reputation 
penalties. The level of moral discontent for firm behaviour, and the perception that the firm is 
to blame for an irresponsibility event, capture both the state of discontent and the direction of 
that discontent. In light of this, this study proposes that celebrity firms are at a distinct 
disadvantage in light of irresponsibility, particularly when the event is associated with 
outcomes perceived as undesirable and when few external causal agents are present. 
Events with both greater effect undesirability and perceived culpability may be less relevant 
for non-celebrities and for firms with a moderate celebrity status because potentially fewer 
stakeholders become aware of the news of irresponsibility. Hence, I hypothesise that: 
H5.9a: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of 
market capitalization). 
H5.9b: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility 
(namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected party non-
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complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market 
capitalization), below-average (third quartile market capitalization) and non-celebrity firms 
(bottom quartile of market capitalization). 
 
5.3.4. The Influence of Celebrity Status in Relation to the Combined Presence of Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
Finally, I explore the combined presence of all three irresponsibility elements described by 
Lange and Washburn (2012: 307) namely, ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and 
‘victimised party non-complicity’. This study proposes that, the presence of all three 
components may elicit the most significant irresponsibility attributions from organisational 
assessors - in some contexts. Specifically, when examining a sample of firms with a 
relatively wide range of celebrity statuses, it may be possible that some organisations fare 
worse than others. Continuing the logic outlined within this chapter, celebrity firms may be at 
significantly greater risk in light of irresponsibility with all three attribution characteristics 
because they may garner significantly more media and stakeholder attention. Thus, for 
celebrities, a greater number of potential assessors may become aware of the associated 
irresponsibility, therefore increasing celebrity firms’ likelihood of being penalised by 
reputational assessors compared to non-celebrity firms. Organisations with moderate to low 
levels of celebrity status may have a distinct advantage in light of revelations of 
irresponsibility because they do not garner the same attention, therefore their activities may 
go largely ‘under the radar’ of organisational assessors. With this in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H5.10a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined 
presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and 
changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market capitalization). 
H5.10b: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of 
effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in 
corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market capitalization), below-
average (third quartile market capitalization) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile of 
market capitalization). 
 
5.4. Data 
This section only briefly takes stock of the variables employed in the analysis (detailed in 
Chapter 3, pages 64-74), whilst explaining the sub-sampling strategy used and the choice of 
sub-samples. As mentioned previously, reputation scores for this study were derived from 
Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most Admired Companies annual survey. The independent 
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variables explored, namely irresponsibility data (e.g. event classifications, stakeholder harm 
types and so on) were derived, in part, from Thompson Reuters ASSET4 dataset and 
supplemented with additional data from the LexisNexis; whilst control variables come from 
DataStream. A full list of corporate irresponsibility events, harm types and event 
characteristics in the sample are provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (Chapter 4, page 91) and 
detailed in the Methodology section in Chapter 3 (c.f. Table 3.1, pages 66-67).  
5.4.1. Dependent Variable 
Corporate Reputation 
Similar to what was detailed in the previous empirical chapter, the WMAC survey measures 
reputation according to an 11-point scale (0 = poor, 10 = excellent). As a reminder, it should 
be mentioned that the companies that appear in the WMAC survey consist of the 5 to 10 
largest companies from the Fortune 1,000 lists for the year prior to the year of the survey 
whilst the respondents are senior executives and outside directors of Fortune 1,000 
companies and financial analysts who cover these companies.  
In this chapter, firms are sub-sampled according to two key organisational characteristics 
that may distinguish some firms from others in their sample and most importantly, have the 
potential to shape attributions of irresponsibility. These organisational characteristics are 
social responsibility and celebrity status. Social responsibility data is collected from 
DataStream and measures how well firms score in terms of trust and loyalty with key 
stakeholders such as employees and or customers. In this case, the variable social 
responsibility was computed into four sub-samples, namely top quartile (firms with high 
social responsibility scores, ‘high SR’), second quartile (firms with above average social 
responsibility scores, ‘above average SR’), third quartile (firms with below average social 
responsibility scores, ‘below average SR’) and bottom quartile (firms with low social 
responsibility scores, ‘low SR’). In turn, celebrity is measured by using the proxy of market 
capitalization (measured as stock price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding) 
collected from DataStream. Since market capitalisation refers to the market value of a 
company’s outstanding shares, it tends to be used by investors as a proxy to determine a 
company’s size (and implicitly future potential) rather than using sales figures or total asset 
values. Here as well, the celebrity variable was computed into four sub-samples, namely top 
quartile (firms with high market capitalization, ‘celebrities’), second quartile (firms with above 
average market cap, ‘above average celebrity’), third quartile (firms with below average 
market cap, ‘below average celebrity’) and bottom quartile (firms with low market cap, ‘non-
celebrities’). Companies with a high market capitalisation value tend to be older and well-
established market players in their respective industries. These companies are therefore 
companies whose strategies and behaviours are most reported in the business press 
(Dowling, 2006).  
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5.4.2. Independent Variables 
Corporate Irresponsibility 
Each independent variable measures a specific aspect of corporate irresponsibility. 
‘ANY_EVENT’ measures all identified acts of corporate irresponsibility per firm year without 
initially distinguishing between the different types of acts of irresponsibility. ‘EVENT_1’ … 
‘EVENT_20’ classify incidents of irresponsibility using general thematic categories (see 
Table 4.1, page 91, for a list of event types). ‘HARM TYPES’ measures how stakeholders 
are affected (see Table 4.2, page 91, for a list of harm types). ‘INJURIES’ measures the 
specific effect of associated human injuries on changes in corporate reputation; 
‘FATALITIES’ describes events with associated human fatalities; ‘DECEPTION’ captures 
incidents where the focal firm is associated with or accused of the deception of an individual 
and or stakeholder group(s); ‘DISCRIMINATION’ describes incidents whereby the firm is 
associated with discriminatory behaviour towards an individual and or stakeholder group(s); 
and ‘JOB LOSSES’ measures incidents associated with the loss of employment of current or 
previous employees.  
In this chapter also, I test for Lange and Washburn’s (2012) increasingly popular theory 
regarding event characteristics for the two types of subsamples, namely social responsibility 
and celebrity status. ‘EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY’ measures events that are associated with 
an associated degree of moral disregard by organisational observers; ‘CULPABILITY’ 
measures whether an incident was reported alongside other potential causal agents; while 
‘NON-COMPLICITY’ measures incidents that are associated with groups of stakeholders 
likely to be seen as non-complicit and evoke increased sympathy from the general 
stakeholder pool. Similar to Chapter 1, I test for the combined effects of these event 
characteristics on changes in corporate reputation for the two sub-samples considered.  
 
5.4.3. Control Variables 
A measure of each firm’s ‘LEVERAGE’ (the ratio of total debt to total assets), and ‘ROA’ 
(pre-tax profits to total assets) were extracted from DataStream. A measure of ‘FIRM SIZE’ 
(the natural logarithm of the value of total assets) was also collected from DataStream and 
included in all the regression models. Furthermore, I measured ‘R&D intensity’ (ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total assets) using the data available in DataStream. I controlled for how well 
the firms score in various areas associated with reputational performance. 
‘ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE’ (ENV_SCORE) and ‘CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE’ 
(CGV_SCORE). Each year was controlled for (respectively, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012); and dichotomous industry sector variables were included which took the value of 
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‘1’ if the firm belonged to a specific industry and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. Please see a full list 
of industry sectors controlled for in this study in Table 4.4 (in Chapter 4, page 96).  
 
5.5. Model specification 
I present linear regression results modelling the relationships between corporate reputation 
and the explanatory variables described in the previous section. Particularly, in this chapter, 
examines whether the effects of corporate irresponsibility variables such as irresponsibility 
events and stakeholder harms, predict changes in reputational scores differently for firms 
which belong to the top quartile of celebrity status, second, third or bottom quartiles 
respectively. Furthermore, this study also examines whether the effects of corporate 
irresponsibility variables such as irresponsibility events and stakeholder harms, predict 
changes in reputational scores differently for firms which belong to the top quartile of social 
responsibility rankings, second, third or bottom quartiles respectively.  
Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 reported the means, standard deviations and correlation matrix for 
the variables in this study. In this chapter, I only examined for multicollinearity between the 
variable “celebrity status” and the other variables, and there were no significant correlations 
found (no correlations over 0.40). Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 4.4 (Chapter 4, page 
95) the VIF for the variable ‘celebrity’ (i.e. market capitalisation) has a value of 4.32, thus 
showing no significant evidence of multicollinearity (see Field, 2009).  
 
5.6. Results for social responsibility sub-sample 
In this chapter, Tables 5.1 – 5.8 present the linear regression results for the sub-sample 
‘social responsibility’ whilst Tables 5.9 - 5.15 present the results of the linear regression 
concerning the effects of corporate irresponsibility on the ‘celebrity’ sub-samples.  
Model 1 is the base model (see Table 5.1). Again, in line with extant empirical research in 
corporate reputation and social responsibility (see Brammer and Millington, 2004; Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2006), results show that changes in reputation are largely contingent on prior 
year rankings as seen in the value of the LAG variable (p<0.001). Similarly, firms with 
greater financial performance appear to benefit from enhanced reputations. Model 2 in Table 
5.2 tests broadly for the effect of corporate irresponsibility (ANY_EVENT) on changes in 
corporate reputation to verify Hypothesis 5.1a which predicted that there are no significant 
relationships between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms 
in the top and bottom quartiles of social responsibility scores. Whilst Hypothesis 5.1b 
predicted a significant and negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
reputational change for firms with above average and below average SR. The results of the 
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regression model show no significant relationship between the variable ANY_EVENT and 
changes in corporate reputation for all sub-samples. Thus, Hypothesis 5.1a is supported, 
whilst no support was found here for Hypothesis 5.1b.  
Hypothesis 5.2a predicted no significant relationships between broad event 
categories/extant typologies and changes in corporate reputation for firms with high and low 
social responsibility scores (Models 3-9). Indeed, Hypothesis 5.2a is mostly supported, 
exception being the marginally positive effect of child labour events on changes in the 
reputation of firms with high SR (β=0.68, p<0.10), the positive effect of public health events 
on firms with low SR (β=1.73, p<0.01) and the negative effect of earnings also on 
reputational changes for firms with low SR (β=-1.13, p<0.10). Reputational enhancements 
may be the result of the financial benefits associated with irresponsibility in which case firms 
with low SR are more appropriately positioned to take advantage of these. Further, the 
positive reputational change associated with child labour incidents may largely be due to the 
appropriate management of such events for higher SR firms. No significant results were 
found for the relationship between harm types/ human injuries/ human fatalities/ deception/ 
discrimination on changes in corporate reputation for firms with high and low SR. The effect 
of job losses is, indeed, marginally significant and negative on reputational changes for firms 
with low SR (β=-0.24, p<0.10). Whilst on the one hand, job losses can be perceived as firms’ 
increasing attempts to become more cost efficient; on the other hand, layoffs may, in some 
circumstances, be considered indicative of negative growth. This may potentially indicate 
that firms with low social responsibility perceptions tend to be held to higher economic 
responsibilities such as sustaining employment.  
Hypothesis 5.2b predicted a significant and negative relationship between broad categories/ 
extant typologies of irresponsibility events and changes in reputation for firms with above 
and below average SR scores, which was only partly confirmed since the reputations of 
firms with above average SR were significantly enhanced by freedom of association events 
(β=1.64, p<0.01). In turn, the reputations of firms with below average SR were significantly 
decreased by accounting controversies (β=-0.54, p<0.01) and human rights controversies 
(β=-0.60, p<0.01). Further, the reputations of firms with below average SR are significantly 
and positively associated with reputation change for child labour incidents (β=0.83, p<0.001) 
and product and service quality controversies (β=0.23, p<0.05). No significant results were 
found for the relationships between harm types/ human injuries/ human fatalities/ deception/ 
discrimination/ job losses and reputational changes for firms with above and below average 
social responsibility scores. Consequently, Hypothesis 5.2b is largely unsupported. 
Models 10-16 test the attribution theoretic framework offered by Lange and Washburn 
(2012) concerning the relationship between EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, perceived 
CULPABILITY and affected party NON-COMPLICITY on changes in corporate reputation for 
firms with different SR scores. Hypotheses 5.3a, 5.4a, and 5.5a predicted that these 
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attribution characteristics would have no significant effect on reputational change for firms 
with the highest and the lowest relative SR scores. Whilst Hypotheses 5.3b, 5.4b and 5.5b 
predicted that firms with above and below average SR scores will be significantly and 
negatively impacted by main effect of the three attribution characteristics outlined by Lange 
and Washburn (2012). Models 10 and 11 in Table 5.6 show no significant relationships. 
Model 12 in Table 5.6 shows a positive but only marginally significant relationship between 
non-complicity and changes in reputation amongst the most socially responsible (β=0.13, 
p<0.10). Hypothesis 5.3a was mostly supported, whilst Hypothesis 5.3b was not supported.  
Furthermore, results in Table 5.7 show no significant relationships between combined facets 
of irresponsibility and changes in reputation for firms with high and low SR scores, thus 
confirming Hypothesis 5.4a. In turn, Model 13 in Table 5.7 illustrates a positive and 
significant effect of the combined presence of effect undesirability and non-complicity on 
changes in corporate reputation for above average SR firms (β=0.00, p<0.05)). Similarly, 
Model 14 shows evidence of reputation enhancements when testing for the combined effect 
of culpability and non-complicity for firms with below average SR (β=0.50, p<0.10); these 
results did not find support for Hypothesis 5.4b. Model 16 in Table 5.8 is only significant for 
reputational changes in firms with above average SR; however, this relationship is also 
positive (β=0.00, p<0.05). Hypothesis 5.5a is fully supported, whilst Hypothesis 5.5b is not 
supported. These somewhat counterintuitive results may imply managerial effects. 
 
Table 5.1: Results of the linear regression for base Model 1: Social Responsibility (SR) sub-
samplea,b,c 
Variables 
Model 1 
High SR 
Above 
average SR 
Below 
average SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.70┼ 0.23 0.89 0.11 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08* 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR  Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error  0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 
F 16.132 11.024 17.319 15.144 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.2: Results of the linear regression for Models 2 and 3: Social responsibility (SR) 
sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 2 Model 3 
High 
SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low 
SR 
High 
SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low 
SR 
Constant  1.82┼ -1.56 0.86 0.11 1.62 0.65 0.75 0.10 
ANY_EVENT 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.02     
EVENT 1_Management 
compensation 
    -0.06 0.30 -0.08 -0.11 
EVENT 2_Shareholder rights     -0.21 -0.31 0.10 0.02 
EVENT 3_Earnings     0.21 -0.20 0.05 -
1.13
┼ 
EVENT 4_Insider Trading     -0.15 0.50 0.30 -0.49 
EVENT 5_Accounting     -0.29 -0.31 -0.54** -0.04 
EVENT 6_Customer/Consumer     0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.04 
EVENT 7_Product & Service 
Quality 
    0.06 0.19 0.23* 0.19 
EVENT 8_Spills and pollution     -0.04 0.09 -0.14 -0.28 
EVENT 9_Product recalls     -0.03 0.15 0.02 -0.03 
EVENT 10_Intellectual property     0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.04 
EVENT 11_Public Health     0.11 0.69 -0.15 1.73*
* 
EVENT 12_Taxation     -0.01 -0.21 -0.06 -0.07 
EVENT 13_Anti-corruption     -0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.12 
EVENT 14_Human rights     0.15 -0.30 -0.60** - 
EVENT 15_Child Labor     0.68┼ 0.34 0.83** 0.79 
EVENT 16_Freedom of 
association 
    0.17 1.64** -0.12 - 
EVENT 17_Diversity and 
opportunity 
    -0.07 -0.00 0.13 -0.18 
EVENT 18_Wages and working 
conditions 
    0.10 0.04 -0.10 -0.20 
EVENT 19_Employee health 
and safety 
    0.12 -0.06 0.24 0.37 
EVENT 20_Ethics     -0.21 -0.20 -0.10 0.03 
LAGS (REP T,1) 
0.73*** 0.68*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 
0.77*** 0.72*** 0.70*
** 
FIRM SIZE  0.05 0.06 0.06┼ 0.08* 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.09* 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
LEVERAGE 
-0.01* -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01┼ 
-0.00 -0.01* -
0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** -0.00 0.02** 0.01 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00
┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 0.03** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01┼ -0.00 
YEAR 
Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Prese
nt 
INDUSTRY 
Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Prese
nt 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.54 
F 15.826 14.310 16.972 14.817 11.405 8.146 
13.731 11.5
32 
R square 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.70 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.3: Results of the linear regression for Models 4 and 5: Social responsibility (SR) 
sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 4 Model 5 
High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.82┼ 0.53 0.66 0.08 1.75┼ 0.27 0.87 0.14 
HARM 1 - 
Financial 
-0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.04     
HARM 2 - 
Physical 
0.07 0.07 0.02 0.14     
HARM 3 – 
Emotional 
0.14 0.02 -0.00 -0.03     
HARM 4 – Civil 
Liberties 
-0.12 -0.01 -0.14 -0.12     
HARM 5 - 
Environmental 
-0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.27     
INJURIES     0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.13 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.02 0.08* 0.09* 0.01 0.04 0.06┼ 0.08┼ 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 6.79 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 
F 14.275 9.709 15.610 13.506 15.800 10.766 16.983 14.854 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.69 0.65 
0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.4: Results of the linear regression for Models 6 and 7: Social responsibility (SR) 
sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 6 Model 7 
High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.66 0.25 0.77 0.12 1.69 0.34 0.82 0.11 
FATALITIES  -0.07 0.04 -0.13 -0.27     
DECEPTION      -0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.01 
LAGS (REP 
T,1) 
0.74*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.05 0.07┼ 0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.07┼ 0.08* 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 3.73 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 
F 15.789 10.759 17.062 14.957 15.755 10.773 16.995 14.811 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
 
 
Table 5.5: Results of the linear regression for Models 8 and 9: Social responsibility (SR) 
sub-samplea,b,c 
 
Independent 
variables 
Model 8 Model 9 
High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
High 
SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.64 0.24 0.97┼ 0.10 1.81┼ 0.37 0.90 0.05 
DISCRIMINATION  -0.09 -0.04 0.05 -0.09     
JOB LOSSES     0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.24┼ 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.71*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09* 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09* 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01┼ -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.00┼ 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01┼ 0.01* 6.26 0.01** 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 
F 15.819 10.759 16.984 14.830 15.831 10.784 16.965 15.016 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.6: Results of the linear regression for Models 10, 11 and 12: Social responsibility (SR) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.61 0.40 0.73 0.42 1.63 0.57 0.63 0.43 1.64 0.64 0.59 0.48 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00         
CULPABILITY     0.02 0.10 -0.06 -0.02     
NON-COMPLICITY          0.13┼ 0.14 -0.07 0.16 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08* 0.01 0.03 0.07┼ 0.08* -0.00 0.02 0.07┼ 0.08┼ 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02┼ 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.00** -0.01┼ -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01┼ -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54 
F 15.799 10.758 17.020 14.836 15.762 10.844 17.032 14.816 15.980 10.914 17.026 14.910 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.7: Results of the linear regression for Models 13, 14 and 15: Social responsibility (SR) sub-samplea,b,c 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
Independent variables 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR High SR 
Above 
average 
SR 
Below 
average 
SR 
Low SR 
Constant  1.64 0.83 0.58 0.44 1.66 0.78 0.56 0.46 1.67 0.75 0.66 0.44 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.07 -0.00 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.13┼ 0.11 -0.06 0.18 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.20 0.46 0.11 -0.52 -0.11 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
AND CULPABILITYc 
-0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00         
EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
    0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00     
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
        -0.34 0.01 0.50┼ 0.35 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.00 0.01 0.07┼ 0.08┼ 0.00 0.01 0.07┼ 0.08┼ 0.00 0.02 0.08┼ 0.08┼ 
RDASS -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.00 -0.01** -0.01┼ 0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01┼ 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01┼ 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01┼ 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 
F 14.953 10.215 16.195 14.040 15.102 10.477 16.212 14.039 14.989 10.176 16.356 14.101 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.70 
N 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 327 253 396 332 
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Table 5.8: Results of the linear regression for Model 16: Social responsibility (SR) sub-
samplea,b,c 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
 
 
5.7. Results for celebrity status sub-sample 
Tables 5.9 - 5.16 present the results of the linear regression concerning the effects of 
corporate irresponsibility on the changes in reputation for the ‘celebrity’ sub-samples.  
As previously indicated, the first model, in this case, Model 17 is the base model (see Table 
5.9). Similar to previous results, reputation scores are highly contingent on the previous 
year’s ranking. Further, this model showed no irregularities or inconsistencies. Model 18 
tests for the predicted effects of Hypothesis 5.6a and 5.6b. Hypothesis 5.6a predicted 
significant and negative reputational changes for celebrity firms. Model 18 in Table 5.10 
shows that ANY_EVENT has a negative and significant relationship with changes in 
corporate reputation for celebrities (β=-0.12, p<0.05) and no significant effect for firms in 
other celebrity sub-samples. Thus, Hypothesis 5.6a as well as Hypothesis 5.6b – which 
predicted that there are no significant relationships between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for non-celebrity firms (second, third and fourth sub-
samples of market capitalisation) - are supported. This result is interesting because this is 
Independent variables 
Model 16 
High SR 
Above 
average SR 
Below 
average SR 
Low SR 
     
Constant  1.66 0.78 0.56 0.47 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc -0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 
CULPABILITY 0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.13 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.00 0.01 0.07┼ 0.08┼ 
RDASS -0.02* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.01* -0.01 -0.01** -0.01┼ 
ROA 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01┼ 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 
F 15.104 10.477 16.229 14.068 
R square 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.69 
N 327 253 396 332 
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the first evidence that the reputations of some firms may be more broadly vulnerable to acts 
of corporate irresponsibility. This may be because celebrities have an enhanced capacity to 
garner increased attention from wider audiences in circumstances both good and bad. 
Hypothesis 5.7a predicted a negative relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility/ extant typologies and changes in reputation for celebrity firms only. Whilst 
Hypothesis 5.7b predicted that there would be no significant relationship between broad 
categories/ extant typologies of irresponsibility and reputational change for non-celebrity 
firms, namely those in the second, third and fourth (bottom) quartiles of market 
capitalisation. Interestingly, the results in Model 19 in Table 5.10, show that different types of 
event categories influence the reputation of firms according to whether they are celebrities or 
non-celebrities. Somewhat counterintuitively, the analysis shows a positive and marginally 
significant relationship between product and service quality (β=0.09, p<0.10) and child 
labour (β=0.44, p<0.05) and the reputation of celebrities; and a negative and significant 
relationship between accounting (β=-0.45, p<0.001) as well as a negative and marginally 
significant relationship between ethical controversies (β=-0.07, p<0.10) and changes in 
corporate reputation scores also for celebrities. Furthermore, Model 20 shows a negative 
and marginally significant relationship between consumer controversies and reputational 
changes for firms with above average market capitalisation (β=-0.09, p<0.10). Further, 
organisations classified into the third quartile of celebrity status, i.e. with below average 
market capitalisation were associated with a number of positive and marginally significant 
results relating to anticorruption (β=0.47, p<0.10), taxation (β=0.71, p<0.10), and insider 
trading (β=1.06, p<0.10), as well as a negative and marginally significant effect for 
shareholder rights events (β=-0.31, p<0.10) on changes in corporate reputation. Finally, the 
reputation of non-celebrities, i.e. firms with low market capitalisation, is significantly and 
negatively related to earnings (β=-2.11, p<0.01) and negatively and marginally affected by 
insider trading controversies (β=-0.56, p<0.10).  
Although the above results, in part, contradict the initial Hypotheses 5.7a and 5.7b, the 
findings may indicate that, whilst a firm may be considered a ‘non-celebrity’ within its wider 
audiences, the firm may, in fact, be well known to managers and senior analysts, such as 
those participants surveyed to compile the WMAC data used within this study. Celebrity 
status may therefore differ depending on the stakeholder group surveyed. Some firms may 
not be considered a celebrity with respect to the general public, yet may be understood to be 
a ‘hometown’ hero or villain with respect to specific stakeholder groups. For instance, 
financial investment services firms may not be widely familiar to the general public yet may 
be distinctly ‘on the radar’ of business and management professionals. Thus, some events 
may leave these firms distinctly vulnerable to incidents such as earnings restatements, 
accounting controversies and shareholder rights issues that specifically undermine their 
financial performance.  
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That said, my results also suggest that other observations of corporate irresponsibility - 
namely those of a more social orientation - may actually enhance corporate reputation. 
Again, firms engaging in irresponsibilities from which they may derive distinct financial 
advantages, may be able to strengthen their aggregate reputations overall when the 
enhancements to the firm’s financial reputation outweigh the damages to the firm’s social 
reputation (such as reputation for product service quality, for instance). What is more, my 
results suggest that below average and non-celebrity firms may be best situated to take 
advantage of this process because their actions may garner significantly less media and 
stakeholder attention. Another initially counterintuitive result was that celebrity firms may 
enhance their reputations in light of certain irresponsibilities too. One straightforward 
explanation for these findings is that celebrity firms in particular, may manage their remedial 
actions to the extent that they may actually enhance assessors’ opinions of the firm. Such 
observations are relatively common in the crisis management literature (see Kash and 
Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 1994; Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). 
Model 20 adds the effect of stakeholder harms (financial harm, physical harm, emotional 
harm, civil liberties harm and environmental harm) on changes in corporate reputation for 
the different celebrity sub-samples. Model 20 in Table 5.11 shows no significant 
relationships between financial, physical, emotional, civil liberties or environmental harm on 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with above average market capitalisation and non-
celebrities (lowest market capitalisation). That said, there is a negative and significant 
relationship between emotional harm and reputation for firms with below average market 
capitalisation (β=-0.53, p<0.05). These findings go counter to the general position of 
Hypothesis 5.7b. That said, there is a negative and significant relationship (although 
marginally) between civil liberties harms and reputation changes for celebrities (β=-0.05, 
p<0.10), thus offering some support for the ideas proposed in Hypothesis 5.7a. 
Furthermore, Model 21 in Table 5.11 tests for the effects of cases of observed human 
injuries on changes in reputation. Results show no significant relationships between human 
injuries and changes in reputation for celebrities and non-celebrities, evidencing Hypothesis 
5.7b but not 5.7a. Having said that, Model 22 in Table 5.12 concerns the effect of human 
fatalities which was insignificant for non-celebrities (those firms classified within the second, 
third and fourth (bottom) quartiles of market capitalisation), but negative and marginally 
significant for celebrities (β=-0.12, p<0.10); thus also confirming Hypotheses 5.7a and 5.7b 
respectively. Also in Model 23, there are no significant relationships between stakeholder 
deception and changes in corporate reputation for none of the sub-samples, thus, confirming 
Hypothesis 5.7b but not 5.7a, where a significant and negative effect of deception was 
predicted on reputation changes for celebrity firms. Similarly, in Table 5.13, Models 24 and 
25 test for the relationships between discrimination and job losses on reputational change 
for each sub-sample; and show no significant relationships, thus confirming Hypothesis 5.7b 
but not 5.7a. With these results in mind, it may be interpreted that whilst non-celebrity firms 
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may be at a distinct advantage in light of irresponsibility compared to celebrity firms, the 
scale and scope of the event may determine the potential significance of reputational 
change for celebrity firms. Overall, these results do seem to indicate that celebrity firms are 
distinctly more vulnerable to reputational penalties in light of irresponsibility compared to 
non-celebrities. 
Similar to the previous analysis, Models 26 to 32 test the attribution theoretic framework 
offered by Lange and Washburn (2012) concerning the condition of 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, perceived CULPABILITY and affected party NON-
COMPLICITY. Hypothesis 5.8a, 5.9a and 5.10a predicted a negative and significant 
relationship between events exhibiting effect undesirability/perceived culpability/ affected 
party non-complicity and reputation change for firms in the top quartile i.e. celebrities. In 
turn, Hypothesis 5.8b, 5.9b and 5.10b predicted no significant relationship between 
undesirability/ perceived culpability/ affected party non-complicity and changes in reputation 
for firms in the second, third and fourth quartiles i.e. non-celebrities. As illustrated in Table 
5.14, the only significant main effect is related to the negative relationships between 
culpability and changes in reputation for celebrity firms (β=-0.16, p<0.01) (Model 27) 
meaning that firms which are more visible are also more susceptible to suffering reputational 
damage when they are seen as culpable for an event of irresponsibility. The logic being such 
findings is that, being both highly ‘visible’ and being perceived as the only potential culprit, 
focuses greater aggregate criticality toward the focal firm. Thus, Hypothesis 5.8b is 
supported, whilst Hypothesis 5.8a is only partly supported for the culpability variable. This 
may imply that culpability is a stronger predictor of reputational damages in light of 
irresponsibility.  
Finally, Models 28 to 32 test for the presence of various combinations of these event 
characteristics on corporate reputation subsamples (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16). Overall, no 
significant effects were found to attest that the presence of either two event characteristics 
(i.e. effect undesirability, culpability and affected party non-complicity) influences changes in 
corporate reputation for none of the celebrity sub-samples. Thus, Hypotheses 5.9a was 
unsupported whereas Hypothesis 5.9b was supported. Similarly, as illustrated in Model 32, 
Table 5.16 - when the effect of the combined presence of the three event characteristics is 
tested – no significant results were found here either; these results show no support for 
Hypothesis 5.10a, yet, support the predictions of Hypothesis 5.10b.  
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Table 5.9: Results of the linear regression for base Model 17: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Variables Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Constant  1.77* 2.51*** 2.29*** 1.38** 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 
RDASS -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
ROA 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01** 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
YEAR  Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error  0.52 0.52 0.45 0.49 
F 11.396 9.743 9.472 18.818 
R square 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.71 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.58 0.55 0.67 
N 336 243 243 214 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.10: Results of the linear regression for Models 18 and 19: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 18 Model 19 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Constant  1.23** 1.64** 2.30*** 2.44** 1.17** 1.79** 2.83** 2.45** 
ANY_EVENT -0.12* 0.01 0.10 -0.02     
EVENT 1_Management 
compensation 
    0.00 -0.04 0.13 0.16 
EVENT 2_Shareholder 
rights 
    -0.05 0.08 -0.31┼ 0.15 
EVENT 3_Earnings     0.21 - -0.85 -2.11** 
EVENT 4_Insider 
Trading 
    -0.09 -0.35 1.06┼ - 
EVENT 5_Accounting     -0.45*** 0.11 -0.30 -0.56┼ 
EVENT 
6_Customer/Consumer 
    -0.03 -0.09┼ -0.4 0.21 
EVENT 7_Product & 
Service Quality 
    0.09┼ 0.23 0.24 -0.19 
EVENT 8_Spills and 
pollution 
    -0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.17 
EVENT 9_Product 
recalls 
    -0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.15 
EVENT 10_Intellectual 
property 
    0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.13 
EVENT 11_Public 
Health 
    0.09 -0.19 -0.20 - 
EVENT 12_Taxation     -0.07 -0.13 0.71┼ - 
EVENT 13_Anti-
corruption 
    -0.02 -0.03 0.47┼ 0.03 
EVENT 14_Human 
rights 
    0.00 0.10 0.90 - 
EVENT 15_Child 
Labour 
    0.44┼ 0.93 - - 
EVENT 16_Freedom of 
association 
    0.45 - 0.19 0.57 
EVENT 17_Diversity 
and opportunity 
    0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.03 
EVENT 18_Wages and 
working conditions 
    -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 
EVENT 19_Employee 
health and safety 
    0.00 0.12 -0.07 -0.08 
EVENT 20_Ethics     -0.07┼ -0.10 0.28 -0.14 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01┼ -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.50 
F 21.854 11.888 7.932 9.095 15.889 8.970 6.128 7.276 
R square 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.65 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.11: Results of the linear regression for Models 20 and 21: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 20 Model 21 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Constant  1.20** 1.50** 2.97** 2.33** 1.31** 1.61** 2.97** 2.41** 
HARM 1 - 
Financial 
-0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00     
HARM 2 - 
Physical 
-0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.08     
HARM 3 – 
Emotional 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.53* 0.23     
HARM 4 – 
Civil Liberties 
-0.05┼ -0.11 -0.02 -0.12     
HARM 5 - 
Environmental 
0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.24     
INJURIES     -0.05 0.09 0.00 -0.05 
LAGS (REP 
T,1) 
0.72*** 0.73*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 
F 19.516 10.903 7.303 8.252 21.603 11.938 7.985 9.096 
R square 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.64 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.65 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.12: Results of the linear regression for Models 22 and 23: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 22 Model 23 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Constant  1.26** 1.64** 2.97** 2.69*** 1.26** 1.53** 2.92** 2.40** 
FATALITIES  -0.12┼ -0.08 -0.01 -0.18     
DECEPTION      -0.07 -0.10 0.14 -0.12 
LAGS (REP 
T,1) 
0.72*** 0.74*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 
F 21.778 11.912 7.851 9.122 21.687 12.031 7.969 9.169 
R square 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.64 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.65 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
 
Table 5.13: Results of the linear regression for Models 24 and 25: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 24 Model 25 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Constant  1.76* 2.51*** 2.30*** 1.35** 1.32** 1.61** 2.96** 2.40** 
DISCRIMINATION  -0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.09     
JOB LOSSES     -0.04 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 
RDASS -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.52 0.53 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 
F 11.142 9.546 9.238 18.393 21.591 11.941 7.871 9.099 
R square 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.65 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 5.14: Results of the linear regression for Models 26, 27 and 28: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
             
Constant  1.46*** 1.64** 2.98*** 2.29** 1.37*** 1.64** 2.99*** 2.43** 1.49*** 1.45* 2.89** 2.44** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00         
CULPABILITY     -0.16** -0.03 0.09 -0.08     
NON-COMPLICITY          0.05 0.12 -0.18 -0.01 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 
RDASS -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02┼ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 
F 21.557 11.888 7.878 9.136 22.196 11.904 7.909 9.134 21.618 12.004 7.967 9.091 
R square 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.72 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.65 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.   
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Table 5.15: Results of the linear regression for Models 29, 30 and 31: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
 aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
Independent variables 
Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
            
Constant  1.43*** 1.46** 2.93*** 2.54** 1.44*** 1.69** 2.72** 2.44** 1.45*** 1.71** 2.90** 2.24** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.21*** -0.06 0.16┼ -0.06 -0.19*** -0.07 0.16┼ -0.14 -0.20*** -0.06 0.12 -0.14 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.11* 0.15 -0.26┼ 0.01 0.09 0.17┼ -0.26┼ 0.14 0.28 0.24 -0.64┼ -0.33 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND 
CULPABILITYc 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00         
EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY AND 
NON-COMPLICITYc 
    0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00     
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
        -0.17 -0.10 0.44 0.43 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 
RDASS -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.50 
F 20.971 11.253 7.606 8.666 21.115 11.263 7.724 8.598 20.973 11.255 7.685 8.542 
R square 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.64 
N 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 336 243 243 214 
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Table 5.16: Results of the linear regression for Model 32: Celebrity sub-samplea,b,c 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
 
 
5.8. Discussion  
This chapter empirically explored (1) broadly, which perceived organisational characteristics 
influence the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation? And 
in what incidences, do these characteristics play a role? (2) Does the organisation’s social 
responsibility perceptions shape the relationship between irresponsibility and reputation? 
And in which circumstances does it do so? (3) Does the organisation’s degree of celebrity 
status influence the relationship between irresponsibility and corporate reputation changes? 
And in which contexts does this seem to be most apparent? Indeed, both variations in 
organisational reputation for social responsibility and celebrity status appeared to drive 
differences in downstream reputation penalties following revelations of irresponsibility. The 
results showed that prior stakeholder perceptions regarding social responsibility and 
celebrity status appear to shape attributions of irresponsibility in different settings.  
In the broadest sense, my results again suggest that reputation updating is only a relatively 
modest phenomenon. Moreover, a general association with irresponsibility in the media was 
Independent variables 
Model 32 
Celebrities 
Above 
average 
celebrity 
Below 
average 
celebrity 
Non-
celebrities 
     
Constant  1.44*** 1.69** 2.70** 2.25** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.19** -0.07 0.16┼ -0.11 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.09 0.17┼ -0.27* 0.08 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND 
CULPABILITY AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 
RDASS -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 -0.01* 
ROA 0.01** 0.01* -0.00 0.01* 
SOC_SCOREc -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.51 
F 21.125 1.263 7.745 8.540 
R square 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Adjusted R square 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.64 
N 336 243 243 214 
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not associated with significant reputation penalties, irrespective of the firm’s perceived social 
performance. In other words, the simple association with irresponsibility tends not to be 
related to any significant alterations in reputation from the most socially responsible firms to 
the least responsible firms. However, celebrities were found to be more broadly vulnerable 
to reputational decline following associations with irresponsibility, thus contradicting the 
notion that celebrity firms are shielded from reputational harm following irresponsibility 
(Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010). In turn, this was not the case for firms with non-
celebrity status, providing some preliminary evidence to suggest that celebrity status may, 
indeed, be a ‘double-edged sword’ (Brooks et al, 2003) in that, whilst being able to garner 
increased stakeholder attention can be a distinctly desirable capability when engaging in 
positive business activities, the firm may also attract greater scrutiny when it is associated 
with undesirable behaviour. That being said, my analysis then systematically explored the 
constituent’s characteristics of corporate irresponsibility to reveal a very different picture. 
The second part of the analysis specifically assessed whether there were broad categories 
of irresponsibility that firms with differing social responsibility perceptions and celebrity status 
were specifically vulnerable toward. Here, the findings suggest that, in line with previous 
works on the halo effect (Ducassy, 2013; Janney and Gove, 2011; Jones, Jones and Little, 
2000; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Sanchez, Sotorrio and Diez, 2012; Vanhamme and 
Grobben, 2009), the most socially responsible organisations were not associated with 
significant reputation penalties following revelations of irresponsibility. In fact, findings 
suggest that, in some cases, the firm’s reputation may become enhanced. More specifically, 
I found that the most socially responsible firms were associated with enhanced reputation 
scores following child labor incidents. Whilst this result seemed initially counterintuitive, a 
common argument within the communications and crisis management literature is that 
irresponsibility may enhance reputations for certain firms, if and when the incident is 
effectively managed. Hence, a negative event may be viewed as an opportunity to 
demonstrate to stakeholders about the firm’s commitment to their social responsibilities 
(Kash and Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 1994; Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). In this study, 
results also suggested that firms with the lowest social responsibility reputations were also 
not associated with significant reputation penalties following irresponsibility. This may 
indicate that bad behaviour, in line with the expectations violations theory (Burgoon, 1978; 
Rhee and Haunschild, 2006), is largely expected by social assessors and thus, not severely 
penalised. One notable exception was that of public health events, in that this classification 
of irresponsibility was associated with enhancements to corporate reputations. This may be 
indicative of the fact that some stakeholder groups tend to also consider the financial 
benefits associated with certain types of irresponsibility. Public health issues such as those 
that follow increased consumption of certain products such as alcohol, tobacco and 
medications may signal growing demand for products rather than corporate negligence.  
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Finally, my broad contention within this chapter was that firms considered to have above and 
below average social responsibility perceptions may be distinctly vulnerable in light of 
irresponsibility. This study argued that stakeholders may neither expect these firms to 
perform very well nor very poorly in terms of social responsiveness. Consequently, firms 
possessing above and below average social responsibility perceptions may be neither 
protected via positive associations, nor do they benefit from such negative associations that 
bad behaviour is broadly to be expected. Whilst firms that were below average in social 
responsibility scores were, indeed, vulnerable to events such as consumer controversies, 
these firms may also gain reputational benefits from acts of irresponsibility, such as product 
and service quality as well as child labor controversies. This may be due to the firm’s 
positive management of events or perhaps because assessors may factor in the potential 
financial benefits that are often associated with specific stakeholder wrongdoing. Enhanced 
perceptions of corporate reputation following irresponsibility was a largely unexpected result, 
but after reviewing the literature, it seems reasonable to suggest that firms may take 
advantage of certain social, economic and environmental problems to demonstrate to their 
publics that the firm is committed to its responsibilities (Kash and Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 
1994; Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). In this context, a firm’s remedial actions may, in 
fact, enhance stakeholders’ perceptions in light of irresponsibility. 
That being said, irresponsibility had a very different effect on the reputations of firms 
depending on their level of celebrity status. Results suggest that celebrity firms were more 
vulnerable to events pertaining to accounting controversies, whereas those firms with above 
and below average celebrity status did not show particularly significant reputation penalties 
following broad classifications of wrongdoing. I argued that generally, non-celebrity firms 
were at a distinct advantage when compared to celebrities. Whilst celebrity status may help 
the firm garner increased stakeholder attention towards its positive business activities, it may 
also work against the firm’s best interests when the organisation is associated with 
irresponsibility. The idea that non-celebrity firms are generally ‘under the radar’ of 
stakeholders’ attention was generally supported, as fewer incidents of irresponsibility were 
reported in the media for firms with the lowest celebrity status. Whilst this evidence only 
tangentially informs this point, it may be considered somewhat indicative that less attention 
is paid to non-celebrity firms. That said, non-celebrity firms were not shielded from reputation 
penalties concerning earnings restatements, suggesting that financial matters may largely 
supersede those of a social nature. Incidents of a more relevant financial nature, such as 
earnings restatements, may then become more widely known to assessors such as 
shareholders, managers and market analysts (these groups being the stakeholders 
surveyed by the WMAC data utilised in this study).  
This study also considered the effects of broad types of moral harm as well as general 
outcomes of irresponsibility in order to assess their relevance from an attribution 
perspective. My general position through the lens of attribution theory was that outcomes of 
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irresponsibility such as financial, physical, and emotional harms as well as incidents 
displaying characteristics like deception, discrimination and job losses would not be relevant 
predictors of downstream reputation damage. These categories are somewhat removed 
from more significant features of irresponsibility that assessors may find more indicative of 
wrongdoing, such as whether the firm was likely culpable or just associated with the event; 
whether the event was considered personally threatening or morally undesirable; or whether 
the event harmed vulnerable parties such as the elderly or the disabled (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012). Results broadly suggest this to be the case with a few noteworthy 
exceptions, i.e. celebrity firms were associated with reputation penalties following civil 
liberties harms. There may be some merit to the idea that firms which become involved in 
more current or ‘topical’ types of irresponsibility may be more susceptible to reputational 
decline, particularly when the firm is already a more prominent organisation, as is the case 
with celebrity firms. Similarly, irresponsibility associated with deception, discrimination and 
job losses was not associated with significant reputation penalties for the majority of firms. 
Again, from an attribution perspective, these categories of irresponsibility may be considered 
too broad in their potential scope as they generally bundle a variety of events with varying 
severity and relevance to reputational assessors. That being said, firms categorised as 
having the least socially responsible perceptions suffered some significant reputation 
penalties following job losses. Here, it has been noted that job losses may be viewed as 
either part of the firm’s cost saving activities, designed to promote better profitability or job 
losses could be viewed as signaling potential future losses as well as negative growth 
(Porritt, 2005). Consequently, results suggest that firms with the lowest social responsibility 
perceptions may be distinctly more vulnerable to reputation penalties following job losses 
because assessors may consider their motive to be indicative of poor future performance. 
The third part of my empirical exploration of the impact of social responsibility perceptions 
and celebrity status, was to unpack these potential contingent firm characteristics in relation 
to the attribution framework offered by Lange and Washburn (2012). My results for social 
responsibility were somewhat mixed. Independent testing of effect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity did not reveal any significant relationships for 
firms with above, below and low social responsibility associations. However, the most 
socially responsible firms were found to have reputationally benefited from being associated 
with harming non-complicit parties such as the young, the elderly, the disabled and so on. 
Again, this could be due to the potential opportunities these irresponsibilities may create, in 
that firms found to positively manage certain events may actually enhance their reputations 
in light of demonstrating increased commitment to their social responsibilities through their 
remedial actions. When the facets of irresponsibility outlined by Lange and Washburn (2012) 
were combined, the results were also somewhat mixed. In particular, firms with above 
average social responsibility perceptions were associated with reputational enhancements 
after revelations of irresponsibility with substantial effect undesirability and affected party 
non-complicity and when testing for all three irresponsibility characteristics outlined by Lange 
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and Washburn (2012). Again, from a crisis management perspective, such results may be 
attributed to the appropriate management of events (Kash and Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 1994; 
Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). Furthermore, social responsibility perceptions may not 
be the only characteristic of the firm assessors draw upon to attribute irresponsibility. 
In this study, results suggest that broadly, celebrity firms are distinctly vulnerable to certain 
facets of irresponsibility outlined by Lange and Washburn (2012). Specifically, incidents 
where there were few alternative causal agents present – meaning, other culpable parties 
were not mentioned in the media – were significantly damaging for celebrity firms. In turn, 
non-celebrity firms were not affected by being associated with events with high culpability. 
This suggests that irresponsibility may be particularly problematic for firms that are able to 
generate increased stakeholder attention, going against ‘market-based’ research that 
suggests the opposite to be the case (Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010). Instead, this 
study’s findings appear to support the idea that high celebrity status may be a disadvantage 
when firms are associated with acts of irresponsibility. Finally, when the irresponsibility 
characteristics effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity 
were tested in various combinations, perhaps surprisingly, these combinations did not result 
in significant reputational effects as previously purported by Lange and Washburn (2012).  
Whilst the analysis illuminated how differences in stakeholder perceptions of the firm may 
shape their attributions in light of irresponsibility, events do not exist in isolation, meaning 
that irresponsibility - in a similar sense to how stakeholder perceptions of firm characteristics 
are built over time – may be remembered by stakeholders and thus, may be part of an 
unfolding sequence of events. The ability of stakeholders to bring to bear their memories of 
firm behaviour and characteristics may, over time, build to broader perceptions of firm 
reputation. Irresponsibility events can be perceived as ‘one off’, isolated incidents, not 
indicative of firm character and capabilities, or part of a broader pattern of irresponsibility. 
Therefore, the frequency of irresponsibility may be critical in stakeholders’ interpretations of 
events. Similarly, a firm’s social responsibilities may only form part of the firm’s overall, 
aggregate reputation amongst the broader stakeholder pool. An equally important 
reputational component has been missing from the analysis, namely the organisation’s 
financial performance. This next empirical chapter explores whether firms vary in their 
propensity for corporate irresponsibility and if so, how specifically differences in financial 
performance affect the relationship between irresponsibility attributions and reputation 
penalties. 
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CHAPTER 6 – EXPLORING THE CONTINGENCIES OF HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I empirically explored the contingencies of reputations for corporate 
social responsibility and celebrity status on the relationship between irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation. In this chapter, I explore the effects of two very different 
perceptions of the firm; ‘history of irresponsibility’ - often referred to in the crisis management 
literature as ‘crisis history’ (Coombs, 2006; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; 2002) and ‘financial 
performance’, using a sample of US firms for an 8-year period between 2004 and 2012. 
More precisely, in this chapter I subsampled firms based on their organisational qualities 
relative to other firms within the specified sample in order to separately test for the effects of 
irresponsibility on reputations. The subsequent longitudinal research offered in this chapter 
seeks to explore the following questions, namely; (1) which perceived organisational 
characteristics influence the relationship between irresponsibility and corporate reputation 
changes? And in what incidences do these characteristics play a role? (2) Does the 
organisation’s history of irresponsibility influence the relationship between irresponsibility 
and changes in reputation? And in which contexts does this seem to be most apparent? (3) 
Does financial performance shape the relationship between irresponsibility and reputation 
changes? And in which circumstances? With this in mind, the aims of this chapter are: 
 To examine whether reputation penalties in light of irresponsibility are contingent on 
prior stakeholder beliefs regarding the firm and its perceived attributes. 
 To explore whether the firm’s history of irresponsibility influences the relationship 
between corporate irresponsibility and changes in reputation. 
 To assess whether the firm’s financial performance influences the relationship 
between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation. 
Again, in this empirical chapter I explore the possible contingencies within the relationship 
between irresponsibility and changes in reputation. This time, the motivating theoretical logic 
for doing so stems from the idea that assessors may observe multiple behaviours over time 
in order to construct more accurate causal inferences (Weiner, 1985). What is more, 
stakeholders may bring to bear their past experiences and observations in order to assess 
news of current events (Kelley, 1967). In this way, irresponsibility may not exist in a vacuum 
but rather, it may be part of a wider story of corporate behaviour. Therefore, in this chapter I 
bring into analytical focus how stakeholder perceptions of the firm’s history of irresponsibility, 
otherwise referred to in the crisis management literature as ‘crisis history’ (Coombs, 2007) 
and the firm’s relative financial performance, may influence assessor interpretations of 
corporate irresponsibility and subsequent reputation assessments. 
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6.2. Exploring the Contingency of History of Irresponsibility 
An attribution-based rationale for exploring the firm’s ‘history of irresponsibility’ is that 
assessors may, through multiple observations, build a sense of an actor’s character or 
capabilities (Kelley, 1967; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). I further extend this logic by 
suggesting that firms with an increased association with irresponsibility may eventually 
amass a significant corpus of negative associations in the memories of organisational 
assessors. Over time, this accumulation of negative associations may ‘tip’ stakeholder 
assessments out of the organisation’s favor, and subsequently leave the firm more 
vulnerable to downward revisions in reputation in light of irresponsibility. Whereas this 
concept has yet to be explored empirically, the crisis management literature has suggested 
similar attribution theoretic ideas. A notable study by Coombs (2007) highlighted that the 
firm’s ‘crisis history’ may be a potential determinant of reputational damage in light of 
corporate irresponsibility, specifically because some firms may be associated with a history 
of stakeholder wrongdoing. In his 2007 Corporate Reputation Review article titled; 
‘Protecting Organisation Reputations During a Crisis: The Development and Application of 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory’, Coombs cites the earlier work of the social 
psychologists Kelley and Michela (1980) to articulate that “[a]ccording to Attribution Theory, 
a history of crises suggests an organisation has an ongoing problem that needs to be 
addressed”. The propensity of the firm to be embroiled in social, economic or environmental 
harm may be remembered by organisational assessors and brought to bear during the 
interpretation of new events. In so doing, some incidents may be perceived as either isolated 
‘one-offs’ or part of a potential pattern of corporate negligence. Therefore, this study 
additionally explores the firm’s history of irresponsibility as it relates to new revelations of 
wrongdoing and reputation penalties by assessing the company’s past history of offences 
and association with irresponsibility. By doing so, this study unpacks how assessors make 
more nuanced social judgements and impressions over time by situating irresponsibility in a 
more ‘natural’ setting, one that includes contextual knowledge surrounding organisational 
histories and stakeholder memories of corporate irresponsibility. Figure 6.1 highlights the 
relevant concepts and line of research enquiry investigated in this first section of Chapter 6. 
 
6.2.1. The Influence of the Firm’s History of Irresponsibility in the Context of Observed 
Irresponsibility 
Subsequent reputational decline following a broad association with irresponsibility, as 
previously argued in this study, is a fairly simplistic idea from a broader attribution 
perspective. Nevertheless, one position held within attribution theory is that individuals own 
an inherent negativity bias, in that negative information is more readily perceived than 
positive information (Ito et al., 1998; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Skowronski and Carlston, 
1989; Vaish, Grossmann and Woodward, 2008). If this is the case, I argued, this may 
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provide one explanation for why research from the finance and economics perspective 
suggests that irresponsibility is frequently associated with significant reputation penalties 
(Alexander, 1999; Engelen and van Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff Lott and 
Wehrly, 2005). 
Figure 6.1: Conceptual overview of the contingent effect of prior crisis history on the 
relationship between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
 
Whilst my previous empirical analysis did not find support for this position, the frequency of 
association with irresponsibility may play a role in determining stakeholder interpretations of 
events, including ‘causal attributions’ of whether the firm is perceived to have caused a 
negative outcome (Heider, 1958; Jones and Nisbet, 1972; Kelley and Michela 1980). 
Because irresponsibility is a broad category that encompasses a variety of different types of 
events, with different outcomes, and subsequently, different perceptions of severity 
associated with them, the overall capacity for observations of irresponsibility to undermine 
reputation may be somewhat diminished. That being said, over time, reputational assessors 
may view the repeated association with irresponsibility as indicative of issues that need to be 
addressed or more fundamental corruptions within the corporate character.  
Therefore, this study proposes that firms with an increased history of irresponsibility may be 
at risk of reputational decline. Regardless of stakeholder perceptions of the event, firms with 
an increased propensity to be associated with irresponsibility may run the risk of being 
perceived as either incompetent in certain areas of their business or it may reveal more 
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sinister aspects concerning the firm’s character (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). For 
organisations considered by organisational assessors to be increasingly ‘prone’ to negative 
outcomes, the simple association with multiple observations of irresponsibility may be 
enough to significantly alter overall stakeholder perceptions of the firm. In turn, for 
organisations with fewer instances of irresponsibility, new revelations of corporate 
irresponsibility may be considered ‘untypical’ of the firm and thus may decrease the potential 
likelihood that reputational assessments will be downwardly revised. With these points in 
mind, I hypothesise that: 
H6.1a: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of 
corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
H6.1b: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate 
irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of 
irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least 
history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
 
6.2.2. The Influence of the Firm’s History of Irresponsibility on Perceptions of Broad 
Categories of Irresponsibility 
From an attribution perspective akin to that proposed by Lange and Washburn (2012), the 
relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and reputation may be considered 
fundamentally too general because typical categories of irresponsibility do not adequately 
capture the nuances that social evaluators may find indicative, such as whether the firm is 
likely culpable or whether the parties harmed were non-complicit (Lange and Washburn, 
2012). Subsequently, broad categorisations are limited because they seemingly bundle 
discreet events with varying propensity to cause harm and which range in perceived 
severity, culpability and evoke varying degrees of sympathy for victims (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012).  
That being said, in the previous empirical chapter of this study, results showed that some 
categories of irresponsibility may be more broadly impactful than others in certain contextual 
conditions. In relation to firm’s history of irresponsibility, an increased propensity for 
stakeholder wrongdoing over time may increase the subsequent risk of reputational 
damages for frequent offending firms. Stakeholders may only give firms ‘the benefit of the 
doubt’ in certain incidences, particularly in ambiguous conditions and for single offences. In 
turn, repeat offences may indicate to reputational assessors that the firm’s involvement with 
irresponsibility is more than simply circumstantial and may be considered part of an 
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increasing pattern of negative behaviour. In so doing, firms with more comprehensive 
histories of irresponsibility may be at substantially greater risk of reputation penalties in light 
of new revelations of irresponsibility. Conversely, firms associated with fewer incidences of 
irresponsibility captured by broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies such as 
harm types, human injuries, fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses - may be less 
vulnerable to downwards stakeholder revisions in reputation. This rationale is based on the 
logic that, until irresponsibility is made apparent, stakeholders have few points of reference 
to determine the likelihood of the firm’s culpability. For ‘repeat offenders’, organisational 
assessors may logically conclude fewer external possible causal agents because the 
repetition of firm offences decreases the likely common sense explanations otherwise 
attributed to chance or other causal agents (Weiner, 1985). In view of these points, I 
hypothesise that: 
H6.2a: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of corporate 
irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
H6.2b: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate 
irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of 
irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least 
history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
 
6.2.3. Unpacking the Effect of the Firm’s History of Irresponsibility as it Relates to 
Attribution Theory 
This study also explores organisations’ history of irresponsibility as it relates to discreet 
attributions. Lange and Washburn (2012) suggest that irresponsibility is attributed when 
some degree of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity 
are present. By unpacking the relevance of the firm’s history of irresponsibility, this study 
draws on other attribution-based theories which contend that assessments are not made in 
isolation and individuals draw on a variety of past experiences and observations in order to 
identify the most appropriate, ‘common sense’ explanations (Heider, 1958). This contingent 
perspective adds greater nuance to the social judgements and impressions process by 
situating irresponsibility in a more ‘natural’ setting which includes contextual knowledge of 
organisational history and assessors’ memories of firm’s previous behaviour. Consequently, 
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the addition of ‘history of irresponsibility’ broadens the scope of empirical assessment, 
moving beyond individual, case-specific assessments of irresponsibility. This rationale is in 
line with the seminal work of the social psychologist Kelley (1967), who noted that 
individuals tend to draw upon past knowledge and experiences to assist the process of 
concluding common sense explanations regarding an event’s causation. In the remainder of 
this first part of the chapter, I specifically explore the potential for the organisation’s history of 
irresponsibility as it relates to effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party 
non-complicity. These characteristics of irresponsibility are tested individually, as well as in 
different combinations to test the explanatory power of Lange and Washburn’s (2012) 
model. In doing so, this study explores how multiple observations of corporate 
irresponsibility over time may play a role in determining stakeholder assessments of incident 
severity, attributions of culpability and the impact of affected party non-complicity. 
With this in mind, I theorise that, generally, organisations considered to be increasingly 
‘prone’ to association with negative social, economic and/or environmental damage may 
potentially be met with greater criticality subsequent to a more eventful history of 
irresponsibility associations. Perceptions of an event’s ‘effect undesirability’ may therefore 
also include assessors’ feelings of discontent towards the organisation’s general behaviour. 
Thus, rather than being ‘event-specific’, the undesirability of the event may also capture, to 
some extent, the general feelings regarding the undesirability of the organisation. Therefore, 
the increased presence of ‘propensity for irresponsibility’ may amplify the relationship 
between effect undesirability and reputation penalties because increasingly, assessors may 
sense that the organisation is either an incapable or generally irresponsible actor. 
Conversely, low propensity for irresponsibility may largely mitigate the impact of effect 
undesirability because observers may be more inclined to think that the event, though 
undesirable, has occurred in isolation and is, therefore, not part of a general pattern of 
negative behaviour.  
The firm’s propensity for irresponsibility may be considered a key influencing factor in 
determining assessors’ common sense evaluations of causal attribution in light of 
irresponsibility. In particular, determining causation can be often ambiguous, as there may 
be multiple causal agents and possible externalities. Assessors may ‘build’ a sense of the 
firm’s culpability for causing social, economic and/or environmental harm over time, through 
multiple observations (Weiner, 1985). Those firms with an increased propensity or 
involvement with irresponsibility may, over time, create broader and more pronounced 
stakeholder skepticism regarding their involvement with irresponsible outcomes. Extant 
reputation penalties literature suggests that generally firms may be given the benefit of the 
doubt, and good social behaviour tends to be rewarded by lessening the degree of 
reputational revision in light of irresponsibility (e.g., Ducassy, 2013; Jones, Jones and Little, 
2000; Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010; Sanchez, Sotorrio and Diez, 2012). That being 
said, most research on the ‘halo-effect’ (and other reputation penalties work more generally) 
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does not consider how multiple observations may accumulate in the memories of 
stakeholders, influencing their reputation assessments.  
Firms associated with harming certain parties perceived to be non-complicit may too 
experience more significant reputation penalties as non-complicit parties tend to evoke 
greater sympathy from the broader stakeholder pool when harmed (Lange and Washburn, 
2012). In the presence of increased propensity for irresponsibility, firms which have been 
typically associated with generating negative social, economic and or environmental harms, 
may be at increased risk of assessors forming negative perceptions regarding the potential 
culpability of the firm in relation to non-complicit parties (Shaver, 1985). Firms associated 
with fewer incidents of irresponsibility may be at a significantly lower risk in light of 
irresponsibility because their behaviour will most likely not be perceived as part of a pattern 
of irresponsible corporate behaviour. In view of these points, this study proposes that: 
H6.3a: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of 
corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
H6.3b: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of 
corporate irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-
average history of irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for 
firms with the least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate 
irresponsibility). 
 
6.2.4. The Influence of History of Irresponsibility in Relation to Combinations of Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and/or Affected Party Non-Complicity 
This study also explores combinations of the irresponsibility characteristics suggested by 
Lange and Washburn (2012) in order to identify potentially important compounding effects 
associated with features of attribution of irresponsibility as outlined by the authors. The 
presence of multiple irresponsibility characteristics may enhance their explanatory power 
with respect to reputation penalties following revelations of irresponsibility.  ‘Effect 
undesirability’ and ‘perceived culpability’ together may be critical in describing the level of 
moral discontent towards a firm’s actions, and the perception of whether external factors 
outside the firm’s control are to blame. In so doing, the combined presence of effect 
undesirability and perceived culpability suggests that the actions associated with the firm are 
more likely to elicit a strong emotional response from observers and that assessors are more 
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inclined to blame the focal organisation for causing the negative outcome. Similarly, events 
with both markedly undesirable outcomes and which harm stakeholders perceived to be 
non-complicit in those outcomes, may increase the reputational risks associated with 
irresponsibility. Further, a comparable logic may be applied to incidents where culpability 
attributions are directed towards a focal firm and non-complicit parties are implicated to have 
been harmed, in that significant reputational risks may be associated with such attribution 
characteristics when the firm has an increased propensity for irresponsibility. In turn, the 
presence of perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity may be more relevant for 
organisations with an increased propensity for irresponsibility because, again, assessors 
may consider the irresponsibility as part of a pattern of bad behaviour, rather than a ‘one-off’, 
isolated incident. Conversely, firms with a lesser propensity for irresponsibility may not be at 
high risk of subsequent reputation penalties following incidents where the focal firm is 
perceived to be culpable and the affected party is non-complicit. In view of these points, I 
hypothesise that: 
H6.4a: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history 
of corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
H6.4b: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average 
history of corporate irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), 
below-average history of irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) 
and for firms with the least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of 
corporate irresponsibility). 
 
6.2.5. The Influence of the Firm’s History of Irresponsibility in Relation to Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
As articulated by Lange and Washburn (2012: 307), the combined presence of all three 
irresponsibility attributions, namely ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected 
party non-complicity’ may be required ‘to some degree’ to elicit attributions of irresponsibility. 
The logical extension of which is that, significant indications of the presence of all three 
characteristics may have the most significant attributions of irresponsibility associated with 
them. From the contingent perspective of the firm’s history of irresponsibility, this study 
argues that firms with the most populous history of corporate irresponsibility run significant 
reputational risks because a history of stakeholder observations of bad behaviour may, over 
time, accrue in stakeholders’ memories and be recalled when assessing future events 
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(Heider (1958). The greater the accumulation of negative attributes in the minds of 
organisational assessors regarding firm behaviour, the more likely new incidents of 
irresponsibility are to motivate assessors to alter their reputational assessments. Firms with 
lesser histories of corporate irresponsibility are subsequently less vulnerable to reputational 
revisions in light of new revelations of socially undesirable behaviour. In view of these points, 
I hypothesise that: 
H6.5a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined 
presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of corporate 
irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
H6.5b: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of effect 
undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in 
corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate irresponsibility 
(second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of irresponsibility 
(third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least history of 
corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
 
6.3. Exploring the Contingency of Financial Performance 
In this final empirical exploration of reputation penalties, this study unpacks the contingent 
effect of financial performance. The rationale to explore the contingent effects of financial 
performance stems from both a theoretical and methodological motivation. In a fundamental 
sense, theories of attribution have suggested that corporate irresponsibility is path 
dependent (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012), in that corporate behaviour is interpreted on 
the basis of prior beliefs and knowledge. Another related attribution concept is that certain 
cues may be more salient to assessors than others because events may be perceived as 
either personally threatening or morally objectionable (Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008), a concept 
much similar to the ‘lemons problem’ outlined in economics (Emons, 1988). The converse to 
these ideas is that, when events do not correspond with prior knowledge and experiences, 
or are not perceived personally threatening/ morally objectionable, stakeholders may not 
attribute irresponsibility or revise their understanding in line with contradictory evidence. 
Here, I extend this logic to include the notion of the social contract between stakeholders. 
More specifically, I suggest that, in a similar sense mentioned earlier in this thesis regarding 
the protective properties of owning a positive reputation for social responsibility, firms which 
are good financial performers, may also largely offset reputation penalties associated with 
corporate irresponsibility. This may be particularly the case because, assessors themselves 
have a primarily financial relationship with the focal organisation. 
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Furthermore, a secondary yet related motivation for exploring the influence of financial 
performance stems from the work of Fryxell and Wang (1994) who found that Fortune’s 
World’s Most Admired Companies annual survey data (also employed in this current study) 
displays a distinct financial orientation. The understanding that WMAC data is somewhat 
financially oriented is generally acknowledged by the wider reputation literature (e.g., Brown 
and Perry, 1994; Deephouse, 2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002) and is also discussed in 
the methodology section of this thesis in more depth (see Chapter 3, pages 64-65). 
Specifically, WMAC survey participants comprise of both market analysts and senior 
managers. Following the valid arguments put forward by scholars such as Fryxell and Wang 
(1994), who stated that WMAC data is “limited to measuring the extent to which a firm is 
perceived as striving for financial goals” (Fryxell and Wang, 1994: 1), this study also 
explores this aspect of reputation in greater depth. I contend that senior management and 
industry analysts may largely ignore or not factor-in corporate irresponsibility for firms with 
enhanced economic performance, because this specific firm attribute may be the most 
relevant dimension of corporate reputation to them. Further, organisations which are not 
considered to be performing appropriately in an economic capacity may be more susceptible 
to reputational decline when also associated with irresponsibilities such as lawsuits, 
compensation, clean-up costs and other remedial actions. These types of irresponsibilities 
may be considered a more significant relative cost for underperforming firms. In order to 
explore this idea further, this study models the relationship between irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation by subsampling for financial performance. Figure 6.2 
highlights the relevant concepts and relationships investigated in this section. 
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Figure 6.2: Conceptual overview of the contingent effect of financial performance on the 
relationship between corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
 
6.3.1. The Influence of Financial Performance in the Context of Observed 
Irresponsibility 
From an attribution perspective, strong financial performance may bolster stakeholders’ 
overall impressions of firm reputation, particularly when the assessor group has a primarily 
economic relationship with the firm. Fundamentally, economic capabilities may be the single 
most relevant aspect of reputation for certain assessor groups, such as shareholders, 
market analysts, competitors and other peer organisations. This study makes the theoretical 
assumption that assessments of reputation following an observed act of irresponsibility are 
shaped by stakeholders’ assessments of financial performance. The assessor groups 
employed here have a distinctly economic relationship with firms in the sample i.e. the 
occupations of market analysts are specifically oriented around the assessment of firms’ 
financial capabilities, whilst managers may be motivated to maintain a keen sense of the 
competition and the broader market players’ financial health over time because this 
knowledge may prove strategically beneficial to their own organisations (Hambrick, 1982).  
With this in mind, this study theorises that, enhanced financial performance may shield the 
firm from negative assessor perceptions in light of corporate irresponsibility akin to 
suppositions advanced by the CSR perspective which suggests that generally, a positive 
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prior reputation may play a role in offsetting the risks associated with irresponsibility (e.g., 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Ducassy, 2013; Godfrey, 2005; Janney and Gove, 2011; Minor 
and Morgan, 2011; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). In terms of general observations of 
irresponsibility, this study suggests that firms with strong financial performance may offset 
the associated reputational risks, whereas worse financial performers may be in a 
significantly weaker position after revelations of irresponsibility because the firm may already 
be considered to be underperforming. Those performing neither distinctly well, nor poorly 
may be able to tolerate moderate reputational risks when compared to those with lesser 
financial performance because a proportion of the firm’s reputation, that of financial 
performance, is somewhat more enhanced. The aggregate perceptions of those with 
enhanced financial performance may be able to withstand greater impacts in other domains 
where they are being assessed, such as impacts to perceptions of social responsibility. 
Moderate economic performers may neither be particularly penalised, nor able to shield 
themselves from the totality of the risks associated with stakeholder wrongdoing; because 
their reputations for financial performance are neither enhanced enough as to largely buffer 
from the effects associated with irresponsibility, nor (I theorise) are they insignificant. In view 
of these points, this study proposes that: 
H6.6a: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance (top quartile of 
financial performance). 
H6.6b: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed 
irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial 
performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial 
performance (third quartile of financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial 
performance (bottom quartile of financial performance). 
 
6.3.2. The Influence of Financial Performance on Perceptions of Broad Categories of 
Irresponsibility 
The general idea that a firm’s reputation may consist of multiple dimensions is not a novel 
one, particularly to the broader reputation, CSR and management literatures (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Devers, Mishina and Belsito, 2009; Love and 
Kraatz, 2009; Rhee, 2009; Rindova et al., 2005; Staw and Epstein, 2000). Attribution theory 
articulates that, over time, individual observations accrue in the minds of assessors to build 
a sense of an actor’s future behaviour (Weiner, 1985). The market performance of the firm 
may be one such example out of many categories of potential observations which may 
subsequently indicate to the organisation’s wider audiences that it is a competent actor 
(Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Those organisations with greater economic capabilities, 
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I argue, in line with previous work on the composition of the reputation concept, may then 
aggregate along with various other facets of the firm’s perceived character and capabilities 
to form part of assessors’ overall perceptions of corporate reputation (Barnett, Jermier, and 
Lafferty, 2006; Fombrun and Rindova, 2000; Lange Lee and Dai, 2011; Scott and Walsham, 
2005). This study proposes that corporate irresponsibility may therefore be largely offset by 
the firm’s economic competencies.  
In applying this theoretical approach to broad categories and extant typologies of 
irresponsibility, including harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, 
discrimination and job losses, this study suggests that firms with relatively stronger financial 
performance will not be associated with significant reputation penalties, because enhanced 
economic performance tends to bolster stakeholder perceptions of the firm. The rationale 
here is that financial performance may be the most relevant aspect of the firm’s activities.  
Organisations with the lowest relative financial performance may be distinctly vulnerable to 
assessor revisions in light of revelations of corporate irresponsibility, because irresponsibility 
may be considered an additional cost that the firm may be unable to adequately manage.  
Finally, firms with moderate economic performance may neither be distinctly vulnerable, nor 
immune to revelations of corporate irresponsibility. Although adequately performing 
organisations may be able to withstand the associated costs of irresponsibility, damage to 
other facets of reputation may impact their overall, aggregate reputation more so than for 
firms with enhanced financial performance. With these points in mind, I hypothesise that:  
H6.7a: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance (top quartile of 
financial performance). 
H6.7b: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of 
irresponsibility and extant typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm 
types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial performance (second 
quartile of financial performance), below-average financial performance (third quartile of 
financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial performance (bottom quartile of 
financial performance). 
6.3.3. Unpacking the effect of Financial Performance as it relates to Attribution Theory 
As stated previously, exploring how the firm’s relative financial performance affects 
reputational assessments in light of irresponsibility may be highly relevant because an 
enhanced economic status may bolster stakeholders’ overall impressions of the firm. Here, 
this study explores how the firm’s relative financial status may impact assessments of 
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irresponsibility as viewed from an attribution perspective. More specifically, I unpack the 
possible contingent nature of financial performance as it relates to individual aspects of the 
attribution process, namely effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-
complicity. My general position is that – as discussed previously – firms may largely offset 
the risks associated with irresponsibility when performing well from an economic standpoint.  
 
6.3.4. The Influence of Financial Performance in Relation to Effect Undesirability, 
Perceived Culpability or Affected Party Non-Complicity 
A primary component of Lange and Washburn’s attribution theoretic framework is the idea 
that events which are perceived as personally threatening, or are in conflict with the values 
of the assessor, will generally be perceived to have greater effect undesirability (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012). The level of effect undesirability, or perceived severity of the event from 
the assessor’s perspective, may, in certain instances, be largely offset by greater capacities 
in other areas, such as the ability to generate shareholder wealth. Firms that are not 
performing adequately in this sense may therefore not enjoy such a position, because 
events eliciting greater effect undesirability may be considered indicative of another area the 
firm is performing poorly in. Also, the incident may be seen as yet another cost to the firm, 
further decreasing its financial performance. Similarly, the remaining components of Lange 
and Washburn’s (2012) attribution framework may also be significant predictors of 
reputational decline for certain organisations. Events that have few alternative causal agents 
or victimise stakeholder groups perceived to be non-complicit may be distinctly problematic 
for firms with low financial performance relative to their peers. In turn, organisations with 
more enhanced economic performance may have the associated risks of irresponsibility 
largely offset. Therefore, in light of these points, this study hypothesises that: 
H6.8a: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial 
performance (top quartile of financial performance). 
H6.8b: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected 
party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average 
financial performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial 
performance (third quartile of financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial 
performance (bottom quartile of financial performance). 
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6.3.5. The Influence of History of Irresponsibility in Relation to Combinations of Effect 
Undesirability, Perceived Culpability and/or Affected Party Non-Complicity 
This study considers combinations of the irresponsibility characteristics outlined by Lange 
and Washburn (2012) in order to explore whether there are salient combinations that 
together provide increased explanatory power. My general theoretical contention is that firms 
with increased financial performance will be largely shielded from reputation penalties in light 
of irresponsibility. In turn, firms with poor relative financial performance will receive 
increased stakeholder scrutiny and subsequent reputation penalties. Firms considered to be 
performing moderately in terms of their economic capacities may fair somewhat better than 
poor financial performers, yet may not enjoy the same level of reputational insurance that 
strong financial performance is likely to provide. With this in mind, I hypothesise that: 
H6.9a: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance 
(top quartile of financial performance). 
H6.9b: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of 
irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-
complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial 
performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial 
performance (third quartile of financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial 
performance (bottom quartile of financial performance). 
 
6.3.6. The Influence of Financial Performance in Relation to Effect Undesirability, 
Perceived Culpability and Affected Party Non-Complicity 
Finally, the model of irresponsibility attributions proposed by Lange and Washburn (2012: 
307) suggests that the combined presence of all three irresponsibility attributions, 
specifically ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘victimised party non-complicity’ 
may be required ‘to some degree’ to elicit attributions of irresponsibility. The logical 
extension of which is that significant indications of the presence of all three characteristics 
may have the most significant attributions of irresponsibility associated with them, and 
resultantly, the most significant impacts on changes in corporate reputation. When 
considering the firm’s financial performance, this study argues that, increased economic 
performance largely mitigates the potential impact of irresponsibility on the firm’s overall 
reputation. I generally posit that assessments of the specific event form only part of an 
event’s capacity to damage overall perceptions of the firm. This is because reputation may 
be contingent on a number of other factors, including the firm’s ability to generate financial 
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returns. Again, in line with this position, I argue that events where the firm is perceived 
culpable, where the effect is perceived significantly undesirable and which involve the harm 
of a non-complicit stakeholder group, may not always be indicative of reputation damages. 
Specifically, the effect of these characteristics may be largely offset by the firm’s overall 
reputation on the basis of whether it is a proficient economic actor as well as a social actor. 
However, firms which are not considered proficient in their capacity to generate economic 
returns may be more vulnerable to reputational decline in light of revelations of 
irresponsibility; because their ‘overall’ reputations are not adequately bolstered in this 
regard. These ideas may be more relevant for, and applicable to research that examines the 
perceptions of reputational assessors who have a primarily economic relationship with the 
firms assessed.  In view of these points, I hypothesise that: 
H6.10a: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of 
effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in 
corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance (top quartile of financial 
performance). 
H6.10b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined 
presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial performance (second 
quartile of financial performance), below-average financial performance (third quartile of 
financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial performance (bottom quartile of 
financial performance).  
 
6.4. Data 
This section only briefly takes stock of the variables employed in the analysis (detailed in 
Chapter 3, pages 64-74), whilst explaining the sub-sampling strategy used and the choice of 
sub-samples. As mentioned previously, reputation scores for this study were derived from 
Fortune Magazine’s World’s Most Admired Companies annual survey. The independent 
variables explored, namely irresponsibility data (e.g. event classifications, stakeholder harm 
types and so on) were derived, in part, from Thompson Reuters ASSET4 dataset and 
supplemented with additional data from the LexisNexis; whilst control variables come from 
DataStream. A full list of corporate irresponsibility events, harm types and event 
characteristics in the sample are provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (page 91) and described in 
more detail in methodological Chapter 3 (pages 66-67). 
6.4.1. Dependent Variable 
Corporate Reputation 
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As detailed in previous chapters, the WMAC survey measures reputation according to an 
11-point scale is used (0 = poor, 10 = excellent). The companies that appear in the WMAC 
survey consist of the 5 to 10 largest companies from the Fortune 1,000 lists for the year prior 
to the year of the survey whilst the respondents are senior executives and outside directors 
of Fortune 1,000 companies and financial analysts who cover these companies.  
However, in this chapter, firms are sub-sampled according to another two key organisational 
characteristics that may distinguish some firms from others in their sample and most 
importantly, have the potential to shape attributions of irresponsibility. These organisational 
characteristics are history of irresponsibility and financial performance. The variable 
‘history of irresponsibility’ reflects a firm’s prior crisis history and is measured as the number 
of negative events that the firm has been associated with in the year prior (this measure is 
cumulative). Data was collected by the author from LexisNexis. History of irresponsibility 
was also computed into four sub-samples, namely top quartile (firms with the most populous 
history of irresponsibility, ‘high HI’), second quartile (firms with above average history of 
irresponsibility, ‘above average HI’), third quartile (firms with below average history of 
irresponsibility, ‘below average HI’) and bottom quartile (firms with lowest history of 
irresponsibility, ‘low HI’). ‘Financial performance’ is measured by using the proxy return on 
total assets (ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets) and extracted from DataStream. ROA was 
computed into four sub-samples; top quartile (firms with high ROA, ‘best financial 
performers’), second quartile (firms with above average ROA, ‘above average financial 
performance’), third quartile (firms with below average ROA, ‘below average financial 
performance’) and bottom quartile (firms with low ROA, ‘low financial performance’).  
6.4.2. Independent Variables 
Corporate Irresponsibility 
Each independent variable measures a specific aspect of corporate irresponsibility. 
‘ANY_EVENT’ measures all identified acts of corporate irresponsibility per firm year without 
initially distinguishing between the different types of acts of irresponsibility. ‘EVENT_1’ … 
‘EVENT_20’ classify incidents of irresponsibility using general thematic categories (Table 
4.1, page 91, for a list of event types). ‘HARM_TYPES’ measures how stakeholders are 
affected (Table 4.2, page 91, for a list of harm types). ‘INJURIES’ measures the specific 
effect of associated human injuries on changes in corporate reputation; ‘FATALITIES’ 
describes events with associated human fatalities; ‘DECEPTION’ captures incidents where 
the focal firm is associated with, or accused of, the deception of an individual and or 
stakeholder group(s); ‘DISCRIMINATION’ describes incidents whereby the firm is associated 
with discriminatory behaviour towards an individual and or stakeholder group(s); and ‘JOB 
LOSSES’ measures incidents associated with the loss of employment of current or previous 
employees.  
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This chapter too, tests for Lange and Washburn’s (2012) increasingly popular theory 
regarding event characteristics for the two types of subsamples, namely history of 
irresponsibility and financial performance. ‘EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY’ measures events 
that are associated with an associated degree of moral disregard by organisational 
observers; ‘CULPABILITY’ measures whether an incident was reported alongside other 
potential causal agents; while ‘NON-COMPLICITY’ measures incidents that are associated 
with groups of stakeholders likely to be seen as non-complicit and evoke increased 
sympathy from the general stakeholder pool. Similar to Chapters 4 and 5, here I also test for 
the combined effects of these event characteristics on changes in corporate reputation, for 
the different sub-samples considered.  
6.4.3. Control Variables 
The variables ‘LEVERAGE’ (measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets) and ‘FIRM 
SIZE’ (the natural logarithm of the value of total assets) were collected from DataStream and 
included in all models. Furthermore, I measured ‘RDASS’ (ratio of R&D expenditures to total 
assets) using the data available in DataStream. I controlled for how well the firms score in 
various areas associated with reputational performance. ‘ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE’ 
(ENV_SCORE), ‘SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SCORE’ (SOC_SCORE) and ‘CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SCORE’ (CGV_SCORE). Each year was controlled for (respectively, 2006, 
2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012); and dichotomous industry sector variables were 
included which took the value of ‘1’ if the firm belonged to a specific industry and ‘0’ 
otherwise. Please see a full list of industry sectors controlled for in this study in Table 4.3 
(Chapter 4, page 96).  
6.5. Model specification 
I present the linear regression results modelling the relationships between corporate 
reputation and the explanatory variables described in the previous section. Particularly, in 
this chapter, it is examined whether the effects of corporate irresponsibility variables such as 
irresponsibility events and stakeholder harms, predict changes in reputational scores 
differently for firms which belong to the top quartile of propensity for irresponsibility (financial 
performance), second, third or bottom quartiles respectively.  
Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 reported the means, standard deviations and correlation matrix for 
the variables in the study. Here, I further examined for multicollinearity between the variable 
‘history of irresponsibility’ and the other variables, and there were no significant correlations 
found. Furthermore, I also re-ran the collinearity diagnostics to add the variable ‘history of 
irresponsibility’; here also, the VIFs remain under the value of 10 showing no significant 
evidence of multicollinearity (for details on VIF values, see Field, 2009).  
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6.6. Results for the history of irresponsibility sub-sample 
In this chapter, Tables 6.1 – 6.8 present the linear regression results for the sub-sample 
history of irresponsibility (‘HI’) whilst Tables 6.9 - 6.15 present the results of the linear 
regression concerning the effects of corporate irresponsibility events on changes in 
corporate reputation for the financial performance (‘FP’) sub-samples.  
Model 1 is the base model (see Table 6.1). As in previous chapters, Model 1 illustrates a 
number of significant effects of the control variables utilised. For instance, prior year 
reputation (the LAG variable) is strongly associated with current year reputation scores. This 
implies that reputation updating is only a modest phenomenon. Firm size does not appear to 
have significant effects on changes in corporate reputation for any of the HI sub-samples. 
ROA has a positive and significant relationship on changes in corporate reputation in that 
firms with high, below average and low HI tend to receive higher reputation scores when 
they register high returns on their existing assets. In turn, the variable leverage tends to 
have a negative and significant effect on changes in corporate reputation mostly for firms 
characterised by high and average HI. Only some marginal effects were found when 
controlling for social, environmental and corporate governance scores. Similar results for 
these control variables are mirrored throughout the remaining regression models in this 
study.  
Model 2 in Table 6.2 tests broadly for the effect of corporate irresponsibility (ANY_EVENT) 
on changes in corporate reputation to verify Hypothesis 6.1a which predicted a significant, 
negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in reputation for firms in 
the top quartile of HI. Whilst Hypothesis 6.1b predicted that firms with above average, below 
average and the lowest HI would not be associated with significant reputational change in 
light of observed irresponsibility. The regression model results show no significant results 
between ANY_EVENT and changes in corporate reputation for any of the sub-samples. 
Hence, Hypothesis 6.1a is not supported, whereas results support Hypothesis 6.1b.  
Hypothesis 6.2a predicted a significant and negative relationship between broad event 
categories/ extant typologies and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the most 
populous HI (Model 3, Table 6.2). Indeed, some of the broad categories of events have a 
negative and significant effect on corporate reputation changes for firms in the top quartile, 
thus Hypothesis 6.2a is confirmed for accounting controversies (β=-0.49, p<0.05), spills and 
pollution events (β=-0.30, p<0.01) and diversity and opportunity (β=-0.25, p<0.10) events. 
Shareholder rights controversies also have a significant effect on the reputation of firms with 
the highest HI, however the effect is a positive one (β=0.42, p<0.05). One explanation for 
this may be that firms with increased histories of corporate irresponsibility may also manage 
irresponsibility effectively. Therefore, reputational enhancements may be largely due to the 
appropriate management of events which has not been captured here. In turn, Hypothesis 
6.2b predicted no relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility events and 
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reputation for firms with lower HI (second, third and fourth quartiles) which was only partly 
confirmed since taxation does have a positive and marginally significant effect on the 
reputation of firms with above average HI scores (β=0.40, p<0.10). Also, there is a positive 
and significant effect of product and service quality (β=0.24, p<0.10) and a negative effect of 
shareholder rights (β=-0.17, p<0.10) and insider trading (β=-0.71, p<0.01) on the reputation 
of firms with below average HI scores. Interestingly, events that have a significant 
relationship on firms in the bottom quartile (low HI scores) are ethics (β=-0.09, p<0.05). This 
category specifically captures events with an underlying moral disposition, yet ‘ethics’ events 
did not fit well within other broad event classifications. A notable observation to be made 
here is that, firms with most frequent associations with irresponsibility were more susceptible 
to categories of irresponsibility that - under other circumstances - are seldom penalised. In 
turn, firms with the least association with irresponsibility were most impacted by more 
idiosyncratic, ethical incidents, suggesting that attributions of irresponsibility are not made in 
isolation and that firms may be given the benefit of the doubt in most instances of 
irresponsibility, unless the event is highly unusual. In the case of ‘unusual’ events, 
specifically ethics controversies, assessors may find unusual events more diagnostic of the 
firm’s ‘true’ nature because the event may be highly context specific (Mishina, Block and 
Mannor, 2012).  
Model 4 in Table 6.3. adds the effect of stakeholder harms (financial harm, physical harm, 
emotional harm, civil liberties harm and environmental harm) on changes in corporate 
reputation for the different sub-samples. Hypothesis 6.2a predicted a negative and 
significant relationship between extant typologies and changes in reputation for firms in the 
top quartile of history of irresponsibility. This hypothesis is supported only for environmental 
harm (Model 4, β=-0.39, p<0.01). In turn, physical harm (β=-0.11, p<0.10) and emotional 
harm (β=-0.80, p<0.05) are negatively related to reputation for firms in the second quartile, 
i.e. with above average HI, whilst civil liberties harms (β=-0.08, p<0.01) is negatively related 
to the reputation of firms in the bottom quartile, i.e. with low HI (Table 6.3). Thus, Hypothesis 
6.3b is not entirely supported. Again, firms with the highest propensity for corporate 
irresponsibility may be distinctly vulnerable to events of an environmental nature whilst those 
with the fewest incidents of irresponsibility were more susceptible to idiosyncratic events, 
such as civil liberties harms. Furthermore, in the same table, Model 5 tests for the effects of 
cases of observed human injuries on changes in reputation. Results show no significant 
relationship between human injuries and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top, 
second, their or bottom quartiles of history of corporate irresponsibility, confirming 
Hypothesis 6.2b here. Similar results were found for the effect of human fatalities which was 
insignificant for all sub-samples of reputation (Model 6 in Table 5.4). Thus, no support was 
found for Hypothesis 6.2a in this instance either (implicitly, supporting Hypothesis 6.2b).  
Model 7 in Table 5.4 shows a negative and marginally significant relationship between 
stakeholder deception and changes in corporate reputation for the top quartile, i.e. firms with 
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the highest HI (β=-0.13, p<0.10), whilst this was not the case for other groups subsampled.  
Similarly, Model 8 in Table 6.5 shows that discrimination, indeed, has a negative and 
significant effect on reputational changes associated with firms in the top quartile of HI (β=-
0.29, p<0.05), but was not associated with reputation penalties for other firms subsampled 
on the basis of HI. Further, in Table 6.5, Model 9 tests for the relationship between job 
losses and changes in corporate reputation changes for each sub-sample, indicating that 
there is a negative and significant effect of job loss events on changes in reputation for firms 
in the top quartiles of history of irresponsibility (β=-0.28, p<0.05) and no significant effect of 
job loss events on the reputation of other sub-samples of firms. In sum, there is some strong 
evidence in the main that firms with the most populous histories of irresponsibility are more 
vulnerable to irresponsibility based on the analysis of extant typologies and broad 
classifications of irresponsibility. 
Models 10 to 16 test the attribution theoretic framework offered by Lange and Washburn 
(2012) concerning the condition of EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY, perceived CULPABILITY 
and affected party NON-COMPLICITY. Hypotheses 6.3a, 6.4a and 6.5a predicted a 
significant and negative relationship between events exhibiting undesirability/ perceived 
culpability/ non-complicity and changes in reputation for firms in the top quartiles of HI. In 
turn, Hypotheses 6.3b,6. 4b and 6.5b predicted no significant relationships on the other sub-
samples. On their own, effect undesirability and non-complicity respectively, had not 
significant effects on changes in reputation for any of the HI sub-samples. Hypothesis 6.3b is 
fully supported, whilst Hypothesis 6.3a was only supported in Model 11, which shows a 
negative and significant relationship between culpability and reputation changes for firms 
with high HI (β=-0.13, p<0.10). Next, Models 13 to 16 tested for the presence of various 
combinations of these event characteristics on corporate reputation subsamples (see Tables 
6.7 and 6.8). Overall, no negative and significant effects were found to attest that the 
presence of either two or all three event characteristics (i.e. effect undesirability, culpability 
and affected party non-complicity) were significant predictors of reputational decline for firms 
with high HI, leading to Hypotheses 6.4a and 6.5a not being supported. In turn, Hypotheses 
6.4b and 6.5b were supported with some important exceptions. Specifically, the 
simultaneous presence of both effect undesirability and affected party non-complicity 
appears to have a positive effect (yet, small) on changes in the reputations of firms with 
above average HI (β=0.00, p<0.10). However, perhaps surprisingly, when the firm is 
perceived as culpable and the affected party is viewed as vulnerable, the reputations of firms 
with low HI seem to benefit significantly (β=0.82, p<0.05). In turn, the combined presence of 
all three corporate irresponsibility attributes has a significant and positive effect only on 
changes in the reputations of firms with above average HI (β=0.00, p<0.10). Again, 
reputational enhancements may be largely the result of the appropriate management of 
events, rather than the events themselves.  
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Table 6.1: Results of the linear regression for base Model 1: History of corporate 
irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Variables High HI 
Above 
average HI 
Below 
average HI 
Low HI 
Constant  1.13* 1.62** 1.18* 0.80 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09┼ 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR  Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error  0.53 0.49 0.48 0.52 
F 15.980 16.925 17.877 15.918 
R square 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.70 
N 468 279 279 282 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.2: Results of the linear regression for Models 2 and 3: History of corporate 
irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 2 Model 3 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
High 
HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
Constant  1.11* 1.73** 1.23* 0.85 1.23** 1.54* 1.19┼ 0.92 
ANY_EVENT -0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.11     
EVENT 1_Management 
compensation     -0.03 -0.31 -0.17 0.06 
EVENT 2_Shareholder 
rights     0.42* -0.03 -0.17┼ 0.03 
EVENT 3_Earnings     -0.52 -0.25 - 0.13 
EVENT 4_Insider 
Trading 
    -0.80 0.50 -0.71** -0.04 
EVENT 5_Accounting     -0.49* -0.03 -0.42 -0.19 
EVENT 
6_Customer/Consumer 
    -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 
EVENT 7_Product & 
Service Quality     0.15 0.06 0.24┼ 0.10 
EVENT 8_Spills and 
pollution     -0.30** -0.07 0.04 -0.01 
EVENT 9_Product 
recalls 
    0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 
EVENT 10_Intellectual 
property     -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 
EVENT 11_Public 
Health     0.33 -0.42 -0.18 0.07 
EVENT 12_Taxation     -0.20 0.40┼ -0.30 -0.13 
EVENT 13_Anti-
corruption     -0.03 0.21** -0.14 -0.04 
EVENT 14_Human 
rights 
    -0.35 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
EVENT 15_Child Labor     - - 0.39 0.33 
EVENT 16_Freedom of 
association 
    -0.11 - 0.34 0.09 
EVENT 17_Diversity 
and opportunity     -0.25┼ 0.03 0.07 0.03 
EVENT 18_Wages and 
working conditions     -0.13 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
EVENT 19_Employee 
health and safety 
    0.13 -0.11 -0.09 0.08 
EVENT 20_Ethics     0.17 -0.12 0.07 -0.09* 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10┼ 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.00 -0.01** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.52 
F 15.677 16.742 17.560 15.545 12.597 12.262 13.395 10.832 
R square 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.76 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.73 0.76 0.69 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.3: Results of the linear regression for Models 4 and 5: History of corporate 
irresponsibility (HI) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 4 Model 5 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
Constant  1.07 1.75** 1.19* 0.84 1.11* 1.62** 1.16┼ 0.87 
HARM 1 - Financial -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01     
HARM 2 - Physical 0.11 -0.11┼ 0.05 0.00     
HARM 3 – 
Emotional 
-0.23 -0.80* 0.07 0.08     
HARM 4 – Civil 
Liberties 
-0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08**     
HARM 5 - 
Environmental 
-0.39** 0.08 0.04 0.03     
INJURIES     -0.12 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 14.950 15.526 16.041 14.240 15.698 16.516 17.481 15.574 
R square 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.65 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.70 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.4: Results of the linear regression for Models 6 and 7: History of corporate 
irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 6 Model 7 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
        
Constant  1.15* 1.60** 1.08┼ 0.70 1.07* 1.76** 1.17* 0.80 
FATALITIES  -0.18 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11     
DECEPTION      -0.13┼ 0.07 -0.03 0.04 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10┼ 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10┼ 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 15.712 16.578 17.524 15.613 15.839 16.600 17.470 15.510 
R square 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.64 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
 
Table 6.5: Results of the linear regression for Models 8 and 9: History of corporate 
irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 8 Model 9 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
        
Constant  1.10* 1.56** 1.19* 0.75 1.05* 1.72** 1.16┼ 0.82 
DISCRIMINATION  -0.29* -0.06 0.11 -0.04     
JOB LOSSES     -0.28* 0.12 0.07 0.01 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10┼ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09┼ 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 2.53 0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 15.897 16.533 17.546 15.514 15.923 16.597 17.499 15.493 
R square 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.74 0.75 0.69 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.6: Results of the linear regression for Models 10, 11 and 12: History of corporate irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
            
Constant  1.15** 1.54** 1.14┼ 0.57 1.03* 1.56** 1.24* 0.59 1.12* 1.56 1.18* 0.56 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00         
CULPABILITY     -0.13* 0.06 -0.07 -0.09     
NON-COMPLICITY          -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.05 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09┼ 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10┼ 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01┼ 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 15.712 16.515 17.600 15.539 15.884 16.581 17.532 15.543 15.685 16.516 17.516 15.537 
R square 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.78 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.7: Results of the linear regression for Models 13, 14 and 15: History of corporate irresponsibility (‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
 aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
Independent variables 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI High HI 
Above 
average 
HI 
Below 
average 
HI 
Low HI 
            
Constant  0.93* 1.54** 1.21* 0.61 1.04* 1.63** 1.10┼ 0.64 1.04* 1.57** 1.21* 0.69 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00┼ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.16* 0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17* 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18* 0.06 -0.08 -0.21┼ 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.12 -0.27 0.04 -0.74* 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY 
AND CULPABILITYc 
-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00         
EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
    0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00     
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
        0.18 0.25 0.05 0.82* 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.11* 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00┼ -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 15.204 15.516 16.733 14.505 15.120 15.725 16.722 14.548 15.130 15.462 16.559 14.861 
R square 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.75 0.70 
N 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 468 279 279 282 
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Table 6.8: Results of the linear regression for Model 16: History of corporate irresponsibility 
(‘HI’) sub-samplea,b,c 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
 
 
6.7. Results for the financial performance sub-sample 
Tables 6.9 - 6.15 present the results of the linear regression concerning the effects of 
corporate irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation for firms categorised in the 
financial performance sub-samples or ‘FP’ sub-samples hereafter.  
Model 17 is the base model (see Table 6.9) whilst Model 18 in Table 6.10 tests broadly for 
the effect of corporate irresponsibility (ANY_EVENT) on changes in corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 6.6a predicted no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top quartiles of financial performance. In 
turn, Hypothesis 6.6b proposed that firms within the second, third and bottom quartiles of 
financial performance would be associated with significant and negative alterations in 
reputation scores in instances of general observed irresponsibility. Model 18 shows no 
significant results for the variable ANY_EVENT on reputation changes for any of the FP sub-
samples, thus providing support for Hypothesis 6.6a but not supporting Hypothesis 6.6b. 
Independent variables 
Model 16 
High HI 
Above 
average HI 
Below 
average HI 
Low HI 
    
Constant  1.07* 1.64** 1.11┼ 0.64 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 -0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.17* 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.04 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
0.00 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 
RDASS 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
LEVERAGE -0.00* -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 
ROA 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01┼ 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00┼ 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CVG_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
YEAR Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.51 
F 15.128 15.736 16.718 14.558 
R square 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.74 
Adjusted R square 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.69 
N 468 279 279 282 
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Hypothesis 6.7a predicted no significant relationship between broad event categories/ extant 
typologies of irresponsibility and reputational changes for firms with high FP, i.e. top quartile, 
whilst Hypothesis 6.7b predicted negative and significant relationships with reputation 
change of broad events and extant typologies for the other sub-samples (Model 19, Table 
6.10). Instead, the regression results suggest that different types of events influence 
different sub-samples of firms. Specifically, the analysis shows positive and significant 
effects on the reputation of firms with the highest FP for product and service quality events 
(β=0.39, p<0.01) and perhaps surprisingly at a first glance, for child labor controversies 
(β=0.61, p<0.01). Yet, a possible interpretation of this last result in particular, is that forms of 
irresponsibility may be associated with distinct financial benefits. In instances where the 
financial benefits outweigh the potential penalties associated with irresponsibility, 
irresponsibility may actually enhance the ‘overall’ perception of the firm. Furthermore, Table 
6.10 also shows a positive and marginally significant relationship between freedom of 
association events and reputation changes for firms in the second quartile, i.e. the above 
average financial performers (β=0.74, p<0.10). Also, accounting controversies (β=-0.64, 
p<0.01) and ethics (β=-0.28, p<0.05) were found to have a negative and significant 
relationship with changes in the reputation of firms in the third quartile of FP. Events such as 
spills and pollution are negatively associated with changes in corporate reputation of firms 
with lower financial performance (β=-0.28, p<0.10). Therefore, these results show some 
support for Hypothesis 6.7b. 
Furthermore, Model 20 adds the main effects of stakeholder harms (financial harm, physical 
harm, emotional harm, civil liberties harm and environmental harm) on changes in corporate 
reputation for firms with different levels of financial performance. Model 20 in Table 6.11 
shows no significant relationships between financial, physical, emotional, civil liberties or 
environmental harms on neither of the corporate reputation sub-samples. Thus, these 
findings support Hypothesis 6.7a but not Hypothesis 6.7b. In turn, Model 21 in the same 
table tests for the effects of cases of observed human injuries on changes in reputation. 
Results show no significant relationship between human injuries and corporate reputation 
changes for firms in the top, second, third or bottom quartiles of FP, again, confirming 
Hypothesis 6.7a yet not Hypothesis 6.7b. It should be mentioned here that similar results 
were found for the effect of human fatalities and deception which were insignificant for all 
sub-samples of reputation (Models 22 and 23 in Table 6.12). Similarly, Models 24 and 25 in 
Table 6.13 show that neither discrimination, nor job losses have a significant relationship 
with changes in corporate reputations irrespective of the category of financial performance 
they fall under (thus, overall, supporting Hypothesis 6.7a and not supporting Hypothesis 6.7b 
in the main).  
As in previous analyses, Models 26 to 32 test the attribution theoretic framework offered by 
Lange and Washburn (2012) concerning the condition of EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY, 
perceived CULPABILITY and affected party NON-COMPLICITY. Overall, the hypotheses 
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predicted no significant relationship between these factors and corporate reputation changes 
for firms in the top quartile of FP (i.e. Hypotheses 6.8a, 6.9a, 6.10a) and a negative and 
significant relationship with corporate reputation changes for firms in the second, third and 
fourth quartiles of FP (i.e. Hypotheses 6.8b, 6.9b, 6.10b). On their own, effect undesirability, 
non-complicity and culpability respectively, have no significant effects on changes in 
reputation for any of the FP sub-samples (see Models 26-28 in Table 6.14). Overall, no 
significant effects were found to attest that the presence of either two or all three event 
characteristics leads to corporate reputation changes. Exception being Model 31 which 
shows that, the combined presence of culpability and non-complicity has a marginally 
positive effect on changes in the reputation of firms with bellow average FP (β=0.46, 
p<0.10). Results show also a strong and positively significant effect of the combined 
presence of culpability and non-complicity on changes in the reputation of firms with low FP 
(β=1.63, p<0.01). An interpretation of these findings may be that the reputational assessors’ 
social responsibility expectations of firms with relatively lower financial performance may be 
limited, in which case, the associated cost-benefits of corporate irresponsibility may, in fact, 
lead to an increase in overall reputational score for these firms because a constituent 
component of overall reputation is the firm’s financial standing. In turn, as shown in Model 
32, the combined presence of all three corporate irresponsibility attributes (i.e. effect 
undesirability, culpability and affected party non-complicity) does not have a significant 
relationship with changes in corporate reputation for any of the FP sub-samples (see Table 
6.16). Consequently, Hypotheses 6.8a, 6.9a and 6.10a are supported by the regression 
models, whilst no support was found for Hypotheses 6.8b, 6.9b and 6.10b.  
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Table 6.9: Results of the linear regression for base Model 17: Financial performance (‘FP’) 
sub-samplea,b,c 
 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
  
 
Variables 
Model 17 
High FP  
Above 
average FP 
Below 
average FP 
Low FP 
Constant  0.95┼ 1.00┼ -0.02 1.84** 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.08┼ 0.09* 0.06 -0.02 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR  Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY 
Present Present Present Present 
Std. error of the estimate 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 16.262 14.162 13.756 17.238 
R square 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N  332 329 301 346 
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Table 6.10: Results of the linear regression for Models 18 and 19: Financial performance 
(‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 18 Model 19 
High 
FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low 
FP 
High 
FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low 
FP 
        
Constant  0.99┼ 1.07┼ 0.00 1.86** 1.33** 0.69 0.37 1.84** 
ANY_EVENT 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.04     
EVENT 1_Management 
compensation 
    0.07 -0.13 0.39 -0.10 
EVENT 2_Shareholder 
rights 
    -0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.04 
EVENT 3_Earnings     0.16 - 0.40 -0.37 
EVENT 4_Insider Trading     0.16 0.29 -0.04 -0.21 
EVENT 5_Accounting     -0.57 -0.42 -0.64** -0.04 
EVENT 
6_Customer/Consumer 
    -0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.09 
EVENT 7_Product & 
Service Quality 
    0.39** 0.17 0.09 0.05 
EVENT 8_Spills and 
pollution 
    -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.28┼ 
EVENT 9_Product recalls     -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.27 
EVENT 10_Intellectual 
property 
    0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
EVENT 11_Public Health     0.31┼ -0.13 -0.27 0.51 
EVENT 12_Taxation     -0.07 -0.37 0.12 -0.13 
EVENT 13_Anti-corruption     -0.04 -0.16┼ 0.07 0.03 
EVENT 14_Human rights     0.03 0.20 -0.63 -0.09 
EVENT 15_Child Labor     0.61** -0.27 0.35 - 
EVENT 16_Freedom of 
association 
    - 0.74┼ 0.27 -0.51 
EVENT 17_Diversity and 
opportunity 
    0.00 0.07 0.02 0.10 
EVENT 18_Wages and 
working conditions 
    0.02 -0.05 -0.17┼ 0.14 
EVENT 19_Employee 
health and safety 
    -0.14 0.01 0.15 0.36┼ 
EVENT 20_Ethics     -0.05 -0.13 -0.28* 0.01 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.07┼ 0.08* 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.12** 0.07 -0.02 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04┼ -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01┼ 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.00 -0.02 0.12** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01* -1.74 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 9.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.55 
F 15.883 13.869 13.462 16.874 12.053 10.312 10.533 12.679 
R square 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.77 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71 
N  332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.11: Results of the linear regression for Models 20 and 21: Financial performance 
(‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 20 Model 21 
High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP 
        
Constant  0.95┼ 0.96 0.10 1.86** 0.89┼ 1.01┼ 0.01 1.87** 
HARM 1 - 
Financial 
-0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.06     
HARM 2 - 
Physical 
0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.15     
HARM 3 – 
Emotional 
0.13 0.30┼ -0.25 0.00     
HARM 4 – 
Civil Liberties 
0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13     
HARM 5 - 
Environmental 
-0.12 0.08 -0.14 -0.16     
INJURIES     -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.12 
LAGS (REP 
T,1) 
0.72*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.07┼ 0.10* 0.04 -0.01 0.08* 0.09* 0.06 -0.02 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.01** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 14.254 12.651 12.404 15.670 15.907 13.839 13.466 16.923 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.68 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.12: Results of the linear regression for Models 22 and 23: Financial performance 
(‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 22 Model 23 
High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP 
        
Constant  0.90┼ 0.93┼ -0.12 1.84** 1.02* 1.03┼ -0.08 1.83** 
FATALITIES  -0.06 -0.11 -0.18 -0.01     
DECEPTION      0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 
LAGS (REP 
T,1) 
0.72*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.08┼ 0.10** 0.06 -0.02 0.07┼ 0.09* 0.07 -0.01 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11*** 0.02** 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.72 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 15.901 13.933 13.615 16.855 15.907 13.842 13.477 16.908 
R square 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
 
Table 6.13: Results of the linear regression for Models 24 and 25: Financial performance 
(‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent 
variables 
Model 24 Model 25 
High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP 
        
Constant  0.92┼ 1.07* -0.01 1.84** 0.94┼ 0.94┼ 0.01 1.89** 
DISCRIMINATION  -0.09 0.09 0.02 -0.01     
JOB LOSSES     -0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.09 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.08* 0.08* 0.06 -0.02 0.08┼ 0.09* 0.06 -0.03 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.01** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 15.929 13.884 13.456 16.855 15.877 13.896 13.457 16.914 
R square 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.14: Results of the linear regression for Models 26, 27 and 28: Financial performance (‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
Independent variables 
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
High FP  
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP  
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP  
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP 
            
Constant  0.99* 0.93┼ 0.39 1.43** 1.03* 0.84 0.35 1.52** 1.07* 0.96┼ 0.38 1.47** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00         
CULPABILITY     0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12     
NON-COMPLICITY          0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.02 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.08┼ 0.09* 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.10* 0.06 -0.01 0.07┼ 0.08┼ 0.06 -0.02 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 0.04┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.11** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.72 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 15.899 13.840 13.467 16.935 15.881 13.875 13.458 17.021 15.942 13.924 13.463 16.858 
R square 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
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Table 6.15: Results of the linear regression for Models 29, 30 and 31: Financial performance (‘FP’) sub-samplea,b,c 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
Independent variables 
Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP High FP 
Above 
average 
FP 
Below 
average 
FP 
Low FP 
            
Constant  1.02* 0.82 0.30 1.49** 1.06* 0.88┼ 0.40 1.49** 1.10* 0.84 0.46 1.48** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.15┼ 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.08 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.40 0.14 -0.36 -1.57** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND 
CULPABILITYc 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00         
EFFECT UNDESIRABILITY AND 
NON-COMPLICITYc 
    -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
CULPABILITY AND NON-
COMPLICITY 
        -0.33 -0.02 0.46┼ 1.63** 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.07┼ 0.09* 0.06 -0.01 0.07┼ 0.09* 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.09* 0.05 -0.01 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 
ROA 0.01 -0.01 0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 0.00 -0.01 0.11** 0.01** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 15.069 13.179 12.707 16.027 14.892 13.213 12.656 16.108 14.950 13.102 12.840 16.525 
R square 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.76 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.72 
N  332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 332 329 301 346 
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Table 6.16: Results of the linear regression for Model 32: Financial performance (‘FP’) sub-
samplea,b,c 
 
aNotes: Dependent variable is reputation change   -    Significance levels are ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10 
bAll regression models are significant for ***p<0.001 
cSince the hypothesised value is <0.005, the statistic reduces to Estimate/SE.  
 
 
6.8. Discussion 
This chapter empirically explored (1) which organisational characteristics influence the 
relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation? And in what 
incidences do these characteristics play a role? (2) Does the organisation’s history of corporate 
irresponsibility influence the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation? And in which contexts does this seem to be most apparent? (3) Finally, does 
financial performance shape the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in reputation? 
And in which circumstances does it do so? Broadly, the results in this study suggest that the 
firm’s history of corporate irresponsibility and financial performance have different underlying 
effects on the relationship between irresponsibility attributions and reputation penalties. 
Independent variables 
Model 32 
High FP  
Above 
average FP 
Below 
average FP 
Low FP 
     
Constant  1.06* 0.88┼ 0.41 1.49** 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITYc 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
CULPABILITY -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 
NON-COMPLICITY  0.07 0.11 0.02 -0.02 
EFFECT_UNDESIRABILITY AND CULPABILITY 
AND NON-COMPLICITYc 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LAGS (REP T,1) 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.07┼ 0.09* 0.05 -0.01 
RDASS -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01* 
ROA 0.01 -0.02 0.11** 0.02** 
SOC_SCOREc -0.00 0.00 -0.00┼ -0.00 
ENV_SCOREc 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00┼ 
CVG_SCOREc -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
YEAR Present Present Present Present 
INDUSTRY Present Present Present Present 
Std. error 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.55 
F 14.893 13.214 12.658 16.112 
R square 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 
Adjusted R square 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 
N 332 329 301 346 
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In the first part of this empirical chapter, I theorised that firms with more populous histories of 
corporate irresponsibility would be more susceptible to reputation penalties in light of 
irresponsibility because, for such firms, events would be assessed by observers as part of an 
unfolding picture of bad behaviour, rather than isolated, ‘one-off’ events. Whilst my findings did 
not suggest this to always be the case, I presented evidence that irresponsibility is more 
significantly penalised for firms with an increased propensity for corporate irresponsibility. 
Interestingly, firms with the greatest histories of irresponsibility were distinctly vulnerable to 
environmental ‘spills and pollution’ events and observations of ‘diversity and opportunity’ 
wrongdoing. This was the first indication found in my empirical exploration of reputation 
penalties which suggested environmental and diversity issues to be impactful to reputations. 
This may suggest that, rather than being irrelevant to reputational assessments akin to the 
position taken by much of the finance and economics literature (see Engelen and van Essen, 
2011), environmental issues appear harmful only for firms with already a significant history of 
irresponsibility. In turn, for other less ‘irresponsibility prone’ organisations, this category of 
environmental harm may be offset by an otherwise positive record in other areas. Again, an 
interesting result was that firms associated with the least history of irresponsibility were more 
susceptible to controversies of an ‘ethical’ nature. The ‘ethics’ category of events specifically 
captured those events with an underlying stakeholder wrongdoing, yet which were not 
adequately captured by other event classifications. This means that, fundamentally, ‘ethics’ 
events tend to be highly idiosyncratic and distinctive to a specific organisational context. An 
interpretation for this result is that ethics controversies may be considered more ‘diagnostic’ 
(Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012) of the firm’s character or capabilities because ethical events 
are so specific and unique to the firm and its context. A broad observation I make here is that 
those with most frequent associations with irresponsibility were more susceptible to categories 
of irresponsibility that under other circumstances, are seldom penalised. Whilst those firms with 
the least association with irresponsibility were most impacted by more idiosyncratic incidents, 
suggesting that attributions of irresponsibility are not made in isolation and that firms may be 
given the benefit of the doubt in most instances of irresponsibility, unless the event is highly 
unusual, in which case assessors may find more idiosyncratic forms of corporate irresponsibility 
diagnostic of the firm’s ‘true’ nature (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012).  
These results were again supported by my further analysis of ‘harm types’ – where firms 
categorized as owning the most populous histories of irresponsibility were significantly impacted 
by environmental events. In turn, firms with the least incidents of irresponsibility were associated 
with significant reputation penalties for the more idiosyncratic harms, such as civil liberties 
events. The subsequent analysis of alternative typologies of irresponsibility suggested that firms 
with less populous histories of irresponsibility were not associated with significant reputation 
penalties. However, the most frequent offending firms were associated with varying degrees of 
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reputation penalties for deceptive behaviour, discrimination and job losses. These results may 
serve as further evidence for the supposition that, rather than categories of irresponsibility such 
as deception, discrimination and job losses being irrelevant to reputational assessments, they 
may, in fact, only be significant for organizations with the most frequent observations of 
irresponsibility. This may imply that, rather than irresponsibility being assessed in isolation, 
assessors may draw on prior experience, observations and knowledge to infer causation for an 
events effect. In other words, rather than being inherently impactful, deception, discrimination 
and job losses may be ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ in that, under normal 
circumstances, such issues may be largely overlooked in light of an otherwise ‘acceptable’ level 
of behaviour. However, after a substantial number of incidents linking the firm to acts of 
irresponsibility, deception, discrimination and job losses may then reveal a pattern of negative 
behaviour than would otherwise be tolerable.   
After exploring the broad classifications and extant typologies of irresponsibility, this study 
empirically assess the framework of irresponsibility attributions offered by Lange and Washburn 
(2012). The analysis revealed some mixed evidence that the irresponsibility qualities ‘effect 
undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected party non-complicity’ were relevant to 
reputation penalties in the context of histories of irresponsibility. I conceptualised that firms most 
frequently associated with irresponsibility may be more susceptible to events with the 
irresponsibility characteristics outlined by Lange and Washburn (2012). I found that only events 
with few alternative causal agents (or a greater likelihood of perceived culpability) were 
associated with reputation penalties for firms with the most populous histories of corporate 
irresponsibility. Organisations with generally less propensity for irresponsibility were not 
associated with significant reputational effects when I tested the three core facets 
independently. This may illustrate that culpability, regardless of the severity of the event, is what 
is most relevant to reputational assessors when determining the assessment of firms with the 
greatest association with wrongdoing. When I tested for combinations of ‘effect undesirability’, 
‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected party non-complicity’ I found only evidence of reputational 
enhancements for firms with less frequent histories of irresponsibility. Perhaps somewhat 
counterintuitive, this result may indicate managerial effects or that other contingencies are at 
work. 
In order to develop these theoretical ideas further, in the second part of this chapter I 
hypothesised that a strong financial position may largely offset the negative impact of 
irresponsibility on changes in corporate reputation. Yet again, my findings did not suggest that 
the general association with irresponsibility was accompanied by significant reputation penalties 
for firms with differing financial performance. Results do, however, suggest that firms with poor 
and below average economic performance were associated with more significant reputation 
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penalties for categories of irresponsibility such as ‘wages and working conditions’, ‘spills and 
pollution’ and ‘ethical’ controversies. This suggests that firms with lower financial performance 
may be more distinctly vulnerable to incidents that would otherwise occur without penalty. What 
is more, this result also suggests that more idiosyncratic events such as those captured by 
ethical controversies may render firms with below average financial performance most 
vulnerable.  
Further, the analysis for the subsample ‘financial performance’ suggests that firms with strong 
financial performance may find reputational enhancements following certain instances of 
irresponsibility, such as ‘child labour’ and ‘product/service quality’ issues. Whilst I previously 
suggested that reputational enhancements following irresponsibility may be initially 
counterintuitive, irresponsibility can, in fact, be associated with financial benefits. These financial 
benefits may potentially be greater than the associated perceived drawbacks of damaging other 
aspects of reputation, such as perceptions regarding product/service quality. In other words, 
incidents such as child labour use may initiate the reflexive moral stance of irresponsibility in 
some reputational assessors; yet other more financially orientated assessors may only assess 
the organisation on the basis of whether its actions have financially beneficial consequences. 
For which, child labor use may have distinct cost advantages, particularly if the firm is also able 
to retain current levels of demand and/or operate this practice without legal ramifications. Having 
said that, my analysis of alternative extant typologies revealed fewer instances of significance 
for the types of harm caused, such as financial, physical, emotional, civil liberties and 
environmental harm as well as deception, discrimination and job losses. This may be because, 
irrespective of financial performance, these incidents are only indicative of irresponsibility when 
they are considered part of an unfolding history of irresponsibility, rather than inherently 
indicative of irresponsibility within themselves. The addition of frequency of irresponsibility in 
relation to financial performance may, together, be most indicative of reputation penalties and 
therefore may be a potential area of consideration for future research.  
Finally, my analysis of the attribution framework proposed by Lange and Washburn (2012) did 
not show significant effects associated with individual constituent elements or combinations of 
‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected party non-complicity’ in the main. That 
said, when the variables ‘perceived culpability’ and ‘affected party non-complicity’ were 
combined, firms with the lowest relative financial performance were associated with significant 
reputational enhancements. This may suggest that firms which are only somewhat relatively 
underperforming may be able to take advantage of the financial benefits associated with 
irresponsibility. However, when considering the results as whole, some extant typologies may 
more adequately capture the social judgements and impressions of reputational assessors. The 
‘broad categories’ (i.e. product recalls, accounting controversies and environmental harms and 
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so on) appeared to capture more discreet aspects of ‘what stakeholders are assessing’, when 
compared to the somewhat narrower attribution theoretic position proposed by Lange and 
Washburn (2012). This may be due to the 20 discreet categories of irresponsibility more 
narrowly capturing stakeholder judgements and impressions compared to the three aspects of 
irresponsibility characterised by effect undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party 
non-complicity. In this way, the three core attribution assessments offered by Lange and 
Washburn (2012) are perhaps limited. This said, the results of this study do find that the 
attribution perspective of ‘path dependency’ is highly relevant to reputation penalties in light of 
corporate irresponsibility.  
Overall, the relative degree of scope of this research project led to 80 separate empirical 
models. Therefore, I illustrate an overview of the propositions and findings of this doctoral thesis 
in Table 6.17 below. In the chapter to follow, I expand on the key research findings of this thesis 
and place them within the broader context of corporate reputation and irresponsibility research.  
Further, I elucidate some potential future research directions for reputation penalties research. 
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Table 6.17: Summary of findings  
Hypotheses (Chapter 4) Results  Comments/Other 
H4.1: There is no significant relationship between the presence of corporate irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation. Supported  Model 2, Table 4.5 
H4.2: There is no significant relationship between broad classifications of irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation. Partly supported 
Model 3, Table 4.5. Exceptions being 
accounting, product and service quality, child 
labour  
H4.3a: There is no significant relationship between financial, physical and emotional harms and changes in corporate 
reputation. Supported  Model 4, Table 4.5 
H4.3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between environmental and civil liberties harms and changes in 
corporate reputation. Partly supported  
Model 4, Table 4.5. Confirmed for civil 
liberties  
H4.4a: There is no significant relationship between cases of observed human injuries and changes in corporate reputation. 
Supported  Model 5, Table 4.6 
H4.4b: There is a significant and negative relationship between cases of observed human fatalities and changes in 
corporate reputation. Not supported   Model 6, Table 4.6 
H4.5: There is no significant relationship between cases of stakeholder deception, discrimination or job loss and changes 
in corporate reputation. Supported   Models 7,8,9, Table 4.6 
H4.6: When irresponsibility is associated with a single attribution component (effect undesirability [or] perceived culpability 
[or] affected party non-complicity) there is a significant and negative effect on changes in corporate reputation. Not supported  Models 10,11,12, Table 4.7 
H4.7: When irresponsibility is associated with more than two attribution components (effect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) there is a stronger negative and significant effect on changes in corporate 
reputation than the presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity alone. 
Not supported  Models 13,14,15, Table 4.7 
H4.8: The relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation is most significant (and negative) when 
event undesirability, perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity are all present. Not supported  Model 16, Table 4.7 
Hypotheses (Chapter 5 – part 1)   
H5.1a: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms 
in the first (top) and fourth (bottom) quartiles of reputation for social responsibility scores. 
Supported  Model 1, Table 5.2 
H5.1b: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation for firms in the second (above average) and third (below average) quartiles of reputation for social responsibility 
scores. 
Not supported  Model 1, Table 5.2 
H5.2a: There is no significant relationship between broad categories and typologies of irresponsibility (including broad 
categories of irresponsibility, outcomes of irresponsibility, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and 
job losses) and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and bottom (fourth) quartiles of social 
responsibility scores. 
Mostly supported  
Models 2-9, Table 5.2-5.5. Exceptions being 
child labour, earnings, public health, job 
losses 
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Table 6.17: Summary of findings (continued) 
Hypotheses (Chapter 5 – part 1) Results  Comments/Other 
H5.2b: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories and typologies of irresponsibility 
(including broad categories of irresponsibility, outcomes of irresponsibility, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, 
discrimination and job losses) and changes in corporate reputation for firms that are above (second quartile) and below 
(third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
Partly 
supported  
Models 2-9, Table 5.2-5.5. Exceptions being 
freedom of association, child labour, product 
and service quality 
H5.3a: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or 
perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and 
bottom (fourth) quartiles of social responsibility scores. 
Supported  
Models 9-11, Table 5.6. Exception being a 
marginal effect of non-complicity in Model 11 
H5.3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect 
undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms that 
are above (second quartile) and below (third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
Not supported  Models 9-11, Table 5.6. 
H5.4a: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability 
and/or perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the 
top (first) and bottom (fourth) quartiles of social responsibility scores. 
Supported  Models 12-14, Table 5.7 
H5.4b: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect 
undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for 
firms that are above (second quartile) and below (third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
Not supported  Models 12-14, Table 5.7 
H5.5a: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability 
and affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms in the top (first) and bottom (fourth) 
quartiles of social responsibility scores. 
Supported  Model 16, Table 5.8 
H5.5b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, 
perceived culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms that are above 
(second quartile) and below (third quartile) average in social responsibility scores. 
Not supported  Model 16, Table 5.8 
H5.6a: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market capitalisation). 
Supported  Model 18, Table 5.10 
H5.6b: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for 
above-average (second quartile market capitalisation), below-average (third quartile market capitalisation) and non-
celebrity firms (bottom quartile of market capitalisation). 
Supported  Model 18, Table 5.10 
H5.7a: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant 
typologies (including broad categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, 
discrimination and job losses) and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market 
capitalisation). 
Partly 
supported  
Models 19-25, Table 5.10-5.13. Highly 
supported for accounting controversies and 
marginally supported for civil liberties and 
fatalities  
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Table 6.17: Summary of findings (continued) 
Hypotheses (Chapter 5 – part 2) Results  Comments/Other 
H5.7b: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies (including; broad 
categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market capitalisation), below-average (third quartile 
market capitalisation) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile of market capitalisation). 
Supported  
Models 19-25, Table 5.10-5.13. 
Exceptions being earnings, taxation, 
anti-corruption, customer 
controversies, shareholder rights, 
insider trading, emotional harm 
H5.8a: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect 
undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms 
(top quartile of market capitalisation). 
Partly 
supported  
Models 26-28, Table 5.14. Supported 
for culpability 
H5.8b: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or 
perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile 
market capitalisation), below-average (third quartile market capitalisation) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile of market 
capitalisation). 
Supported  Models 26-28, Table 5.14 
H5.9a: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect 
undesirability and/or perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for 
celebrity firms (top quartile of market capitalisation). 
Not supported Models 29-31, Table 5.15 
H5.9b: There is no significant relationship combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or perceived 
culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile 
market capitalisation), below-average (third quartile market capitalisation) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile of market 
capitalisation). 
Supported  Models 29-31, Table 5.15 
H5.10a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for celebrity firms (top quartile of market 
capitalisation). 
Not supported  Model 32, Table 5.16 
H5.10b: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and 
affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for above-average (second quartile market capitalisation), 
below-average (third quartile market capitalisation) and non-celebrity firms (bottom quartile of market capitalisation). 
Supported  Model 32, Table 5.16 
Hypotheses (Chapter 6 – part 1)   
H6.1a: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
for firms with the greatest history of corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
 
Not supported  Model 2, Table 6.2 
H6.1b: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms with 
above-average history of corporate irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history 
of irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least history of corporate 
irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Supported  Model 2, Table 6.2 
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Table 6.17: Summary of findings (continued) 
Hypotheses (Chapter 6 – part 1) Results  Comments/Other 
H6.2a: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies 
(including; broad categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job 
losses) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of 
corporate irresponsibility). 
Partially 
supported  
Models 3-9, Table 6.5. Supported for 
spills and pollution, diversity and 
opportunity, environmental harm, 
deception, discrimination, job losses 
H6.2b: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies (including; broad 
categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and changes 
in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate 
irresponsibility), below-average history of irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the 
least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Partially 
supported  
Models 3-9, Table 6.5. Exceptions 
being shareholder rights, insider 
trading, product and service quality, 
taxation, anti-corruption, ethics, 
physical and emotional harm, civil 
liberties harm 
H6.3a: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or 
perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of 
corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Partially 
supported 
Models 10-12, Table 6.6. Supported 
for culpability in Model 11 
H6.3b: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or perceived 
culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate 
irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of irresponsibility (third quartile history 
of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate 
irresponsibility). 
Supported  Models 10-12, Table 6.6 
H6.4a: There is a significant and negative relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability 
and/or perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest 
history of corporate irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Not supported  Models 13-15, Table 6.7 
H6.4b: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or 
perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average 
history of corporate irresponsibility (second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of irresponsibility 
(third quartile history of corporate irresponsibility) and for firms with the least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of 
history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Partially 
supported 
Models 13-15, Table 6.7. Exceptions 
being effect undesirability and non-
complicity and culpability in Model 14 
and non-complicity in Model 15 
H6.5a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms with the greatest history of corporate 
irresponsibility (top quartile of history of corporate irresponsibility). 
Not supported  Model 16, Table 6.8 
H6.5b: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and 
affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average history of corporate irresponsibility 
(second quartile history of corporate irresponsibility), below-average history of irresponsibility (third quartile history of corporate 
irresponsibility) and for firms with the least history of corporate irresponsibility (bottom quartile of history of corporate 
irresponsibility). 
Supported 
Model 16, Table 6.8. There is a 
marginal effect present for firms with 
above average HI (yet, the effect is 
small). 
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Table 6.17: Summary of findings (continued) 
Hypotheses (Chapter 6 - part 2) Results  Comments/Other 
H6.6a: There is no significant relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation for firms 
with strong financial performance (top quartile of financial performance). 
Supported   Model 18, Table 6.10 
H6.6b: There is a significant and negative relationship between observed irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation 
for firms with above-average financial performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial 
performance (third quartile of financial performance) and low financial performance (fourth quartile of financial performance).  
Not supported  Model 18, Table 6.10 
H6.7a: There is no significant relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies (including; broad 
categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job losses) and 
changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance (top quartile of financial performance). 
Partially 
supported  
Models 19-25, Table 6.11-6.13. Exception 
being the significant and positive effect of 
child labour, product and service quality 
H6.7b: There is a significant and negative relationship between broad categories of irresponsibility and extant typologies 
(including; broad categories of irresponsibility, harm types, human injuries, human fatalities, deception, discrimination and job 
losses) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial performance (second quartile of financial 
performance), below-average financial performance (third quartile of financial performance) and for firms with the lowest 
financial performance (bottom quartile of financial performance). 
Partially 
supported  
Models 19-25, Table 6.11-6.13. Supported 
for anti-corruption, accounting, wages and 
working conditions, spills and pollution, 
ethics 
H6.8a: There is no significant relationship between combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or 
perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial 
performance (top quartile of financial performance). 
Supported   Models 26-28, Table 6.14 
H6.8b: There is a significant and negative relationship combined facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability and/or 
perceived culpability and/or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average 
financial performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial performance (third quartile of 
financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial performance (bottom quartile of financial performance). 
Not supported  
Models 26-28, Table 6.14. No significant 
effects were found 
H6.9a: There is no significant relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect undesirability or 
perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial 
performance (top quartile of financial performance). 
Supported   Models 29-31, Table 6.15 
H6.9b: There is a significant and negative relationship between individual facets of irresponsibility (namely, effect 
undesirability or perceived culpability or affected party non-complicity) and changes in corporate reputation for firms with 
above-average financial performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial performance (third 
quartile of financial performance) and for firms with the lowest financial performance (bottom quartile of financial 
performance). 
Partially 
supported  
Models 29-31, Table 6.15. Notable 
exception being the combined presence of 
culpability and non-complicity in Model 31 
H6.10a: There is no significant relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived culpability and 
affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms with strong financial performance (top quartile of 
financial performance). 
Supported   Model 32, Table 6.16 
H6.10b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the combined presence of effect undesirability, perceived 
culpability and affected party non-complicity and changes in corporate reputation for firms with above-average financial 
performance (second quartile of financial performance), below-average financial performance (third quartile of financial 
performance) and for firms with the lowest financial performance (bottom quartile of financial performance).  
Not supported  
Model 32, Table 6.16. No significant effects 
were found 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
7.1. Discussion  
This PhD thesis explored the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and reputation 
penalties by attending to a comprehensive analysis of event characteristics as well as a number 
of contingencies that shape the attributions stakeholders make in light of irresponsibility. This 
study modeled for the effects of both extant typologies and broad categories of irresponsibility 
on changes in corporate reputation - as well as more recent theoretical offerings from the 
attribution theory perspective (Lange and Washburn, 2012). In the later empirical chapters, this 
study also explored the position that reputational assessments are ‘path dependent’ (Mishina, 
Block and Mannor, 2012). To test this theory, I explored the possible contingencies within the 
relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate reputation by adding various 
contextual information regarding stakeholders’ prior beliefs (social responsibility reputation and 
celebrity status) and knowledge (history of corporate irresponsibility and financial performance). 
The aims of this study were threefold; (1) first, this research aimed to assess the relationship 
between distinct aspects of corporate irresponsibility and how stakeholders interpreted them (2) 
Second, to unpack how stakeholder’s prior beliefs influenced the process of social judgements 
and impressions formation. (3) Finally, this thesis aimed to understand the extent to which 
stakeholders reevaluate firm reputations in light of stakeholder knowledge. Due to the relative 
scope of these research aims, here I go on to discuss the some of the key findings of my 
exploration of the relationship between corporate irresponsibility and reputation penalties. 
In view of my overall findings, I find reputation updating appears to be only a relatively modest 
and infrequent phenomenon. Reputations therefore appear to be more resilient in the face of 
irresponsibility than previously thought, contradicting a long held assumption that reputation is a 
distinctly fragile asset (Koronis and Ponis, 2012; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Scott and Walsham, 
2005) and also the more recent notion that assessors have a distinct cognitive bias towards 
negative information (Gordon et al, 2008; Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom, 2010; Hanson and 
Mendius, 2009; Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012). Furthermore, irrespective of differences in 
firm attributes, incidents of a financial orientation – such as accounting controversies - appear to 
be more broadly impactful on reputations than social or environmentally oriented harms. 
Accounting irresponsibilities may undermine what may be considered the primary function of the 
organisation i.e. the accumulation and distribution of financial resources, which in turn, may 
have the most fundamental and far reaching effects on reputations. Additionally, another key 
finding of my research is that firm characteristics matter to the process of stakeholder 
attributions of irresponsibility. As a result, reputational penalties appear to be largely contingent 
upon - not only what firms ‘do’ - but also, what firms are thought of ‘being’.  
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Subsequently, my results show firms with the most populous histories of corporate 
irresponsibility are particularly prone to reputation penalties for events which - for the most part – 
tend not to be penalised. These events include environmental harms and issues concerning 
stakeholder equality. This may imply that rather than irresponsibility existing in isolation, 
stakeholder assessments of the firm and its behaviour is a more dynamic process achieved 
through multiple observations over time. In this manner, stakeholders may gather a ‘sense’ of 
whether the firm is a responsible or irresponsible actor by assessing its behaviour in different 
contexts and towards various stakeholder groups.  Finally, my research suggests that celebrity 
organisations are distinctly more vulnerable to reputation penalties when connected to acts of 
corporate irresponsibility in the media than non-celebrity firms. These findings are particularly 
interesting, as they largely contradict extant research which suggests celebrities to be shielded 
from the negative outcomes of irresponsibility (notably, Pfarrer, Pollock and Rindova, 2010). 
Consequently, my research finds evidence toward the seemingly more logical position that the 
enhanced capacity of celebrity firms to capture greater stakeholder attention may be a distinct 
disadvantage when the news about the firm is negative. Consequentially, these findings also 
imply a number of theoretical, practical and policy implications that will be discussed here in 
more detail. 
From a theoretical perspective, my empirical exploration of the attribution framework offered by 
Lange and Washburn (2012) compared to several extant typologies, suggests a number of 
conceptual implications for future work. Though the results presented here were somewhat 
mixed, the attribution framework of irresponsibility presented by Lange and Washburn (2012) 
was less effective overall than the broad categories of irresponsibility employed by much of the 
market-penalties research (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005). I attribute this to either a potential oversimplification of the 
model to only three core facets namely, ‘effect undesirability’, ‘perceived culpability’ and 
‘affected party non-complicity’ (Lange and Washburn, 2012) or a number of possible 
contingencies that were not considered here. Relatedly, the overarching finding of my PhD 
research - that reputations are more resilient in the face of irresponsibility than previously 
thought - may imply a process of stakeholder attribution which is shaped by a number of 
mediators. I specifically explored the mediating effect of stakeholder perceptions of the firm’s 
social responsibility and celebrity status, as well as more objective assessments of the 
organisation’s history of past offences and financial performance. In this way, my research finds 
some strong evidence to suggest that reputation penalties appear ‘path dependent’, in that 
assessors’ prior beliefs tend to shape how current events are interpreted (Mishina, Block and 
Mannor, 2012). Even so, there may be other potential contingencies that have not been 
explored in this study; such as the firm’s perceived innovativeness, brand value, environmental 
performance, as well as aspects of the business model or pricing strategy. For instance, an 
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interesting line of potential future questioning could be; do stakeholders attribute social 
irresponsibility to firms offering luxury goods and services more so than to low-cost providers? 
And are there greater reputation penalties associated with these? In this way, future research 
should empirically explore the remaining contingencies within the stakeholder attribution 
process, of which authors have already conceptualised a number of potential mediators at 
length (see Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011).  
Moreover, the broad finding that reputations appear more resilient than previously thought may 
also implicate a more complex process of stakeholder forgiving, forgetting or apathy which may 
account for why firms are often not penalised for irresponsible behaviour (Barnett, 2014). As the 
majority of reputation penalties research to date focuses on the immediate effects of 
irresponsibility on reputational change (e.g., Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; 
Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005), my longitudinal research suggests that 
measures of reputational assessments may be distinctly time-sensitive, as over time, assessors 
may forgive or even forget the behaviour of the firm. In this way, measures of reputation taken 
immediately after the event has occurred may not be representative of the reputation penalties 
phenomena because individuals, particularly shareholders, tend to overreact to news of 
corporate irresponsibility in the short term (Gillet et al, 2010). By using a longitudinal research 
strategy, I observe a very different effect of corporate irresponsibility on reputational change. 
One which appears significantly less impactful than previously assumed by research that utilised 
stock market proxies of reputation penalties. 
Relatedly, this research also implicates the potential importance of management of events. I 
highlight this point specifically because following the analysis, I found a number of incidents 
whereby the firm was associated with both corporate irresponsibility and reputational 
enhancements. Whilst this may appear counterintuitive, the crisis management literature has 
long suggested that firms which actively and successfully manage irresponsibility, may enhance 
their audience’s perception of the firm through a mechanism of affirming organisational 
commitment to their social responsibilities (Kash and Darling, 1998; Mitroff, 1994; Ulmer, 
Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). In this way, future research should elucidate the ways in which this 
mechanism impacts the relationship between irresponsibility and changes in corporate 
reputation and most importantly, assess which of the potential management and 
communications practices most effectively achieve this? 
Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that there may be some audience-specific effects 
associated with my research - in that the Fortune dataset utilised here evaluates only the views 
of managers and market analysts. Other stakeholders may respond differently to news of 
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irresponsibility. Future research should therefore assess the views of other relevant stakeholder 
groups when examining the effects of corporate irresponsibility on reputation penalties.  
Even so, the finding that reputations are more resilient than previously suggested (Koronis and 
Ponis, 2012; Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Scott and Walsham, 2005) 
has a number of practical implications. Whilst the management approach I advocated is one of 
caution, due to the ‘non-reputation’ penalties that may be associated with acts of corporate 
irresponsibility, celebrity organisations should be aware that the reputation penalties associated 
with corporate irresponsibility may be more substantial for them. Resultantly, celebrity 
organisations should be more proactive and prepared to allocate increased resources to the 
appropriate management of corporate irresponsibility, should the need arise. That being said, 
the main but controversial result of my research is that for the most part, irresponsibility is only 
infrequently associated with significant reputational impacts. This finding generally corroborates 
the many ‘real-life’ examples of corporate misconduct, where firms appear seemingly 
reputationally unharmed following widely publicised acts of corporate irresponsibility. From a 
policy and regulatory perspective, my research suggests that seldom do incidents which injure 
or fatally injure stakeholders, damage corporate reputations. The CSR literature has long stated 
that stakeholder expectations perform a ‘quasi-regulatory’ influence on organisations to behave 
more responsibly (Aguilera et al, 2007; Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012; Campbell, 2007). 
The logic being, that firms are encouraged to act responsibly in order to avoid the associated 
reputational costs of being found to have behaved objectionably. However, my results suggest 
that publics infrequently penalise firms for irresponsible behaviour. Therefore, the ‘quasi-
regulatory’ mechanism performed by reputation as suggested in the institutional theory strand of 
CSR research, may only play a marginal role in discouraging bad behaviour. In this way, more 
appropriate regulation may be advisable to promote better corporate social performance as well 
as to discourage irresponsibility, particularly for incidents that injure or fatally injure 
stakeholders. 
 
7.2. Conclusion 
By situating assessors at the center of the reputation penalties process and by measuring 
reputational change over a significant length of time, this research contrasts the majority of 
extant works on reputation penalties which utilise short-run stock market declines as a proxy for 
reputation damage (Alexander, 1999; Engelen and Essen, 2012; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005). I proposed that the conclusions drawn by the extant body of 
literature may be distinctly inaccurate because many ‘real-life’ examples of corporate 
irresponsibility are seemingly not associated with the significant decline in reputation (Alexander, 
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1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 
2009). More specifically, the thematic assumption that reputation is in some fundamental sense 
a fragile asset, jars with examples of corporate irresponsibility such as Apple’s price fixing of e-
books, the discrimination and exploitation controversies associated with Wal-Mart’s operations, 
the human rights abuses associated with Primark’s business model, the tax avoidance at 
Google, and so on. This doctoral thesis problematised the existing assumptions in the literature 
by exploring both alternative theoretical and methodological approaches to reputation penalties 
in light of observed irresponsibility. More specifically, this thesis models both extant typologies of 
irresponsibility and theories of attribution utilising large-scale survey data to longitudinally 
explore reputational change over time. The results of this empirical research suggest that 
irresponsibility may, in fact, only be associated with significant reputational decline under certain 
contextual circumstances.  
My findings suggest that issues of a financial orientation, specifically accounting controversies, 
tend to be associated with broad reputational effects. Yet, after further empirical exploration of 
the contingencies of various firm characteristics - namely perceptions of social responsibility, 
celebrity status, history of corporate irresponsibility and financial performance - I found evidence 
to suggest that reputation penalties may be shaped by pre-existing firm attributes and 
stakeholder perceptions. In this way, my research lends support to the position that reputational 
assessments are ‘path dependent’ (Mishina, Block and Mannor, 2012) in that reputational 
assessments tend to be shaped by assessors’ pre-existing beliefs and knowledge. My findings 
also highlight that celebrity firms may be distinctly vulnerable to reputational penalties in light of 
irresponsibility, in that enhanced celebrity status may be something of a ‘double-edged sword’.  
More specifically, being a distinctly prominent firm helps garnering greater stakeholder attention 
for positive business activities (Wartick, 1992) and greater stakeholder criticality when 
associated with negative ones. This said, I found that only some types of irresponsibility were 
significant under certain conditions. Contradicting the view of much of the market penalties 
literature. I also find that environmental events are associated with significant reputation 
penalties for firms with extensive histories of irresponsibility. This suggests that, this form of 
irresponsibility tends not to be penalised, unless the firm has already a propensity for 
irresponsibility.  
Moreover, my research implies that assessors may observe firm behaviour over time before 
arriving at negative conclusions about the firm’s character and/or capabilities. This finding is in 
line with a long history of observation in social psychology, which suggests that seldom do 
individuals update their perceptions when confronted with contradictory evidence (Asch, 1946; 
Darley and Gross, 1983; Fryer et al, 2013; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). This research 
explored incidents with potential for reputation updating to take place, though what I found 
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suggested that reputational assessments are fairly constant and that reputation updating may 
only be a marginal phenomenon. This result broadly conflicts with the majority of reputation 
penalties research to date (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 
2005; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009), yet this corpus of research has, historically, 
abstracted the ‘perceiver’ away from the process of reputation penalties. By adding ‘the 
perceiver’ back into analytical focus, I offer a potentially more accurate depiction of reputation 
penalties, one which suggests reputation is not as fragile as previously understood.  
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APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
*Full details available on request 
Traditional literature review methods have been identified as owning numerous problems, 
including a high degree of subjectivity and lack of generalizability (Mulrow, 1994). I instead 
adopt an archival - systematic review methodology. It has been argued that the systematic 
review method enhances objectivity and quality in the literature review process (Tranfield et al. 
2003). Although the methodology is not without flaws- such as the difficulties in synthesising 
data from different disciplines, the underrepresentation of books, and the production of large 
volumes of material to review (Pittaway et al. 2004) I felt that these drawbacks were 
compensated by having “clear goals, reproducibility, a broad and inclusive search based… 
incorporating a synthesized approach to organize the literature” (Walker, 2010; 358). The 
systematic review process broadly consists of a number of key steps; (1) identifying relevant 
literature and assessing its relevance and usefulness, (2) data extraction and processing, (3) 
and data analysis. I discuss the steps to my approach in turn. 
 
Literature Identification 
The first phase in the systematic review process is to identify relevant literature on both 
corporate reputation and crisis events. A primary obstacle arose from the breadth and 
contestation of both the terms “corporate reputation” and “crisis”. Corporate reputation is 
associated, and in many cases has been treated as substitutable, for a variety of other related 
phenomena. Rather than limiting the search solely to corporate reputation*, I included the 
related search terms; image, identity, prestig*, status, esteem*, and affect as a primary search 
term category. Throughout this paper I refer to ‘crisis’, ‘negative’, ‘harmful’, and ‘damaging’ 
events interchangeably. For the purposes of this paper I do not draw a distinction between these 
terms. We therefore articulate these terms to mean ‘any potential, current, or past event which 
threatens the corporate reputation of the firm’. My reasoning was to enable the systematic 
review process to broadly capture work related to corporate reputation during various negative 
contextual settings, examples of terms I included in my search include; crisis, negative*, harm*, 
damage*, stigma*, ruin*, corrupt*, malfeasance*. This process led to a total of 497 individual 
searches from the 7 primary and 71 secondary search terms identified. A link between each 
“Boolean” term was established by searching with an “AND” connecting each primary and 
secondary term.  
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I applied the search strategy outlined above initially to the databases; Web of Science and 
EBSCO Business Source Premier. The Web of Science was chosen because “it is one of the 
most comprehensive databases incorporating research from numerous disciplines” (Walker, 
2010: 359). However, this database does not include the subject specific journal Corporate 
Reputation Review and also the relevant publication Business & Society. Therefore, Business 
Source Premier was employed in order to capture any relevant literature that may have 
otherwise been overlooked. In addition, I also took measures to ensure I had captured the 
maximum potential articles for analysis, including manual searches in the databases Google 
Scholar and ProQuest. This strategy provided over 30,000 pieces of evidence for my initial 
sample. 
Refining this work began firstly by removing the duplicate literature from my consideration set. 
This removed nearly a third of the total articles from my database. Secondly, I identified work 
that had no relevance to my research. More specifically, I refined the sample on the basis of the 
following exclusion criteria; (1) papers focused on anything other than an organisational crisis or 
negative events, (2) literature which defined the primary search term as anything other than 
broadly a socially constructed phenomenon assembled from stakeholder evaluations of the firm, 
(3) used the primary search term tangentially, and (4) literature in which the primary search term 
was not the focal interest of the study. Leaning on the side of inclusion, the criteria was tested 
on 100 articles to ensure agreement and reliability of exclusion. The remaining of the 
approximately 8,000 papers was then reviewed in more detail. I then employed the criteria 
outlined above to an examination of each remaining paper’s title, abstract and key words. This 
assisted the discovery of irrelevant topics, such as the reputations of individuals, and stimulatory 
treatment of reputation in game theoretic conditions. If more information was necessary to make 
a judgment, I went further into the article itself. This stage of the research, whilst labour 
intensive, resulted in 169 papers which specifically addressed my line of inquiry.  
 
Data Extraction 
The second step of a systematic review involves extracting and processing the data. Tranfield 
(2003) proposed that this step should involve the development of a standardised process to 
reduce author subjectivity. In light of this, I developed a detailed data-extraction form. The pro 
forma included a mixture of quantitative and qualitative coding variables, ranging from those 
assisting the identification of basic information, such as the name of the author(s), the title, year 
of publication, Google Scholar citations, to the more specific attributes of the literature itself, for 
instance; the epistemological orientation of the paper, the broad methodological approach, the 
types of stakeholder(s) studied, and so on. I developed the coding framework with a number of 
key objectives in mind; I wanted to reflect the nature of corporate reputation and harm events in 
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use, including the numerous theoretical components of the phenomena, as well their 
operationalization, results, and any prescriptive managerial advice. I therefore developed the 
pro-forma after extensive consideration of these elements. This resulted in a detailed 901 pages 
long Microsoft Excel document consisting of 146 quantitative and qualitative variables.  
 
Data Analysis 
Once a primary grid was constructed, I was in a position to begin various analyses. Both 
quantitative and qualitative features were systematically extracted from the sample. Where the 
coding process had identified numerical features, a quantitative analysis of frequencies and 
patterns were employed for comparison. This method assisted the research in reflecting the 
core features of the extant literature. However, given the aims of the research was both to 
consolidate knowledge regarding the specific management practices of reputational issues 
during negative events, and also to highlight the underlying assumptions of the literature, I 
designed-in a level of flexibility, allowing the researchers to extract salient features of the 
literature as they developed. 
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APPENDIX 2: OVERVIEW OF REPUTATION PENALTIES LITERATURE 
 
Figure 1: Publications by Year 
 
 
 
Table 1: Frequent Publications 
Position (joint position) Publication Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
    
1  (1) Corporate Reputation Review 27         16 
2  (2) Journal of Public Relations 
Research 
9 5.3 
3  (2) Public Relations Review 9 5.3 
4  (3) Journal of Business Ethics 6 3.6 
5  (3) Strategy & Leadership 6 3.6 
6  (4) Journal of Management Studies         4         2.4 
7  (4) Journal of Business Strategy 4 2.4 
8  (4) Reputation Capital 4 2.4 
9  (5) Organization Science 3 1.8 
10  (5) Journal of Communication 
Management 
3 1.8 
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Figure 2: Contribution of the literature overview 
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Table 2: Examples of the Thematic Assumption that Reputations are Fragile  
Quotation Type Author(s) Exemplar Quote(s) 
   
Explicit  Koronis & Ponis, 2012: 283 “Given the fragile nature and complexity of the reputation 
concept…” 
 Scandizzo, 2011: 46 “Events can tarnish reputation” –  
“An otherwise trivial event has a hugely negative impact” 
 Minor & Morgan, 2011: 40 “…reputation can be a fragile thing.” 
 Schwartz, 2000: 4  “It takes a long time to build a reputation, but it can be 
destroyed overnight in a single event.” 
  
Eccles, Newquist & Schatz, 2007:  
104 
Eccles, Newquist & Schatz, 2007:  
110 
 
“organisations are especially vulnerable to anything that 
damages their reputations” –  
“a company’s reputation is also vulnerable…”  
 Raithel, Wilczynski, Schloderer & 
Schwaiger, 2010: 390 
“reputation is very fragile because it can be damaged very 
easily overnight (Hall, 1993)”  
 Bebbington, Larrinaga & Moneva, 
2008: 339 
“At the same time, Scott and Walsham (2005,p.312) note that 
reputation takes “time to create, cannot be brought and is 
easily damaged” 
 Hayes & Patton, 2010: 37 “reputation can be severely damaged in a few days as a result 
of an unexpected crisis.” 
 Sims, 2009: 455 ‘‘Executives say it takes 20 years to build a positive 
reputation, but you can destroy it in 30 s’’ (Botelho, 2004). 
Gaines- Ross (2008a) has recently echoed this view in 
suggesting that the recent corporate crises show that a 
company’s reputation can be destroyed in seconds.” 
   
Implicit Hoeken, 1998: 51 “Negative publicity in newspapers can cause severe and 
lasting damage to a company's corporate reputation.” 
 Garcia & Hart, 2007: 51 “company reputations are often just one determined blogger 
away from crisis.” 
   
 Tucker & Melewar, 2005: 377 “Advances in technology and communication have 
rendered corporate reputations more vulnerable than 
ever to criticism and attack…” 
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Table 3: Examples of the Thematic Assumption of Significant Performance Deficiencies 
Quotation Type Author(s) Exemplar Quote(s) 
   
Explicit  
Neufeld, 2007: 38 
 
Neufeld, 2007: 40 
“Incurring reputational damage can be fatal” 
 
“Negative risks lead to loss of reputation, loss of market 
share, financial losses and, sometimes, as in the case of 
Arthur Andersen, for instance, the demise of the company” 
 
Thießen, 2009: 215 
 
Thießen, 2009: 220 
“Once lost, rebuilding reputation is more like a marathon 
than a sprint, and it may take many years to recover.”-  
“recovering from crises that hit reputation takes time – often 
many years” 
 
Resnick, 2004: 30 
“It is clear that public missteps resulting in the loss of 
confidence and trust among investors, analysts, customers 
or other stakeholders are understood to be potentially 
devastating to the long-term survival of a business” 
 
Eisenegger, 2009: 16 
“positions of power sooner or later become fragile once 
reputations sustain significant damage.” 
 
Firestein, 2006: 25 
“Stock price can always come back. Business strategies can 
always be changed. But when an organization’s reputation is 
gravely injured, its recovery is difficult, long-term, and 
uncertain. A risk to its reputation is a threat to the survival of 
the enterprise.”  
   
 
Gaultier-Gaillard & Louisot, 2006: 
425 
 
Gaultier-Gaillard & Louisot, 2006: 
430 
“Reputation is an intangible asset that directly affects the 
market value of the firm.”  
 
“‘‘bad reputation’’ has negative consequences and a 
downside impact on the value of the firm to stockholders.” 
 Pekka, 2010: 44 
“The loss of reputation affects competitiveness, local 
positioning, the trust and loyalty of stakeholders, media 
relations, and the legitimacy of operations, even the license 
to exist.” 
 
De Blasio, & Veale, 2009: 75 
“Organizational crises can have devastating consequences 
to reputation, an important, intangible asset that can threaten 
an organization’s long term viability.” 
Implicit 
Fombrun, Gardberg & Barnett, 
2000: 87 
“damaged reputation manifests itself in impoverished 
revenues, decreased ability to attract financial capital, and 
reduced appeal to current and potential employees.” 
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APPENDIX 3: LexisNexis search terms for EVENT CATEGORIES 
Table 4: LexisNexis search terms for events 
EVENT TYPE KEY WORD SEARCH TERMS 
EVENT 
1_Management 
compensation 
executive pay or executive compensation or executive salaries or executive bonuses or bonus 
or bonuses or compensation package and controversial or controversy or scandal or 
scandalous or unethical or giant or uproar or outcry or anger or angered or attacked or 
attacking 
 
EVENT 2_Shareholder 
rights 
investor rights or investors right or shareholder rights or shareholders rights or shareholder 
activism or shareholder revolt or shareholders revolt or shareholders angry or shareholders 
angered or rights of shareholders or shareholders fight or feud with shareholders or 
shareholder feud or feud with investors or investor feud 
 
EVENT 3_Earnings  
EVENT 4_Insider 
trading 
insider trading or insider dealing or insider deals or insider dealings or stock options backdating 
or backdating stock options 
 
EVENT 5_Accounting 
accounting fraud or fraudulent accounting or accounting controversy or false accounting or 
cooking the books or creative accounting or misrepresentation of accounts or stock options 
investigation or investigating stock options or stock options backdating or backdating stock 
options 
 
EVENT 
6_Customer/Consumer 
consumer complaints or customer complaints or consumers complained or customers 
complained or consumers deceived or customers deceived or consumer controversy or 
overcharging customers or overcharging consumers or overcharging customers or 
overcharging consumers or angry customers or consumer anger or consumers angry or 
customers angry or price hikes or price hike or exploiting customers or exploiting consumers or 
consumer rights 
 
customers injured or consumers injured or customers hurt or consumers hurt or consumers 
concerned or customers concerned or consumer concerns or customer concerns or customers 
health or consumer safety or consumers safety or customer safety or customer safety or 
personal injuries or personal injuries or “product safety issue” or “product safety issues”  
 
deceptive marketing or deceptive adverting or consumer deception or customer deception or 
deceived customers or deceived consumers or false advertising or false marketing  or labelling 
or label or misleading or warn consumer or warn customers or product warning 
 
EVENT 7_Product and 
service quality 
poor service or poor quality or quality issue or quality issues or product quality or products 
quality or unnecessary product or unnecessary products or fault or faulty or unsafe 
 
EVENT 8_Spills and 
pollution 
pollution or spill or spills or environment and accident or cleanup or clean up or clean-up or 
harm or damage or harmed or damaged or catastrophe or catastrophic or controversy or 
scandal or litigation or sued or suit or violated or violations or violating or violates or breach or 
breaches or breached or investigation 
 
biodiversity or wildlife and litigation or accused or damage or harm or harmed or damaged or 
disaster or crisis or controversy or controversial or litigation or suit or sued or suing or 
settlement or settle or settles or devastation or devastated   
 
EVENT 9_Product 
recalls 
product recall or defective product or faulty product or dangerous product or product dangerous 
or voluntary recall or voluntarily recalled or issues a recall or issued a recall or issuing a recall 
 
EVENT 10_Intellectual 
property  
intellectual property or infringement and litigation or sued or suit or settlement or settle or 
settling or court or suing or appeal or appealed or accused or accusing or accuse or dispute 
 
EVENT 11_Public 
health 
toxic or public health or health concerns or safety concerns or public safety or personal 
litigation or personal damages  
 
EVENT 12_Taxation 
tax fraud or tax evasion or evading tax or evaded tax or unpaid tax or unpaid taxes or "not paid 
tax" or "has not paid its taxes" 
 
EVENT 13_Anti-
corruption 
anti-competition or antitrust or anti-competitive or anticompetition or price fixing 
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Table 4: LexisNexis search terms for EVENT CATEGORIES (continued) 
 
  
EVENT TYPE KEY WORD SEARCH TERMS 
EVENT 14_Human 
rights 
controversy or controversial or sued or suit or suing or settled or settles or settle or unethical or 
unethically or fraudulently or fraud or stolen or stole or bribe or bribed or allegations or unlawful 
or illegal or illegally or distrust or immoral or immorally or deceived or deceive or deceiving or 
fined or deception or manipulated or scandal or investigated or probe or investigation or crime 
 
EVENT 15_Child 
labour  
Child labour or child labor or exploit or exploitative or underage or minimum age or “child labour 
violations” or “child labour questioned” or “child labor questioned” or endangered children  
EVENT 16_Freedom 
of association 
Right to join a group or right to leave a group or right to take collective action or right to pursue 
interests of member or freedom of association violated or right to join a group violated or 
peaceful protest or right to protest 
EVENT 17_Diversity 
and opportunity 
social exclusion or socially exclusive or social exclusivity or excluded groups or excludes groups 
or diversity or discrimination or discriminated or discriminate or discriminates or excluded or 
excludes or inequality or treated unequally or treated unfairly 
 
EVENT 18_Wages 
and working 
conditions  
workers wages or employees wages or workers earnings or employees earnings or employees 
salaries or workers salaries or working conditions or employee compensation or worker 
compensation or employees compensation or workers compensation or workers protested or 
worker protest or employees protested or employee protest or strike or striking or strikes or 
redundancies or redundancy or job cuts or cut number of jobs or axed or trade union or trade 
unions 
 
EVENT 19_Employee 
health and safety 
employee injuries or employee injured or employees injured or workers injured or worker injured 
or employees die or employees died or workers died or workers die or employees hospitalized or 
workers hospitalized or employee hospitalized or worker hospitalized or employee compensation 
or worker compensation or safety violations or violated safety or safety scrutinized or "health and 
safety violations" or "health and safety questioned" or "health and safety incident" or workplace 
accidents or endangered workers or endangered workforce or endangered employees 
 
EVENT 20_Ethics unethical or scandal or controversy or controversial or controversially or fraud or fraudulent or 
fraudulently or deception or deceived or manipulated  
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APPENDIX 4: LexisNexis search terms for HARM typologies  
 
Table 5: Search terms for HARM typologies  
SECONDARY 
(HARM EVENTS) 
   
Crisis Dishonest* Ill-treat* 
Crises Mistrust* Shatter* 
Harm* Distrust* Undermine* 
Hurt Outrage* Tarnish* 
Damag* Suspici* Victim* 
Negative* Threat* Wound* 
Wrong-doing* Scandal* Distort* 
Bad* Prevent* Foul* 
Accident* Injure* Recall 
Revelation* Abuse* Weak* 
Violen* Misuse* Wrong* 
Breach* Cheat* Malevolen* 
Blame* Discredit* Malfeasan* 
Misconduct* Mistreat* Shame* 
Misdeed* Tamper* Break 
Fraud* Misrepresent* Broke* 
Deception Offend* Benevolen* 
Deceive* Prosecut* Malic* 
Accuse* Ruin* Repercussion* 
Accusa* Shock* Consequenc* 
Violat* Spoil* Sabotage* 
Catastroph* Disaster* Urgen* 
Restatement Loss* Detriment* 
Risk* Penalt*  
   
 
 
